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Earth Day has passed, but its passions have marked our law in deep
and abiding ways. Statutes passed in the early 1970s did more than
commit hundreds of billions of dollars to the cause of environmental
protection in the decades ahead.' They also represent part of a com-
plex effort by which the present generation is revising the system of
administrative law inherited from the New Deal. The rise of environ-
mental consciousness in the late 1960s coincided with the decline of
an older dream-the image of an independent and expert administra-
tive agency creatively regulating a complex social problem in the public
interest. When Congress reacted to Earth Day, it set about to do more
than clean the water and purify the air; it also sought a new shape for
the administrative process-one that would avoid the use of "expertise"
as an excuse for inaction and that would protect agencies from capture
by special interests. It is a decade now since Congress began to articulate
this new vision of administrative law-long enough for us to begin to
test its aspirations against concrete results. In this spirit, we propose
to sift a decade's experience generated by one of the countless experi-
ments in administrative lawmaking written into the Clean Air Amend-
ments of 1970.2 We seek to understand how decisionmakers perceived,
defined, and solved problems in the evolving framework of environ-
mental regulation, so that we may begin to distinguish experiments in
administrative design that have succeeded from those that have failed.
Beyond this, our study also focuses upon a crucial substantive policy
issue: the future of the coal-burning power plant. At present, such
plants contribute forty-eight percent of all electric power produced in
the United States.3 This share will grow over the next half century.4
With oil scarce, nuclear risky, solar embryonic, and hydro limited, the
nation's rich and cheap coal reserves call for exploitation. 5 At the same
1. The total annual cost of air and water pollution abatement in 1978 alone was
S39.5 billion, 10 U.S. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, ANN. REP.: ENVIRONMENTAL
QuALiTY-1979 at 667 (1979). The CEQ estimates that air and water pollution control costs
will amount to $588 billion between 1970 and 1987. Id.
2. Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857b-18571 (1976)) (amend-
ed 1977). The original Clean Air Act, Pub. L. No. 84-157, 69 Stat. 314 (1955), has been
amended numerous times since its initial passage. The term "Act" will be used in text and
notes to refer to the version of the Clean Air Act that is contextually relevant at that
point in the essay.
3. 2 U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADmIN., ANN. REP. TO CONGRESS 135 (1979) (1979 figures).
4. COAL-BRIDGE TO THE FUTURE: REPORT OF THE WORLD COAL STUDY 245 (C. Wilson ed.
1980).
5. See id. at 61-83 (global prospects); Cf. ENERGY FUTURE: REPORT OF THE ENERGY PROJECT
AT THE HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL (R. Stobaugh & D. Yergin eds. 1979). The Stobaugh
and Yergin report strongly advocates increased use of alternative energy sources, such as
solar energy. Id. at 216-33 (favoring "balanced" energy program). Nevertheless, it pre-
dicts a large and increasing role for the use of coal. Id. at 232-33. For a balanced
critique of the Stobaugh and Yergin study that gives even greater emphasis to coal, see
Joskow, America's many energy futures-a review of Energy Future, Energy: The Next
Twenty Years, and Energy in America's Future, 11 BELL J. ECON. 377, 383-84 (1980).
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time, coal burning generates its own environmental costs. Coal-fired
power plants are major sources of several pollutants; currently they
are the single most important source of sulfur oxides. 6 As a result, the
control of new coalburners has gradually emerged as one of the most
pressing questions confronting the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA), leading it, in June of 1979, to revise the "new source perfor-
mance standards" (NSPS) it would impose upon sulfur emissions from
new coal-burning power plants.7 Environmentalists and the utility in-
dustry have challenged the new NSPS in litigation currently before the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.8
A careful analysis of the EPA's decision will reveal the way our in-
stitutions are resolving a critical environmental trade-off generated by
the energy crisis. We have concluded that Congress' well-intentioned
effort in 1970 to improve environmental quality through an improved
administrative process has led, in 1979, to an extraordinary agency
decision that will cost the public tens of billions of dollars to achieve
environmental goals that could be reached more cheaply, more quick-
ly, and more surely by other means. Indeed, the agency action is so
inept that some of the nation's most populous areas will enjoy a worse
environment than would have resulted if the new policy had never
been put into effect." Yet the people who shaped the 1979 decision
are remarkable for their high intelligence and conscientiousness. Their
failure to make sensible policy is a symptom of organizational, not
personal, breakdown-a failure to give decisionmakers bureaucratic
incentives to ask the hard questions raised by any serious effort to
control the environment. Thus, to understand the decision, we must
do more than outline the substance of the environmental problem
and the administrative response. We must address broader questions
raised by the framework in which Congress, agencies, courts, and
special interest groups interacted to form and implement policy.
Our story begins with the way Congress set about regulating the
6. In 1976, power plants produced 65% of the sulfur oxides, 29% of the nitrogen
oxides, and 25% of the particulates emitted in the United States. EPA, 1976 NATIONAL
EMtISSIONS REPORT vii (1979) (EPA Pub. No. 450/4-79-019).
7. 44 Fed. Reg. 33,580-624 (1979) (codified in 40 C.F.R. § 60.43a (1979)). The con-
troversy surrounding the 1979 NSPS has already generated a modest literature. See, e.g.,
ENERGY: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS 378-81 (Ford Foundation 1979); Navarro, The Politics
of Air Pollution, PUB. INTEREsT, Spring 1980, at 36; Badger, New Source Standard for
Power Plants I: Consider the Costs, 3 HARV. ENVT'L L. REv. 48 (1980); Ayres & Doniger,
New Source Standard for Power Plants II: Consider the Law, 3 HARv. ENVT'L L. REv. 63
(1980). Although we agree with many points made by Navarro, Badger, and the Ford
group, none of these studies attempts a comprehensive analysis of the decision's merit or
an institutional analysis of the decision's decade-long development.
8. Sierra Club v. Costle, No. 79-1565 (D.C. Cir., filed June 11, 1979).
9. See pp. 1515-36 infra.
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environment in 1970. Rather than consigning new power plants to the
discretion of an independent expert agency idealized by New Deal
theory, Congress tried to play a more aggressive role in policymaking.
There are many different ways, however, that Congress could have
tried to direct agency policy; indeed, it will be a principal purpose of
this case study to isolate the agency-forcing statute as a legal form
worthy of careful study in its own right. In its eagerness to move
beyond New Deal ideals, the Congress of 1970 hit upon a form of
agency forcing that replaces familiar New Deal maladies with new,
but hardly less serious, diseases. The EPA responded to Congress'
primitive effort at agency forcing by creating a regulatory universe
only tangentially related to environmental realities. It treated the
power plant problem as if it were an engineering exercise insulated
from critical ecological and economic issues.
After setting the bureaucratic stage, we trace the way the coalburner
rose to the surface of congressional deliberations in 1976 and 1977,
when the legislature was obliged to confront the consequences of its
earlier exercises in aggressive policymaking. We then compare this
post-New Deal process of congressional amendment with a viewpoint
commended by New Deal ideals-one that focuses on the relationship
between economic costs and ecological benefits promised by alternative
regulatory policies. Having contrasted the competing decisionmaking
perspectives, we can begin to appreciate the perplexities the EPA
confronted in 1977-when it attempted to place its expertise at the
service of a new congressional exercise in agency forcing enacted as
part of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977. At this point, the
conflict between administrative philosophies took institutional form,
as different parts of the executive bureaucracy reacted differently to
the congressional effort to move beyond the New Deal. It is only in the
light of this bureaucratic struggle that the EPA Administrator's 1979
decision becomes more understandable, if not more rational.
Our study concludes by exploring the larger implications of the EPA's
decision for the future of administrative law. We try to identify an
appropriate role for courts that are called upon to resolve the per-
plexities generated by agency forcing. We then shift focus from judicial
review to legislative reform. Congress was not wrong in hoping to move
beyond New Deal ideals in 1970; it is imperative, however, that its early
efforts in agency forcing be replaced by statutory structures that promise
a more fruitful dialogue between politicians and technocrats in the
decade ahead.
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I. Beyond the New Deal Agency
Imagine that Earth Day had fallen a generation earlier-when Frank-
lin Roosevelt, rather than Richard Nixon, was in the White House.
In response to a sense of crisis, the President asserts that the environ-
ment deserves a New Deal and turns to his Brain Trust for a legislative
remedy. How would the New Deal have sought to transform the
environmental impulse into a legal reality?
A. The New Deal Ideal
We shall isolate three distinct, if interrelated, elements of the New
Deal answer.' 0 The first is the affirmation of expertise." Understanding
the environment, after all, is an exceedingly technical business requir-
ing the coordination of a bewildering variety of specialties ranging
from ecology to engineering to economics. The centual task is to create
a structure capable of deploying the varieties of relevant expert
knowledge. Without a deep understanding of the scientific and social
facts, there can be no hope of defining an intelligent solution to the
chronic problems of a complex and interdependent society. In affirming
the need for expertise, however, we should not be blind to the failures
of particular experts. Most important is the problem of obsolescence-
science marches on, new facts emerge, new theories evolve. Al-
though an administrative agency may not be at the frontier of research,
at the very least it should keep up with the consensus of informed
opinion. This means that the ideal agency may, from time to time, be
required to change course dramatically to take into account new in-
sights generated by the best available knowledge. Such flexibility is
absolutely essential if the agency is to free itself from ideas that no
longer illuminate the changing reality it seeks to regulate.
Two institutional corollaries follow from the affirmation of expertise.
The first is agency insulation from central political control.'2 At the
very best, detailed congressional instruction would freeze existing ex-
pert consensus into black letter law, thereby making it harder to cope
10. Although these principles have deep roots in American history, see M. BERNSTEIN,
REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION 26-30, 37-39, 50-52 (1955), we follow
the most thoughtful recent scholarship in viewing the New Deal as the period in which
these ideals gained the most practical importance and intellectual support. See J. FREEDMAN,
CRISIS AND LErrTiMACy 32-33, 44-46, 59-60 (1978) (conception of New Deal ideal broadly
consistent with model described in this article); Stewart, The Reformation of American
Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1676-81 (1975) (same); cf. J. LANDIS, THE AD-
MINISTRATIVE PRoCFSS 23-24, 68-70 (1938) (contemporary account of New Deal ideals).
11. See J. FREEDMAN, supra note 10, at 44-46.
12. See id. at 59-62.
1471
The Yale Law Journal
with the problem of obsolescence. Moreover, there is little reason to
expect the very best. In the words of James Landis, the most thoughtful
New Deal theorist, "[t]hose with experience in legislative matters ...
recognize that it is easier to plot a way through a labyrinth of detail
when it is done in the comparative quiet of a[n agency] conference
room than when it is attempted amid the turmoil of a legislative
chamber or committee room."' s Rather than tying the agency's hands
with a host of particular rules and detailed instructions, Congress
should content itself with the most general kinds of policy guidance.
By restricting itself to the role of Polonius, Congress gives evidence
of a self-conscious awareness of its institutional incompetence. Instead
of imposing a hard and fast solution on a complex and changing
problem, the legislature should instead invite the agency to organize
the expert knowledge required for intelligent regulation. To imple-
ment this goal, Congress should try to insulate the agency from other
sources of power that might overwhelm its deepening understanding
of the policy problem. By making the agency "independent" from the
executive, 14 and by endowing it with multiple commissioners,'; the
New Deal makes it difficult for a momentary national impulse to place
its mark on the course of agency policy. An even more extreme form
of insulation is provided by "cooperative federalism." Here, the
states, operating under loose federal supervision, are asked to design
a program responsive to th peculiarities of local conditions. 6
13. J. LANDIS, supra note 10, at 69-70.
14. We use the term "independent agency" to include those agencies whose heads
the President cannot remove without cause. See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND
GovERNMENT 16 (2d ed. 1975). Prominent independent agencies include the Interstate Com-
merce Commission (founded in 1887), the Federal Trade Commission (1914), the Federal
Communications Commission (1934), the Securities and Exchange Commission (1934), and
the Civil Aeronautics Board (1938). Id.
15. See id. at 17.
16. Although the states have often been celebrated as "laboratories" of innovation and
experiment, there is a pervasive ambiguity concerning the kind of local conditions to
which they are expected to respond. On the one hand, the states may be viewed as
political bodies that ought to be responsive to local values and constituencies slighted in
national politics. On the other hand, the states may be viewed merely as convenient
repositories for expert bureaucracies with superior sensitivity to local contexts. Although
both these views support insulation from the vagaries of national politics, they diverge
in their affirmative recommendations. For a sensitive treatment of the tension, see Stewart,
Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating State Implementation of
National Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196, 1211-22 (1977); for a sensitive legally-oriented study
of the tensions generated by "cooperative" structures, see Mashaw, The Legal Structure
of Frustration: Alternative Strategies for Public Choice Concerning Federally Aided High-
way Construction, 122 U. PA. L. Rav. 1 (1973); for critical views from other disciplines,
see J. PRESSMAN & A. WILDAVSKY, IMPLEMENTATION 87-124 (1973); Rose-Ackerman, Risk-
taking and Reelection: Does Federalism Promote Innovation? 9 J. LEGAL STuD. (forth-
coming June 1980).
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Not that insulation is ever conceived as complete. Through the
power over agency appointments and appropriations, sustained shifts
in national values are expressed over time. Agency policymaking,
however, is not to be subordinated to every blip in national opinion;
the agency is, first and foremost, to be responsive to the evolving
complexity of the substantive problem it confronts.
But the New Deal agency is not only to be insulated from national
politics; it is also to be insulated from judicial oversight. The over-
riding aim of administrative law is to discourage the courts from
displacing expert policy judgments by their own legalistic readings of
the statute.17 Thus, judicial review focuses on questions that promise
to support the use of expertise-most notably, did the agency give
serious consideration to all the relevant data and arguments?' 8 Beyond
this, the courts are to restrain the temptation to second-guess agency
decisions, striking down only those rare cases of arbitrary or capricious
action that patently belied the myth of expertise. 9
If Earth Day had fallen in the late thirties, then, one might imagine
the Brain Trust advancing a familiar congressional remedy to a new
social dis-ease. Congress should create an "independent" agency con-
sisting of five commissioners-no more than three from the same
party-to take on the enormous regulatory task. After sagely instructing
the commissioners to preserve the integrity of nature, the health of
the citizenry, and the prosperity of the economy, the statute should
leave the commission on its own as it seeks to define a sound environ-
mental policy. Rather than giving concrete policy guidance, the statute
should diffuse political direction yet further by delegating vast areas
of policymaking to the states.
Legalism should be kept to the periphery. Doubtless, there must be
some guarantee that interested parties can obtain a hearing before the
commissioners impose cleanup burdens upon them. Doubtless, in-
dustry will try to tie the commission's hands by making these hearings
as long and complicated-and as court-like-as possible. Yet the courts
17. See FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Go., 509 U.S. 134, 138-44 (1940) (Frankfurter,
J.); J. FREEDMAN, supra note 10, at 45-46.
18. 2 K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE § 16.05 (1st ed. 1958) (requirement that
agency state findings and reasons); 4 id. §§ 29.02, 29.03 ("substantial evidence" review on
record as a whole).
19. See S. BREYER 9. R. STEwART, ADM1INISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 288-90
(1979). A single paragraph cannot, of course, do justice to the complexity of the thought
of scholars and judges who gave substance to this conception of administrative law, or to
the countervailing tendencies that hid beneath its surface. Reading a few hundred pages,
selected at random, from one of the great treatises of the last generation is the best way
to gain a sense of the texture of the discourse. See K. DAvis, supra note 18; L. JAFFE,
JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION (1965).
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should support the expert agency's effort to resist these tendencies-
giving affected parties their constitutional due without depriving the
agency of policymaking flexibility.20
B. A New Generation Confronts the New Deal
But Earth Day did not fall during the Great Depression. By the
late sixties, a generation's experience had eroded New Deal confidence
in expert policymaking.21 Two themes may be detected in the emerg-
ing chorus of criticism. The first, more conservative, line of attack did
not directly assault the New Deal affirmation of expertise. Instead, it
asserted that the agencies had somehow failed to make use of their
broad rulemaking powers to engage in creative policymaking in the
public interest. They had relapsed instead into the old lawyer-ridden
ways of case-by-case adjudication, laboring mightily through procedural
labyrinths without successfully defining basic directions for future
regulation.22 Rather than becoming a home for dedicated experts, the
independent commission seemed a revoling door for lawyers hoping
to gain inside experience that could later be cashed out in lucrative
private practice.23 Rather than encouraging an impartial search for
the public interest, the collegial structure of the independent agency
mired would-be policymakers in collective indecision.2 4 These criti-
cisms of agency performance merged, sometimes imperceptibly, into
a more radical critique of the New Deal ideal itself. This line of
attack saw expertise as a myth concealing the inevitability of hard
value choices, political insulation as a screen concealing the capture
of the agency by special interests.2
5
Such critiques generated a predictable set of proposed remedies. On
the one hand, there was an increasingly impatient demand that the
agencies finally redeem their New Deal promise by generating clear
standards through creative rulemaking. 2 On the other hand, there
20. See Verkuil, The Emerging Concept of Administrative Procedure, 78 CoLum. L. REv.
258, 281-84 (1978).
21. See, e.g., T. LowI, THE END OF LIBERALISM (1969); PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY COUNCIL
ON EXECUTIVE ORGANIZATION, A NEW REGULATORY FRAMEWORK (1971) (the "Ash Council"
report); Cutler & Johnson, Regulation and the Political Process, 84 YALE L.J. 1395,
1395-98 (1975) (citing other sources).
22. M. BERNSTEIN, supra note 10, at 180-82; PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY COUNCIL ON EXECUTIVE
ORGANIZATION, supra note 21, at 49.
23. M. BERNSTEIN, supra note 10, at 185; L. KOHLM EIER, THE REGULATORS 73 (1969).
24. PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY COUNCIL ON EXECUTIVE ORGANIZATION, supra note 21, at 34-43.
25. See, e.g., M. BERNSTEIN, supra note 10, at 155-60; T. LoWvI, supra note 21, at 72-93;
J. SAx, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT 52-56, 60-62, 107 (1970) (environmental area).
26. H. FRIENDLY, THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 142-47 (1960); PRESIDENT'S AD-
VISORY COUNCIL ON EXECUTIVE ORGANIZATION, supra note 21, at 34-35.
1474
Vol. 89: 1466, 1980
Beyond the New Deal
was an increasing temptation to tinker with the institutional corol-
laries associated with the New Deal ideal. If existing agencies did
not redeem New Deal ideals, perhaps some creative legislative or ju-
dicial responses would make a difference.
27
Responding to the prevailing sense of unease, both courts and
legislatures began experimenting with a wide variety of different-
sometimes contradictory-solutions that promised to fill the legitimacy
gap that had opened before them.28 Environmental law proved to be
especially fertile ground for these proliferating experiments. 2 9 When
legal activists tried to give their environmental hopes statutory expres-
sion in the early seventies, their concrete experiences gave added point
to the growing suspicion of New Deal models amongst the American
establishment.30 Before 1970, environmental protection was principally
a matter for the states, rather than the federal government; and when
environmentalists surveyed the state scene, the agencies they observed
seemed to parody New Deal hopes. The typical state agency was so
understaffed that it could not even pretend to understand the environ-
ment it was trying to regulate.31 Although state agencies frequently took
27. See, e.g., H. FRIENDLY, supra note 26, at 13-14, 163-73 (need for increased specificity
in legislative definition of agency goals); Sive, Some Thoughts of an Environmental Lawyer
in the Wilderness of Administrative Law, 70 COLUm. L. REv. 612, 614-19 (1970) (advocat-
ing increased judicial scrutiny of administrative actions). Once again, we have not tried
to detail the trends we have described in all their complexity. For an excellent survey
of the regulatory reform movement in all its aspects, see ABA COMM'N ON LAW AND
THE ECONOMY, FEDERAL REGULATION: ROADS TO REFORM (1979).
28. See, e.g., United States v. Florida East Coast Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224, 240-42 (1973)
(ratification of less formal agency procedures); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v.
Federal Power Comm'n, 354 F.2d 608, 620-25 (2d Cir. 1965) (remand to conduct more de-
tailed proceedings). See generally I K. DAvIs, ADMINISTRATivE LAW TREATISE § 6.1 (2d ed.
1978) (applauding widespread judicial innovation during 1970s in review of agency rule-
making).
Congressional approaches have varied from attempts to influence regulation by sup-
plementing the information considered by regulators, see, e.g., National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1969) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-
4347 (1976)), to the direct specification of technical standards, see, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 2001-
2012 (1976) (automotive fuel efficiency standards), to phased deregulation, see, e.g., Airline
Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (1978) (to be codified at 49
U.S.C. §§ 1301-1308, 1324, 1371-1389). See generally SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL Op-
ERATIONS, STUDY ON FEDERAL REGULATION, SEN. Doc. No. 25, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. (1977).
29. See, e.g., ABA COMM'N ON LAW AND THE ECONOMY, supra note 27, at 27; S. BREYER
& R. STEWART, supra note 19, at 283-85.
30. See, e.g., J. ESPOSITO, VANISHING AIR 112-14 (1970); Stevens, Air Pollution and the
Federal System: Responses to Felt Necessities, 22 HASTINGS L.J. 661, 679-81 (1971). For an
opposing view of the problems attributable to the New Deal agency, see Jaffe, The Ad-
ministrative Agency and Environmental Control, 20 BUFFALO L. REv. 231, 233-36 (1970).
31. See O'Fallon, Deficiencies in the Air Quality Act of 1967, 33 LAw & CONTEMP.
PRoD. 275, 286-96 (1968) (reviewing state agency resources and performance); Vaughn,
State Air Pollution Control Boards: The Interest Group Model and the Lawyer's Role, 24
ORLA. L. REv. 25, 30-32 (1971) (insufficient budgets and inadequate staffing).
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the form of "independent" commissions, their membership was often
dominated by the very interests that had most to gain from pollution.32
In response to this dismal reality, the 1970 Act33 not only massively
increases the federal presence, but takes steps to guard against the
repetition of yet another New Deal failure.3 4 Instead of permitting
a group of "independent" commissioners to run off in different di-
rections, the Act places primary responsibility on a single Adminis-
trator squarely situated within the executive branch.35
Just as the Act refuses to insulate the EPA in a New Deal fashion,
so too it challenges the New Deal affirmation of expertise in two very
different ways. First, the Act requires the Administrator to set quanti-
tative clean air targets that would "protect the public health"36 while
allowing for an "adequate margin of safety" and to reach these targets
by 1977 at the latest.3 7 In taking this step, Congress forced the agency
to specify its ends far more clearly than required by the New Deal
model. No longer could expertise be used as an excuse for avoiding the
inevitably controversial task of defining ultimate environmental ob-
jectives; instead, the agency must define its goals in a highly visible
way and recognize that Congress will call it to account by a certain
date if it finds its performance unsatisfactory.
At the same time it energetically pursued this ends-forcing strategy,
Congress treated a second form of agency forcing in a more am-
bivalent way. Once having set air quality targets, the next step was
to define the best means of achieving the clean air targets by 1977.
And at this stage, Congress was more reluctant to make a total break
32. See, e.g., J. EsPosITo, supra note 30, at 125 (state agency "acted like an under-
ground chamber of commerce"). See generally Vaughn, supra note 31, at 22-38 (discussing
methods of selecting state board members).
33. Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (current version
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (Supp. II 1978)).
34. For an historical analysis of the passage of the Act that emphasizes precisely this
challenge to New Deal ideals, see Marcus, Environmental Protection Agency, in THE
POLITICS OF REGULATION 267, 267-74 (J. Wilson ed. 1980) (citing relevant sources).
35. Until 1970, air pollution control was the responsibility of the National Air Pollu-
tion Control Administration (NAPCA), an administrative subdivision of the Department
of Health, Education, and Welfare. In July of that year, President Nixon submitted Re-
organization Plan No. 3 of 1970 to Congress; upon becoming effective, the plan created
the Environmental Protection Agency and transferred to the new agency most of the
functions formerly vested in NAPCA. Reorg. Plan No. 3 of 1970, 3 C.F.R. § 1072 (1966-
1970 Compilation), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app., at 827 (1976), and in 84 Stat. 2086 (1970).
36. 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (Supp. II 1978).
37. For stationary sources, such as power plants, the Act originally envisioned attain-
ment of its health-related targets by 1975. See 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a)(2)(A) (1976). Heavily
conditioned provisions could, however, stretch these formal deadlines by an additional
two years, see 42 U.S.C. § 7410(e) (Supp. II 1978), and individual plants might qualify for
an extra year's grace, see 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(f) (1976) (amended 1977).
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with New Deal models. Indeed, so far as existing plants were con-
cerned, Congress remitted the problem of defining individual cleanup
obligations to a classical New Deal process: in a low visibility, highly
discretionary process, state-level administrators, with federal assistance,
develop a State Implementation Plan (SIP).3 8 The binding federal
constraint is that, taken together, polluters within each airshed must
reduce emissions sufficiently to bring local conditions into compli-
ance with federal clean air targets.39 Because different airsheds have
different air quality and contain different polluters with different
cleanup costs, various SIPs require old plants to reduce their sulfur
dioxide (SO2) discharges in widely varying amounts.4
0 When viewed
through New Deal eyes, this disparity is admirable. Because the pol-
lution problem is of different severity in different parts of the country,
why not ask polluters to cut back accordingly? If, due to local con-
ditions, it is relatively expensive for coalburners to reduce their emis-
sions compared to other dischargers, why not allow local compliance
plans to take this factor into account? In principle, this decentralized
process could harness the energies of knowledgeable experts to work
effectively for the public good by designing reduction requirements
to meet EPA air quality goals fairly and efficiently.
So far as new power plants are concerned, however, the Act makes a
second and sharper break with New Deal ideals. Rather than encourag-
ing policymakers to define each plant's cleanup obligations in the light
of local environmental conditions, the Act's provisions for new source
performance standards41 require all plants of the same type, re-
gardless of their location, to meet the same emission ceiling for each
38. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a) (Supp. II 1978). See also IV. RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
233-35 (1977) (discussion of state processes and available federal assistance).
The critical feature of the SIP process is its reliance on air quality models that predict
how a plant's emissions affect the air quality in its surrounding area. Due to these models'
technical complexity, the EPA has provided states with a massive set of support documents
as aids in the preparation of SIPs. See id. at 235-37.
39. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2) (Supp. II 1978). If an area is already in compliance with
the ambient air standards, the doctrine of prevention of significant deterioration (PSD)
requires maintenance of existing levels of air quality. See Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, 344
F. Supp. 254 (D.D.C.), aff'd, 4 Envir. Rep. Gas. 1815 (D.C. Cir. 1972), aff'd by an equally
divided court sub norn. Fri v. Sierra Club, 412 U.S. 541 (1973); cf. 42 U.S.C. § 7491 (Supp.
II 1978) (seeking to prevent visibility deterioration).
40. Statewide average SIP requirements for coal-burning power plants range from
0.8 to 5.0 pounds of SO, per million BTU produced. Memorandum from Tommy Holland,
Energy Information Section, to John H. Haines, Assistant to Director, Emissions Standards
and Engineering Division, EPA at 3 (May 23, 1978) (EPA Docket No. OAQPS-78-I, Item No.
II-B-117). Individual plants in some states are allowed emissions ranging from 8 to 10
pounds per MBTU, using short-term averages. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. §§ 52.1881(b)(13)(i),
(b)(23), (b)(28), (b)(33) (1979) (emission limits set by EPA for Ohio counties and sources).
41. 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (Supp. II 1978) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-6 (1976)).
1477
The Yale Law Journal
pollutant. The Act also breaks with the New Deal paradigm by limit-
ing the Administrator's freedom in setting the NSPS. Rather than con-
tenting itself with the sententious advice to "protect the environment
while assuring a vigorous economy," the original section 111 required
the EPA Administrator to set effluent standards that could be satisfied
by the "best system of emission reduction which (taking into account
the cost of achieving such reduction) the Administrator determines has
been adequately demonstrated." 42 Although, as we shall see, this formu-
la is fairly elastic, its general thrust is plain. So far as new plants are
concerned, Congress not only forced the EPA to specify its ends with
clarity, but also presumed to specify the best means of achieving clean
air objectives: only the "best system" would be acceptable in new
plants.
To some extent, this insistence on better performance from new
plants makes good sense. Old plants, after all, have often been designed
with little or no thought to pollution control. New limitations would
often require expensive retrofitting. In contrast, new plants can be
designed from the start to take pollution reduction into account.43 But
by lifting the NSPS process out of the general effort to tailor cutback
requirements for existing plants to local environmental goals, the Act
makes it easier for policymakers to push NSPS beyond the point of
ecological justification. From the vantage point of the environment,
it makes no difference whatever whether a pound of sulfur oxide is
emitted by a power plant built before or after some magic date.44 Nor
does it matter whether the sulfur is removed by a primitive hosing or
by the most advanced gismo ever conceived by the mind of man. What
matters is the impact of the sulfur oxide on the world outside the
power plant. And this depends not only on emissions but on a host of
other factors-the height of the stack, the direction of the wind, and
42. Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, sec. 4(a), § 111(a), 84 Stat. 1676
(current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a) (Supp. II 1978)).
43. For example, control technology necessary to remove So. from smokestacks requires
a relatively fixed amount of space within a plant near the smokestack. Because many
plants built before 1970 did not anticipate the need to allow room for add-on technology,
emission control is often more difficult and expensive for old plants than new ones. Re-
trofitting typically increases the original cost of control technology by 25% to 30%. See
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, AIR QUALITY AND STATIONARY SOURCE EMISSION CONTROL
451-54 (Comm. Print 1975) (prepared for House Comm. on Public Works, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess.) [hereinafter cited as STATIONARY SOURCE EMIssION CONTROL].
44. From the vantage point of Congressmen from dirty air regions, however, uniform
restrictions on new plants had additional attractions. NSPS meant that their states would
be at less of a disadvantage in competing for new industry. See H.R. RPP. No. 1146, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE CONG. 9- AD. NEws 5356, 5358; [1977]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1263 nn.2 & 4 (citing relevant sources), cf. Rose-Ackerman,
Does Federalism Matter? 89 J. POLITICAL ECON. (forthcoming 1981) (discussion of strategic
implications of federal system).
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the plant's proximity to population centers.45 Unless the EPA defined
the "best system of emission reduction" to take account of these com-
plexities, however, section 111 could be read to authorize a narrow
inquiry into the technological design of the plant rather than a can-
vass of the ecological stakes involved in new construction. By giving
statutory prominence to technological means of purification in new
plants, section 111 would distort policymaking perceptions for years
to come.
At this point, we begin to glimpse the complexity of the link be-
tween environmental symbol and administrative process. However
ironic, it is the New Deal ideal that is consistent with the ecological
insight into reality. For it is the expert agency, unencumbered by
abstract legalisms, that promises to craft a policy responsive to the
complexities of environmental relationships. Yet the one thing clear
to the Act's draftsmen was that the New Deal agency had failed.
C. From Statute to Policy
In establishing its special regime for new plants, Congress intended
to ensure that the interests of future generations would not be com-
promised by the passivity characteristic of the New Deal agency. The
EPA, however, still had to translate the statute into practical policy.
Its task was to establish a standard that, in the words of the statute,
"reflects the degree of emission limitation achievable through the ap-
plication of the best system of emission reduction which (taking into
account the cost of achieving such reduction) the Administrator de-
termines has been adequately demonstrated.""' As we shall show, how-
ever, setting such a standard would have been tricky business at best;
in its desire to avoid the perils of expertise, Congress had adopted
a formula that was exceedingly difficult to apply to the facts presented
by the coalburner. Unfortunately, however, the EPA did not respond
to the inept statute by the creative use of its expertise, but instead
treated NSPS as a problem in applied sanitary engineering.
1. Technology in a Vacuum
By its very terms, two aspects of the statute invited, if they did not
require, agency sophistication in setting a standard for new coal-
burners. First, there is the instruction that the Administrator take cost
"into account" in making his decision. A billion dollars is a lot of
money, but it is a sensible investment if it purchases ten billion dollars
45. STATIONARY SOURCE EMISSION CONTROL, supra note 43, at 193-94, 624-34.
46. Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, sec. 4(a), § 111(a)(1), 84 Stat.
1676 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a) (Supp. II 1978)).
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in benefits. Rather than contemplating cost figures in the abstract,
doesn't the language authorize an assessment of the net costs generated
by a system after its environmental benefits have been taken into con-
sideration?47 Second, a proposed system must be "adequately demon-
strated" before it becomes the basis for a cleanup requirement. This
phrase obscures difficult policy dilemmas. On the one hand, the EPA
could have relied on new and untried cleanup technologies and take
the risk that they would fail to work effectively. On the other hand,
the agency could have satisfied itself with well-established technolo-
gies, and thereby lessen incentives to create new technologies that
would improve cleanup performance. Yet there were creative pos-
sibilities for a statutory interpretation that would ameliorate, if not
eliminate, this tension. For example, couldn't the agency have set a
schedule of increasingly stringent requirements over an extended pe-
riod of twenty or thirty years?
Unhappily, however, the agency did not try to ask, let alone answer,
either of these questions. Instead, it read the statutory language as if a
standard could be established on the basis of a narrow engineering
judgment. To understand the bureaucracy's view of its own choices, we
must consider the state of technology as it appeared in the early 1970s.
At that time, there existed two methods for reducing emissions from
coal-fired plants: a relatively old-fashioned technique known as physical
coal cleaning, or "washing," 48 and an embryonic technology, flue gas
47. Courts have, with varying force, agreed with this proposition. Under a provision
of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(A) (1976) (limitations
that require "best available technology economically achievable for such category or class,
which will result in reasonable further progress toward the national goal of eliminating
the discharge of all pollutants . . ."), closely analogous to section 111 of the Clean Air
Act, see p. 1479 supra, the Fourth Circuit has held that the EPA must compare the costs
and ecological benefits of its chosen standard with those of alternative levels of heat reduc-
tion, or, at the very least, provide the "best information available" on the expected
ecological benefits of the ordered reduction. Appalachian Power Co. v. Train, 545 F.2d
1351, 1364 (4th Cir. 1976); accord, National Crushed Stone Ass'n v. EPA, 601 F.2d 111, 121
(4th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 1011 (1980).
Although the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has not required the
EPA to conduct cost-benefit analyses as part of the establishment of NSPS, Portland
Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 387 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921
(1974), it has required that the agency establish some minimal relationship between costs
and expected benefits. Essex Chemical Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 427, 433 (D.C. Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 969 (1974) ("best system" in section 111 means system that
"can reasonably be expected to serve the interests of pollution control without becoming
exorbitantly costly in an economic or environmental way"). The D.C. Circuit has also
required that the EPA consider cost-benefit analyses submitted to it. Portland Cement
Asss'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d at 387.
48. See generally MrrnE CORP., THE PHYSICAL DESULFURIZATION OF COAL 41 (1970)
(Nat'l Tech. Information Serv. Pub. No. PB-210-373). Before 1970, mines cleaned
their coal primarily to remove impurities other than sulfur. The simultaneous removal of
pyrites was an incidental benefit. See id. (more than half of U.S. coal production cleaned
to some degree since before 1960).
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desulfurization, commonly known as "scrubbing."4 9
Physical coal cleaning removes sulfur from coal before the coal is
burned. Freshly-mined coal is crushed, passed through a screen, and
wetted, so that heavy, sulfur-bearing fragments settle outY0 The rel-
atively simple processes used to perform these functions remove
most of the sulfur-bearing particles called pyrites that are physically
mixed with the coal as it comes from the mine.5 1 They do not, how-
ever, remove sulfur that is chemically bonded to the coal 5 2 Nonethe-
less, the gains achieved by simple washing techniques can be sub-
stantial, varying from twenty to forty percent.5 3 Within these limits,
physical coal cleaning is a cheap 4 and reliable technology. Moreover,
even more effective coal-washing techniques were being developed in
the early 1970s. 5
Nonetheless, the EPA disregarded such mundane methods and
focused on more symbolically satisfying technologies-methods that
would cleanse the smoke produced by coal-burning boilers. In 1971,
only the scrubber performed these symbolic functions. Instead of rely-
ing on physical processes such as crushing and washing, a scrubber de-
pends on the maintenance of a large-scale chemical reaction56 that
49. The first full-scale scrubber built in the United States began operation in 1968
and was abandoned in 1971. By the end of 1971, the nation's second and third scrubbers
had begun operation. EPA, REPORT OF THE HEARING PANEL: NATIONAL PUBLIC HEARINGS
ON POWER PLANT COMPLIANCE WITH SULFUR OXIDE AIR POLLUTION REGULATIONS 88-89 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as REORT OF THE HEARING PANEL].
50. See Huettenhain, Yu, & Wong, A Technical and Economic Overview of Coal Clean-
ing, in I PROCEEDINGS: SYMPOSIUM ON COAL CLEANING TO ACHIEVE ENERGY AND ENVIRON-
MENTAL GOALS 256, 259-74, 277-85 (1979) (EPA Pub. No. 600/7-79-098a) (describing com-
monly used physical coal cleaning methods) [hereinafter cited as SYMPOSIUM ON COAL
CLEANING].
51. STATIONARY SOURCE EMISSION CONTROL, supra note 43, at 370.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 371.
54. See p. 1523 infra.
55. By grinding coal into a finer slurry and using more sophisticated separation tech-
niques, it is possible to wash out more of the pyritic sulfur than can be reached by the less
sophisticated methods practiced in the early 1970s. J. Kilgroe & J. Strauss, Use of Coal
Cleaning for Air Quality Management 7-12 (Jan. 22-25, 1980) (unpublished paper pre-
sented at Second Conference on Air Quality Management in the Electric Power Industry,
Austin, Tex.).
56. In a typical scrubber, as exhaust gases flow up a power plant smokestack, they are
exposed to a lime or limestone solution that is sprayed in their path. Sulfur dioxide in
the gas reacts with the spray and goes into solution, from which it is later removed,
dewatered, and disposed of in the form of sludge. 2 EPA, FLUE GAS DESULFURIZATION SYS-
TEM CAPABILITIES FOR COAL-FIRED STEAl! GENERATORS 3-2 to 3-8 (1978) (EPA Pub. No.
600/7-78-032b) [hereinafter cited as FGD SYSmII CAPABILITIES]. On an average day, a
typical scrubber will remove 190 tons of SO, while consuming over 400 tons of limestone
and thousands of gallons of water. Torstrick, Henson, & Tomlinson, Economic Evaluation
Techniques, Results, and Computer Modeling for Flue Gas Desulfurization, in 1 PROCEED-
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requires continuous supervision.57 Although early scrubbers removed
about seventy-five percent of the SO2 in flue gases,5s they were prone to
frequent breakdowns.59 When the Administrator promulgated his new
standard of performance in 1971, only three scrubbers were operating
in the United States.0° The oldest, built in 1968, would be abandoned
by the end of the year.61
In short, the EPA squarely confronted the problem posed by any
statute that requires a finding that a system be "adequately demon-
strated"-how to trade off certainty and economy against incentives
for further technological development. Moreover, creative ways of
mediating the tension were available; perhaps a standard based on im-
proved washing should be required in the intermediate term, with
reliance on scrubbers projected for a decade hence. Rather than giving
the statutory formula a creative interpretation, however, the language
was used as an excuse for thought. The possibility of advanced coal
washing was never considered, and, in official documents, the agency
narrowly focused its attention on the question whether the scrubber
was "available" in some engineering sense, divorced from other de-
velopment opportunities. 2 Such an approach justified the bureaucracy
in spending its limited resources on engineering projections that at-
tempted to determine whether scrubbers could be made operational in
the near future. On the basis of these projections, the Administrator
determined that the capacity of scrubbers to eliminate about seventy
percent of a coalburner's sulfur oxides03 had been adequately dem-
onstrated, and proceeded to the task of translating this engineering
judgment into regulatory policy.
INGS: SYMePOSIUM ON FLUE GAs DESULFURIZATION 118, 121, 134 (1978) (EPA Pub. No. 600/7-
78-058a) [hereinafter cited as FGD SYMPOSIUM]. In the early 1970s, few utilities possessed
engineers capable of supervising these processes. STATIONARY SOURCE EMISSION CONTROL,
sukra note 43, at 456.
57. See FGD SYSTEM CAPABILITIES, sukra note 56, at 4-2.
58. EPA, BACKGROUND INFORMATION FOR PROPOSED NEW SOURCE PERFORMANCE STANDARDS
10-11 (1971) (coal-fired power plants) [hereinafter cited as 1971 BACKGROUND DOCUMENT].
59. FGD SYSTEM CAPABILITIES, supra note 56, at 4-13 (approximately 30% operability
for systems built before 1973). Despite significant improvements since the early 1970s, id.,
system availability still troubles many plants. See EPA, EPA UTILITY FGD SURVEY:
DECEMBER 1978-JANUARY 1979 at x (1979) (EPA Pub. No. 600/7-79-022c) (in survey of plant
operation over two-month period, half of systems had less than 50% reliability during at
least one month).
60. 37 Fed. Reg. 5768-69 (1972).
61. REPORT OF TaE HEARING PANEL, subra note 49, at 88.
62. See 1971 BACKGROUND DOCUMENT, supra note 58, at 16 (proposed standards are
"insensitive to cost/benefit analysis when stack-gas cleaning is employed in that it is the
only control system available").
63. 37 Fed. Reg. 5768-69 (1972).
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2. Squaring the Circle
It was at this point that the agency was forced to confront the
dilemmas imposed by its own impoverished reading of the statute.
The embarrassing fact is that the agency's interpretation made it con-
ceptually impossible to move from its engineering judgment about
the scrubber's availability to a definition of the quantity of sulfur
oxides that new power plants would be allowed to discharge. To see
why, merely reflect upon the fact that a power plant's emissions are a
function of not one, but two, variables. Before the Administrator
could tell the industry how many pounds of SO 2 a plant could emit
for each million BTU (MBTU) of energy it produced, it was not
enough to determine that scrubbers could eliminate seventy percent
of the sulfur in the coal. It was also necessary to determine the amount
of sulfur in the coal that the plant burned.64 The engineering judg-
ment was readily translated into an emission limitation only if all
of America's coal contained the same sulfur content. For then seventy
percent could be multiplied by a constant to yield a single nation-
wide limit on new plant discharges.
But, alas, America's coal reserves range from one to more than ten
pounds in sulfur content.6 5 To make matters even more difficult for
the Administrator, these coals are distributed unevenly throughout the
coal-producing regions. Roughly half of the nation's reserves lie west of
the Mississippi in the Northern Great Plains and Rocky Mountain
64. The British thermal unit (BTU) is a measurement of the amount of energy re-
leased by a coal when burned. A typical coal contains roughly 22 million BTU (MBTU)
per ton.
The amount of sulfur found in a coal may be expressed either as a percentage of the
total weight of the coal, or as the amount of sulfur that will be released per MBTU of
heat released by the coal. Because coals vary substantially in heat content per pound,
coals with the same percentage of sulfur by weight may generate different amounts of
SO0 while producing the same amount of energy. The measurement of sulfur content in
terms of pounds of sulfur dioxide produced per MBTU is a more meaningful index of a
plant's discharge and will be used here whenever possible.
65. See McCreery & Goodman, An Evaluation of the Desulfurization Potential of U.S.
Coals, in Sy.,iPosuM ON COAL CLEANING, supra note 50, at 387, 404 (characterizing coals on
low end of scale); EPA, SULFUR REDUCTION POTENTIAL OF U.S. COALS 28 (1976) (EPA Pub.
No. 600/2-76-091) (fig. 16) (reprinting U.S. Dep't of Interior, Bureau of Mines, Pub. No. RI
8118) (showing extent of U.S. reserves containing more than 10 pounds per MBTU).
American reserves of coal are enormous, and there is little work that provides detailed
characterizations of the combined sulfur content, heat content, and sulfur reduction
potential of the United States reserve base. See EPA, ELECTRIC UTILITY STEAM GENERAT-
ING UNITS: BACKGROUND INFORMATION FOR PROPOSED SO, EMISSION STANDARDS 4-3 (1978)
(EPA Pub. No. 450/2-78-007a) [hereinafter cited as 1978 SO2 BACKGROUND INFORMATION].
Although the U.S. Bureau of Mines has in its records a large number of detailed samples
of coal reserves from various locations, further analysis is required to determine how
well these samples represent the entire reserve base. See McCreery & Goodman, supra, at
403-06 (reporting high degree of uncertainty in representativeness of previous studies).
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regions, and consist largely of low sulfur coal."' Eastern reserves-
primarily from the Midwest and the Appalachians-contain much
higher proportions of higher sulfur coal. 67
These facts signaled the bankruptcy of the engineering approach:
it is mathematically impossible to multiply a constant by a variable
to yield a single nationwide numerical ceiling on power plant emis-
sions. The agency's predicament was intensified by a final statutory
artifact. Although the statute directed the Administrator to look at the
"best system" in defining applicable effluent standards, it did not
authorize him to force polluters actually to install scrubbers if they
could meet the effluent limit in some other way. 8 Thus, whatever
ceiling the Administrator might set, polluters might find it cheaper
simply to burn low sulfur coal than to install scrubbers. The threat
of a massive shift to lower sulfur coal would, in turn, generate pow-
erful political pressures from the Eastern producers of high sulfur
coal. The conceptual inadequacy of an engineering approach-its lack
of explicit concern with the variability of polluting inputs-masked the
potentially explosive political problem: how to parry the predictable
counterattack by Eastern coal?
Not, surely, by surrendering without a fight. After all, the whole
point of environmental regulation is to force producers to bear the
social costs of their enterprise. High sulfur coal had previously gained
an unfair competitive advantage over low sulfur coal precisely because
the extra harm it caused the environment was not reflected in coal
prices; a program of controlling sulfur oxides merely removed that
advantage. 69
Although this point is obvious in the abstract, it still had to survive
the foreseeable counteroffensive by the Eastern high sulfur coal indus-
66. U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMIN., suPra note 3, at 123 (236 of 438 billion tons of
coal in national demonstrated reserve base lie west of Mississippi River; unavailable
figures based on extractable amount of heat might show lower proportion of national
reserves because of lower heat content of many Western coals). Roughly 64% to 70% of
all Western coal produces less than 1.2 pounds of SO, per MBTU. See 1978 SO. BACK-
GROUND INFORMATION, supra note 65, at 4-6. Western coal has accounted for a small, but
increasing, share of national production. 2 U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, BUREAU OF MINES,
MINERALS YEARBOOK 1961 at 59 (1962); NATIONAL COAL Ass'N, COAL FACTS 80-81 (1978-79)
(5% in 1961, 9% in 1971, 24% in 1977) (all figures exclude Alaska).
67. Only 7% to 10% of reserves in the Eastern and Eastern Midwest regions produces
less than 1.2 pounds of SO. per MBTU. 1978 SO- BACKGROUND INFORMATION, supra note
65, at 4-6.
68. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1970) (Administrator "should not
make a technical judgment as to how the standard [of performance] should be imple-
mented. He should determine the achievable limits and let the owner or operator de-
termine the most economic, acceptable technique to apply.")
69. See generally A. KNEESE, R. AYRES, & R. D'ARGE, ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT
84-85 (1970).
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try. The EPA could have tried to preempt this attack by showing that
the threat to the industry was not nearly so great as a superficial anal-
ysis suggested. Or it might have demonstrated that the dangers of sulfur
oxides were so intolerable that high sulfur mines could not reasonably
hope to defend their competitive advantage in the political struggle
that was sure to follow. But in its initial 1971 decision, the agency did
not prepare the ground for the battle that, even then, was plainly
perceptible to knowledgeable experts.
Despite the conceptual impossibility, and political unwisdom, of
moving immediately from its engineering judgment to regulatory
standards, the agency tried to square the circle by treating the problem
of coal variability as if it were a minor detail. At no point did the
agency explicitly recognize that its findings about scrubbing were com-
patible with an NSPS ceiling ranging all the way from 3 pounds
per MBTU to 0.3 pounds per MBTU, depending on whether ten
pound Eastern or one pound Western coal was being scrubbed at seven-
ty percent efficiency. Apparently there was no effort, however rudimen-
tary, to estimate the costs and benefits generated by a range of different
possible emission ceilings. Instead the agency simply finessed its con-
ceptual and political problems by announcing a number and making
a few casual remarks in its support. The numerical ceiling was set at
1.2 pounds of SO 2 per MBTU;70 in support, we were simply told that
this ceiling would permit Eastern plants to scrub the average coal,
which was said to contain about four pounds of sulfur per MBTU
([1 - 0.70] X 4 lb = 1.2 lb). 71 At the same time, the agency recognized
that utilities might respond to this ceiling the natural way, by burning
1.2 pound coal.72 It entirely failed, however, to estimate the impact such
decisions would have on the Eastern coal industry, let alone whether
the benefits of the 1.2 standard outweighed its expected costs. 73 In-
stead, it blandly proclaimed that burning low sulfur coal could also
be used to satisfy the new standard.
74
70. 36 Fed. Reg. 24,876-77 (1971) (codified in 40 C.F.R. § 60.43 (1979)).
71. 37 Fed. Reg. 5767-71 (1972) (supplemental statement in connection with final
promulgation; published after Kennecott Copper Corp. v. EPA, 462 F.2d 846 (D.C. Cir.
1972) (requiring more specific explanations of reasoning underlying EPA ambient air
regulations)). The 4 pound per MBTU figure used in the text is inferred from the EPA's
conclusion that the 1.2 standard was attainable by use of 70% scrubbing. The EPA
actually expressed the sulfur content of the "average" coal as a percentage of the coal's
weight, and not of its heat content. Cf. note 64 supra (explaining methods for measuring
sulfur content of coal).
72. See 1971 BACKGROUND DocumENrr, supra note 58, at 12-13 (low sulfur coal could be
burned to meet standard, but not enough supply for all new and existing plants, and too
expensive to ship to some areas).
73. See id. at 16.
74. Id. at 12.
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In short, a study of the EPA's 1971 decision suggests that Congress
had succeeded only too well in transcending New Deal ideals of ex-
pertise. Rather than interpreting section 111 as requiring it to put
costs into the context of environmental benefits, the agency fastened
on the scrubber as a symbol of technological salvation. Rather than
explaining to high sulfur producers why they must gradually give way
before the public interest, the agency had assumed their problem out
of existence.
Yet it was not as though EPA set out to make bad decisions. To the
contrary, the EPA was responding rationally to the bureaucratic in-
centives created by the Act. In 1971, the EPA was an infant agency
that had yet to create a reputation for itself; it confronted a clear
congressional deadline requiring it to reach specified clean air targets
by 1977. If the EPA was to reach these targets, its prime problem was
to force the states to force existing polluters to cut back on existing
pollution, not to plan for plants coming on line in 1980 or 1990. To
override the EPA's interest in establishing its credibility by acting in
pursuit of short-term goals, section 111 would have had to req u ire the
agency to begin the lengthy and difficult task of long-range planning.
Yet this effort to force the agency to confront economic and ecological
complexity was the last thing Congress had in mind in moving beyond
the New Deal. Rather than forcing the agency to redeem the promise
of expertise, section 111 made it relatively easy for the EPA to treat
NSPS as if it were an engineering problem.
Moreover, the agency's narrow reading of the statute was not to be
remedied by the creative use of judicial review. This is not to say that
the District of Columbia Circuit was altogether happy with the
agency's performance. When the 1.2 standard was appealed by the
utility industry, the court did sense that something was wrong with the
agency's conception of its mission.75 The particular fact that attracted
judicial attention was the enormous quantity of sludge generated by
a typical scrubbing operation."6 True to its mechanical reading of
section 111, the agency had failed to take this second-order environ-
mental harm into account before finding that scrubbing was qualified
as the "best" method of emission reduction. This proved too much for
the court of appeals, which remanded the matter to the EPA for
75. Essex Chemical Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 427, 441 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. de-
nied, 416 U.S. 969 (1974).
76. Id. A single lime-limestone scrubbing system may produce several hundred thousand
tons of sludge a year. EPA, CONTROLLING SO, EMISSIONS FROM COAL-FIRED STEAM-ELECTRIC
GENERATORS: SOLID WASTE IMPACr 14-18 (1978) (EPA Pub. No. 600/7-78-044a).
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explicit consideration. 77 Unfortunately, however, the court did not
recognize that the agency's disdain for the solid waste problem was only
symptomatic of the abdication of its long-range planning function.7 8
As a result, the agency merely repromulgated its original NSPS stan-
dard, this time declaring explicitly that it had taken sludge into
account.
70
Although the agency's continuing neglect is readily explicable in
terms of the bureaucratic needs of the moment, the sad story that
follows owes a great deal to this bad beginning. The failure to create
a sound structure for comparing costly means and environmental ends
permitted partisans on both sides to pursue their interests without
recognition of the larger aim-to fulfill our obligations to the next
generation without causing unnecessary hardship for the Earth's present
inhabitants.
II. The Politics of Ignorance
Operating under vague statutory mandates, New Deal agencies
typically have ample opportunity to fend off congressional intervention
by adapting to changing legislative sentiment through the use of ad-
ministrative discretion. 0 Within broad political constraints, agen-
cies work out policy questions under the limited supervision of courts.
In contrast, the Clean Air Amendments of 1970 tried to resolve so
many disputable substantive questions that congressional interven-
tion was soon required to respond to critical problems developing
under the original act:8 ' major amendments were seriously consid-
ered in 1976 and passed in 1977.
Not that the interregnum between 1971 and 1976 is devoid of in-
terest. During these years, scrubbing policy was disputed in several
contexts-in a lawsuit dealing with new Western power plants, as an
77. 486 F.2d 427, 441 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
78. The court's notation of certain antipollution possibilities, however, see id. at 440
n.48 (use of low sulfur coal complies with emission standard without scrubbing); id. at
441 n.51 (speculating on desirability of more flexible standard), might have suggested the
need for broader consideration of net environmental benefits.
79. 40 Fed. Reg. 42,045, 42,047 (1975) (draft response to remand); 42 Fed. Reg. 61,541
(1977) (final promulgation of standards, declaring that "none of the comments persuaded
the Agency to change the policy expressed in the September, 1975, draft response, i.e.,
that scrubber sludge can be fixated and disposal (sic] of in an environmentally acceptable
manner at reasonable costs.")
80. Cf. J. LANDIS, supra note 10, at 68-69 (detailed delegation requires repeated amend-
ment).
81. The most pressing issues were posed by the failure of automakers to comply with
Congress' cutback requirements and the failure of the states to meet the Act's clean air
targets in a timely fashion. See 7 ENVIR. RE'. (BNA) 1288, 1304 (1977).
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administrative solution to the compliance problems raised by old
plants, and as a possible way of preserving Western "clean air areas."
These discussions placed scrubbing on the agenda when new plants
returned to the forefront of congressional attention in 1976. Un-
fortunately, however, these agenda-setting activities narrowed the
scope of inquiry and distorted the issues, obscuring the nationwide
environmental implications of a forced scrubbing requirement.
Nor did the process of legislative revision serve to cure this defect.
Rather than focusing attention on the world beyond Washington, D.C.,
a bizarre coalition of environmentalists and dirty coal producers tried
to exploit congressional ignorance to serve their own, mutually incom-
patible, purposes. The result was a hopelessly incoherent mix of statu-
tory language and legislative history, which set the stage for the most
recent effort by the EPA to reconcile the law with the environment.
A. Setting the Agenda
After adopting its 1971 NSPS regulations, the EPA would have been
happy to invest as little energy as possible in future planning. With
the agency taking a passive role, outside litigants framed the issues for
examination by the agency and the courts.
1. The Navajo Challenge: The Distorting Prism of Adjudication
The principal lawsuit grew out of a conflict between chapters of
the Navajo tribe and one of the environmental movement's perennial
targets-the complex of massive coal-burning facilities located near Four
Corners, Arizona. 2 Because low sulfur coal was readily available in the
Southwest, the plants would be able to meet the 1.2 pound standard
the natural way. The Navajo tribes argued that burning low sulfur
coal was not sufficient under section 111. They insisted that the EPA
require the plants to install scrubbers, thereby reducing SO2 well below
the 1.2 NSPS standard.
83
From the vantage point of a litigator concentrating on Four Corners,
this demand was but another battle in the long war to impose costly
controls for environmental gains. From a national perspective, how-
ever, the issue was far more complicated-even granting environ-
mentalist premises. Southwestern power plants would use Western low
sulfur coal regardless of scrubbing requirements for the simple reason
82. Oljato Chapter of the Navajo Tribe v. Train, 515 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
83. See Letter from Joseph J. Brecher, Native American Rights Fund, to William D.
Ruckelshaus, Administrator, EPA at 3 (March 20, 1973) (on file with Yale Law Journal)
(request on behalf of Indian tribes that EPA issue notice of proposed rulemaking to revise
1971 NSPS for power plants).
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that, when shipping costs were taken into account, this was by far the
cheapest coal available. Yet, although a seventy percent scrubbing re-
quirement 4 would reduce Four Corners' emissions by seventy percent,
this would hardly be the outcome of a nationwide requirement. In the
East and Midwest, many plants would have a choice between nearby
high sulfur coal and more distant low sulfur varieties. If the ceiling
remained at 1.2 and scrubbing were required by law, these utilities
would lose all economic incentive to pay the costs of shipping low
sulfur coal. Instead, they would use their seventy percent scrubbers on
the four-pound coal readily available nearby. Burning low sulfur coal
without scrubbing might be the cheaper and more natural way to
achieve the same result. Thus, forced scrubbing promised to be a sym-
bolically satisfying but peculiarly inefficient response to the realities of
coal burning. Moreover, a massive shift to scrubbing would place
enormous burdens on the EPA inspection system. Scrubbers only scrub
when operated; unless EPA mounted an ongoing and credible enforce-
ment effort, the shift to high sulfur coal might even increase S0 2
loadings in some populous regions east of the Mississippi. 5
Given their narrow focus on Four Corners, however, the Navajo had
no need to concern themselves with the impact of scrubbing on the
other side of the country. Worse yet, when the Navajo went to court to
force the EPA to impose scrubbers, the agency did not try to defend its
1971 decision on the merits. Although there is evidence that agency
specialists were aware of the costs of inducing a shift away from low
sulfur coal in the East,86 agency lawyers chose to defend EPA's 1971
decision on a narrow procedural ground. In this they were successful-
the District of Columbia Circuit rejected the Navajo challenge,8 7 re-
84. In addition to arguing that scrubbers be required, the Navajo argued that scrubbers
were capable of 90% sulfur removal, rather than approximately 70% as concluded by the
EPA. Id. We use the EPA's determination of demonstrated capabilities in the present
example.
85. See pp. 1526-28 infra.
86. See, e.g., Letter from John R. Quarles, Jr., Acting Administrator, EPA, to Martin
Green, Dep't of Justice (Jan. 23, 1974) (on file with Yale Law Journal).
87. Oljato Chapter of the Navajo Tribe v. Train, 515 F.2d 654, 661, 666 (D.C. Cir.
1975) (dismissal for failure to seek administrative review prior to initiation of suit). The
Navajo attempted to sue the agency under § 304 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (Supp. II
1978), on the theory that failure to revise an arguably invalid standard constituted a
failure to fulfill a nondiscretionary duty. The court rejected this theory, but indicated
that the Navajo ultimately might obtain judicial review of the NSPS after petitioning the
Administrator under § 307. Following this initial defeat, the Navajo, joined by the Sierra
Club, renewed efforts to reduce Western emissions by following a different procedural
course. In early 1977, the EPA agreed to the groups' request for formal reconsideration of
the 1971 NSPS. See 42 Fed. Reg. 5121 (1977). The reconsideration process had barely begun,
however, by the time Congress enacted its own revisions to § II1 as part of the Clean Air
Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, sec. 109, § 111, 91 Stat. 685 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 7411 (Supp. II 1978)).
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lieving the agency of the immediate need to invest more energy in
the scrubber. Unhappily, however, the lawyers' strategic victory de-
prived the agency of a critical opportunity to educate its public.
Although Four Corners dramatized the way scrubbing might reduce
Western emissions, no similar event would dramatize the disadvan-
tages of a high-technology strategy in the East.
2. The Struggle over Existing Plants
While the new plant standards were left on the back burner, the more
immediate battle over old plant emissions engaged the attention of all
participants."8 By fixing environmentalists' attention upon scrubbing
as a technological solution, this struggle left its mark on the later
revision of NSPS.
The immediate sulfur oxide problem was posed by existing coal-fired
plants, which contributed about half of the overall load of sulfur oxide
in the United States in 1972.89 If the Act's promise of clean air was to
be redeemed, many of these plants would have to cut their emissions
substantially.9" Moreover, under the law, each plant's lawful emissions
could be determined only after a state agency had calculated the cut-
back required to assure regional compliance with the ambient standards
for sulfur dioxide.91 A set of exhausting courtroom battles lay ahead.
92
Predictably, utilities tried to minimize the cost of the changes re-
quired of them. Instead of building scrubbers or burning low sulfur
coal, a coalburner could reduce its effective contribution to the local
sulfur oxide problem by building "tall stacks," up to 1000 feet high,
88. The compliance problems of existing power plants were widely studied at this time.
See, e.g., REPORT OF THE HEARING PANEL, supra note 49; ADMINISTRATOR OF EPA, CONTROL
OF SULFUR OXIDES, S. Doc. No. 59, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) [hereinafter cited as CONTROL
OF SULFUR OXIDES]; EPA, POSITION PAPER ON REGULATION OF ATMOSPHERIC SULFATES (1975)
(EPA Pub. No. 450/2-75-007) [hereinafter cited as POSITION PAPER]; STATIONARY SOURCE
EMaISSION CONTROL, supra note 43, at 193-711 (1975). Only the EPA's position paper gave
more than a glancing look to the problems posed by strategies to control new plants. See
POSITION PAPER, supra, at xvi-xix, 60-80.
89. EPA, 1972 NATIONAL EMISSIONS REPORT 1 (1974) (EPA Pub. No. 45012-74-012).
90. In the fall of 1973, 70% of the nation's coal- and oil-burning power plants emitted
more SO, than allowed by the proposed SIPs. EPA, EPA ENFORCEMENT: A PROGRESS RE-
PORT: 1976 at 12 (1977). Following revisions in the original SIPs, the EPA estimated that in
1975 at least 40% of the coal-burning capacity in the U.S. would require emission reduc-
tions to comply with primary air quality standards. REPORT OF THE HEARING PANEL, supra
note 49, at 14.
91. Pub. L. No. 91-604, sec. 4(a), § 110, 84 Stat. 1676 (current version at 42 U.S.C. §
7410(a)(2) (Supp. II 1978)); see NV. RODGERS, supra note 38, at 235-37 (description of com-
plex factors on which SIP emission limitations are based).
92. By late 1973 it was already apparent that most coal-burning power plants would
not meet the original mid-1975 deadline. REPORT OF THE HEARING PANEL, supra note 49,
at 3. By 1975, the EPA was no longer planning for full compliance by June of that year
or even by 1977, but by 1980. CONTROL OF SULFUR OXIDES, supra note 88, at 1-6.
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thus increasing the speed at which its gases diffused beyond the air
quality region in which it was located. 93 To respond to the temporarily
higher concentrations created by inversions or other unfavorable me-
teorological conditions, the utilities proposed an "intermittent control
strategy." They would hold a reserve of low sulfur fuels to burn during
inversion periods. Alternatively, during an air pollution emergency,
they would bring their cleanest plants on line first to meet peak demand
conditions.
0 4
The environmentalists predictably responded to these proposals with
alarm. Tall stacks, they rightly feared, would improve local conditions
only at the expense of more distant regions.95 They also opposed the
utilities' use of "intermittent controls," 96 which imposed significant
burdens on future efforts to monitor compliance. 97 In response to
these fears, environmental groups brought suit to challenge the legality
of the utilities' strategies under the Clean Air Act.98 Once again, the
exigencies of litigation obscured the real problems raised by sulfur
emissions. Although the EPA recognized that the long-range transport
of sulfur oxides raised serious policy problems, 99 environmentalists did
not concentrate on forcing the EPA to channel its energies in long-term
93. See STATIONARY SOURCE EMISSION CONTROL, supra note 43, at 212-16. In 1975, a tall
stack was estimated to cost 3% to 17% of the cost of a scrubber. Id. at 210, 215. At least
fifteen states provided credit for the use of tall stacks in 1974. See Clean Air Act Oversight:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Environmental Pollution of the Senate Comm. on Public
Works, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 320, 330 (1974) (statement of Richard Ayres) [hereinafter cited
as 1974 Senate Oversight Hearings].
94. See, e.g., Implementation of the Clean Air Act-1975: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Environmental Pollution of the Senate Comm. on Public Works, Pt. 2, 94th Cong., Ist
Sess. 1417-21 (1975) (statement of Donald G. Allen, New England Electric System, present-
ing discussion by James R. Mahoney, consultant) [hereinafter cited as 1975 Implementation
Hearings].
95. See, e.g., Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Health and the Environment of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 493 (1977) (statement on behalf of Izaak Walton League of America)
(opposing tall stacks because of acid rain and sulfates) [hereinafter cited as 1977 House
Hearings]; Ayres, Enforcement of Air Pollution Controls on Stationary Sources under the
Clean Air Amendments of 1970, 4 ECOLOGY L.Q. 441, 452-54 (1975) (describing "environ-
mental bankruptcy" of dispersion strategy).
96. See 1975 Implementation Hearings, supra note 94, at 1899 (letter from League for
Conservation Legislation); Ayres, supra note 95, at 452-55.
97. See 120 CONG. REC. 18,960 (1974) (reprinting memorandum from EPA enforcement
division). Environmental groups based their objections, in part, on the difficulty in proving
that a utility had failed to burn low sulfur coal or to comply with a complex dispatching
algorithm. See 1975 Implementation Hearings, supra note 94, at 1313-14 (statement of
Benjamin Wakes, Montana Dep't of Health and Environmental Sciences); 1974 Senate
Oversight Hearings, supra note 93, at 320, 325-26 (statement of Richard Ayres).
98. See, e.g., NRDC v. EPA, 489 F.2d 390, 406-09 (5th Cir. 1974), rev'd in part on other
grounds sub nom. Train v. NRDC, 421 U.S. 60 (1975) (Clean Air Act permits use of
dispersion techniques such as tall stacks only where methods of emission reduction un-
available or unfeasible).
99. PosrrtoN PAR, supra note 88, at xv-xix.
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directions. 100 Instead, they sought solutions more readily obtainable
through judicial decree. Moreover, the desire to attain rapid com-
pliance with SO2 standards produced a peculiar faith in technological
solutions. Rather than pressing power plants to use low sulfur fuel,
environmentalists emphasized scrubbing as their preferred remedy to
utility footdragging. 1'0
While implementation of any cleanup strategy awaited the outcome
of litigation, 10 2 the rhetorical battle over scrubbing--both in and out of
court-heated up. The utilities insisted that scrubbers were unreli-
able,103 and environmentalists increasingly viewed scrubbers as the
final solution to the utilities' unreasonable delays. 04 Thus, the old-
plant dispute evolved in a way that mocked the SIP process' aspirations
to tailor cleanup burdens in a way that was sensitive to local environ-
mental realities. Rather than forcing EPA to beef up its enforcement
operation and consider the problem of long-range transport, the critical
issue was increasingly perceived to be the viability of a single tech-
nology. And, although the issue was initially considered in connection
with old plants,'0 5 the scrubber "solution" was present in the minds of
policymakers when new plants came to the fore.
B. The Clean Air-Dirty Coal Coalition
New plant scrubbers had been discussed, in the years between 1971
and 1976, in contexts that precluded full examination of the nation-
100. For example, Ayres criticized the EPA's attempts to use complex diffusion models
to produce a closer fit between ambient air criteria and control requirements. See Ayres,
supra note 95, at 468-69.
101. See, e.g., 1975 Implementation Hearings, supra note 94, at 1899 (letter from League
for Conservation Legislation); 1974 Senate Oversight Hearings, supra note 93, at 320, 320-
24 (statement of Richard Ayres); Ayres, supra note 95, at 443-49.
102. By the end of 1976, only 59% of the nation's power plants were operating in full
compliance with sulfur oxide emission limitations or meeting federally enforceable
schedules. EPA, EPA ENFORCEMENT: A PROGREsS REPORT, 1976, supra note 90, at 12. Of the
plants comprising the remaining 41%, many operated in areas where challenges to SIPs
remained unresolved. Id.
103. 1975 Implementation Hearings, supra note 94, at 1421 (statement of Donald Allen,
New England Electric System); id. at 1431, 1439-40 (statement of Electric Utility Industry
Clean Air Coordinating Committee, 61 investor-owned utility companies); 1977 House
Hearings, supra note 95, at 1365, 1383 (statement of A. Joseph Dowd on behalf of Edison
Electric Institute); 6 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 1300 (1975) (utility representatives' statements to
panel of National Governors' Conference energy officials).
104. See note 101 supra.
105. See, e.g., Clean Air Act Amendnents-1975: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Health and the Environment of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
94th Cong., Ist Sess. 34, 39-40 (testimony of Russell E. Train); id. at 826-27 (testimony of
representative of Nat'l Coal Association); Clean Air Act Oversight-1973: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Public Health and Environment of the House Comm. on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. 13, 16-17 (1973) (testimony of John A. Quarles, Jr.,
Acting Administrator, EPA).
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wide dimensions of the problem: the Four Corners suit against Western
coalburners and the struggle for SIP compliance by old plants. While
preparing amendments to the Act in response to industry's failure to
meet statutory deadlines, 06 the House subcommittee permitted the
controversies of the Act's first five years to define the problems that
were worthy of attention. Rather than considering NSPS on its own
merits and taking steps to beef up the EPA's effective capacity for
long-term planning, the subcommittee used the scrubber as a sym-
bolically satisfying way of responding to other more pressing political
needs.
1. The Clean Air Regions
The treatment of new coal-burning plants did not emerge directly
upon the legislative agenda. Instead, it attracted the attention of con-
gressional staffers as they grappled with a far more pressing issue-the
treatment of the "clean air regions."
Although the 1970 Act had established minimum air quality objec-
tives for the nation, 07 many areas in the nation already enjoyed air far
cleaner than the Act required. 08 Yet the original draftsmen did not
focus clearly on the problem posed by this embarrassment of riches. In
these areas, did the 1970 Act amount to a Dirty Air Act legitimating
pollution up to the minimum standards? When EPA began to approve
SIP's that permitted power plants to degrade clean air regions, the
Sierra Club went to court to challenge the legality of this decision. It
emerged victorious by a narrow margin. After it convinced a single
district judge of the impropriety of the Administrator's decision, this
outcome was sustained by an equally divided Supreme Court. 10 9
Unless Congress amended the statute, the litigation meant that EPA
could not approve state plans which permitted increases in the levels
of pollutants in the clean air areas. Although environmentalists strongly
106. See note 81 supra.
107. See 50 C.F.R. §§ 50.4 to 50.5 (1979) (air quality standards for sulfur oxide). The
areas west of the Mississippi have been a special focus of environmentalist concern. See
Nondegradation Policy of the Clean Air Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Air and
Water Pollution of the Senate comm. on Public Works, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 5, 7 (1973)
(statement of Laurence Moss, President, Sierra Club) (discussing Southwest, Rocky Moun-
tains, and Northern Great Plains). Their SO, levels are generally lower than the national
average. See STATIONARY SOURCE EMISSION CONTROL, supra note 43, at 238.
108. Most of the air quality regions in the country were in compliance with annual
and twenty-four hour SO2 standards. EPA, MONITORING AND AIR QUALITY TRENDS REPORT,
1974 at 15 (1976) (EPA Pub. No. 450/1-76-001) (16% of stations violated annual standard
in 1970, 9% in 1974; 11% violated 24-hour standard in 1970, 5% in 1974).
109. Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, 344 F. Supp. 253 (D.D.C.), aff'd, Envir. Rep. Cas.
1815 (D.C. Cir. 1972), afrd by an equally divided court sub nom. Fri v. Sierra Club, 412
U.S. 541 (1973).
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supported this course, it became apparent that their objectives would
evoke concerted opposition by groups interested in Western economic
development.1 10 Searching for ways of packaging environmentalist ob-
jectives in politically acceptable forms, House staffers working under
Congressmen who supported the protection of clean air areas turned
to the solution advanced by the Navajos' abortive lawsuit at Four
Corners-a scrubbing requirement for all new plants. Even if the
highly visible provisions mandating "nondegradation" of the clean air
areas succumbed to political counterattack, requiring all new coal-
burners to scrub would reduce the overall level of Western emissions,
thus providing secondary protection to the endangered clean air re-
gions.
2. The House Proposals of 1976
Universal scrubbing, in short, would provide a second line of statu-
tory defense for the clean air regions. Thus, when amendments were
initially proposed by the subcommittee, they contained not only an
elaborate effort to preserve the clean air regions but also a barely
perceptible alteration of section 111. As we have seen, the 1970 version
of this section directed the agency to set performance standards that
reflected "the degree of emission limitation achievable through the ap-
plication of the best system of emission reduction . . . ."I" In contrast,
the new House proposal required a standard that "reflects the degree
of emission reduction achievable through the application of the best
technological system of continuous emission reduction ....
The significance of this change was far from obvious, given the
special definition of "technological system of continuous emission
reduction" that also appeared in the House proposals. Rather than
defining the term to require an "add-on" pollution control tech-
nology, section Ill(a)(7) gave the term a technical meaning: "a
technological process for production or operation by any source which
110. See, e.g., 1975 Implementation Hearings, supra note 94, at 862-65 (statement of
J.D. Geist, Exec. Vice President, New Mexico Public Service Co.) (need to amend 1970 Act
to negate Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus interpretation and avoid preclusion of "further devel-
opment of my State's vast energy resources"); id. at 1984-85 (statement of E. Allan Hunter,
President, Utah Power and Light Co.) (Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus means "continued
poverty in many rural areas of the west" and "inability to develop our own resources").
Ill. Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, sec. 4, § 111, 84 Stat. 1676
(current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (Supp. II 1978)) (emphasis added).
112. H.R. 10498, § 1l1(a)(1)(C), reprinted in H.R. RPe. No. 1175, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
310 (1976) (enacted as Pub. L. No. 95-95, sec. 109(c)(1)(A), § 1ll(a)(1)(C), 91 Stat. 685 (1977)
(emphasis added).
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is inherently low-polluting or nonpolluting." 1 3 And the use of low
sulfur coal seems precisely the kind of step suggested by this explicit
definitional extension. 114 If anything, this explicit language placed
the use of low sulfur coal on a more solid statutory foundation than
before.
Turning to the House committee report, however, one enters a new
world of meaning. The report explicitly proclaims that scrubbing or
some other "add-on" technology is required of all new coalburners.
The statutory definition of "technology" to embrace the operation of
"low-polluting or nonpolluting sources" is explicitly denied-without
explanation-to the typical user of low sulfur coal. 1 5 This clear
statement would bear fruit only if the EPA and the courts focused their
attention upon the committee report, glancing at the statute itself only
when the report's language was ambiguous. Unfortunately, this ap-
proach to statutory interpretation is hardly unprecedented."16 If the
legislative history were to be taken seriously by the courts, the equa-
tion of a "technological system" with scrubbing would serve the sub-
committee's purpose of providing low visibility insurance for the clean
air areas.
3. The Uses of Technocratic Intelligence
As the House committee position evolved in 1975 and early 1976,
the committee staff turned to the executive branch for data in sup-
port of its proposals. 1 7 The EPA modelers' principal task was to
examine the impact of the elaborate new provisions that had been
designed to prevent the significant deterioration of air quality in clean
113. Id. § 111(a)(7), reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 1175, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 310-11 (1976)
(enacted as Pub. L. No. 95-95, sec. 109(c)(1)(B), § 111(a)(7), 91 Stat. 685 (1977) (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(7) (Supp. II 1978)) (emphasis added). According to the House report,
this definition refers "to any technology which is inherently low polluting or non-pollut-
ing (e.g., fluidized bed combustion, use of water-based paints instead of solvents, etc.).
." Id. at 161.
114. Use of low sulfur coal may reduce emissions from a boiler previously using high
sulfur coal by up to 75%. See p. 1483 supra.
115. The report states that a source "may no longer meet NSPS requirements merely
by use of untreated oil or coal," presumably because it is not "technological." H.R. REP.
No. 1175, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 161 (1976) [hereinafter cited as 1976 HousE REPORT].
116. See Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. R.Ev.
527, 543 (1947).
117. See EPA, A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF THE ECONOMIC IMPACT ON THE ELECTRIC
UTILITY INDUSTRY OF ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO SIGNIFICANT DETERIORATION (1976) (Nat'l
Tech. Information Serv. No. PB 251 394) [hereinafter cited as EPA PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS];
EPA & FEDERAL ENERGY ADMIN., AN ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT ON THE ELECTRIC UTILITY
INDUSTRY OF ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO SIGNIFICANT DETERIORATION (1975) (Nat'l Tech.
Information Serv. No. PB 246 205) [hereinafter cited as EPA-FEA ANALYSIS].
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air regions-PSD, as it is known in the trade.118 But the EPA staff
also cast a side-long glance at the House efforts to impose universal
scrubbing through section 111. Rather than using their expertise to
redefine the problem as it was perceived by busy laymen on Capitol
Hill, however, the EPA staff work proceeded within the framework
of congressional understanding. It failed to address the environmental
risks of scrubbing high sulfur coal in the East,119 which had not yet
gained a high place in EPA consciousness. Moreover, it failed to assess
the possibility of achieving emission reductions more cheaply by
lowering the 1.2 ceiling rather than requiring all coalburners to use
scrubbers. Thus, it presented a false dichotomy: universal scrubbing
was treated as if it were the only alternative to the EPA's existing 1.2
standard. 120 Because cheaper ways of achieving lower emission levels
had been excluded a priori, the formal analysis made it appear that
Congress was buying some real sulfur oxide emission reductions by
forcing scrubbing on the utility industry.' 2'
Despite its narrow focus, the technocratic report was hardly an un-
qualified endorsement of the subcommittee's innovation. It emphasized
that the invisible amendment to section 111 was a very expensive prop-
osition-adding, by 1990, 14 billion dollars over the level of expen-
diture required in the name of PSD.'1 2 Moreover, the EPA's projections
suggested that demand for Eastern coal would grow over the next
twenty years even without the artificial respiration provided by the
scrubber.
23
118. See EPA PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS, supra note 117, at I-I to 1-4; EPA-FEA ANALYSIS,
suPra note 117, at 1-3.
119. See EPA PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS, supra note 117, at V-17 (analysis of nationwide
emissions only).
120. See id. at 1-3 to 1-4 (discussion of policy alternatives).
121. Id. at V-17. The EPA predicted that a universal scrubbing requirement would
result in a 1990 emissions level, nationwide, 22% lower than the level that would result
from a 1.2 standard. Even without scrubbing, emissions were predicted to decline, relative
to 1974 levels. The EPA study noted that almost no reduction in national emissions beyond
those produced at a 1.2 standard was required to meet PSD requirements. Id. at V-1 (table
V-1). Instead, the EPA predicted that site selection for new plants could maintain low
levels of SO, in clean air regions. Id. at V-2.
122. Id. at V-8.
123. Id. at V-5. Western production would increase tenfold by 1990 over 1974 produc-
tion of 64 million tons, but mines in the Appalachians and Midwest (including for these
purposes Arkansas and Oklahoma) would enjoy an increase from 531 million tons in 1974
to 680 million tons in 1990. Id. The Appalachian region's production would grow by 45%,
id., while the output of Midwest coal-higher in sulfur content and closer to the low-
sulfur West-would decline by 15% from 149 to 125 million tons in 1990. Suspiciously,
the EPA predicted that universal scrubbing would almost precisely offset the Midwestern
reduction-promising an additional 25 million tons of sales in 1990. In the East and
Midwest combined, however, this 25 million ton gain is less than 5% of present produc-
tion and no more than 17% of the total growth projected for the region under full scrub-
bing. Id.
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4. Dirty Coal and Clean Air Converge
The EPA report hardly suggested that the scrubber was a life-and-
death issue for Eastern coal. Nonetheless, Eastern interests were pre-
dictably receptive to the House subcommittee's "new" NSPS proposal
when the subcommittee's staff went searching for politically potent
allies. 24 Although universal scrubbing had only a problematic relation
to clean air goals, dirty coal producers valued the proposal in its own
right. If Eastern utilities were forced to install scrubbers, it would
be possible for them to meet the 1.2 NSPS while continuing to buy
cheap high sulfur coal. It was only if utilities remained free to sub-
stitute low sulfur coal for scrubbers that a shift away from high
sulfur coal was even conceivable. Thus, it made sense for the dirty
coal producers to abandon their campaign to weaken pollution stan-
dards and take up the cudgels for the costliest possible clean air
solution-universal scrubbing. 12 5 In so doing, Eastern coal interests
abandoned their traditional alliance with utilities whose interests lay
in minimizing the expense of pollution control requirements.
The stage had been set for a bizarre convergence of clean air and
dirty coal forces. The subcommittee had originally turned to scrubbing
as an ancillary environmentalist measure in support of PSD, and viewed
the coal lobby merely as a convenient ally in the battle for clean air.
But once the attention of the coal lobby had been engaged, the scrub-
bing issue took on a life of its own in the service of regional protec-
tionism. This peculiar political marriage is evident in the 1976 House
124. The anxiety of Eastern coal producers must be understood in light of the recent
past as well as the foreseeable future. Although the EPA data, see note 123 supra,
showed that Eastern coal would increase production even without universal scrubbing,
Eastern coal had recently suffered market cutbacks at the hands of clean air. In the 1960s,
Northeastern states had dramatically cut back on the sulfur emissions they would tolerate,
and at the same time, oil import quotas were eliminated. Northeastern utilities substituted
imported low sulfur oil for Eastern high sulfur coal. As a consequence, coal shipments to
power plants on the Atlantic coast, from Maine to Virginia, fell from 40 million tons
(70.3% of all utility fuel burned) in 1964 to 15.4 million tons (15.7%) in 1973. See Non-
degradation Policy of the Clean Air Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Air and Water
Pollution of the Senate Comm. on Public Works, supra note 107, at 141-49. Although
this collapse in the market was offset by gains in sales of Eastern coal in other areas,
resulting in gradual increases in production over the period from 1964 to 1973, 1 U.S.
DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, BuREAU OF MINES, 1973 MINERALS YEARBOOK 326 (1975) (production
statistics); 2 U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF MINES, 1964 MINERALS YEARBOOK 59
(1965) (same), the Eastern coal producers had been taught a lesson they would not quickly
forget.
125. The United Mine Workers, whose membership is concentrated in the East, had
no difficulty coming out publicly for universal scrubbing. See 1976 HousE REPORT, supra
note 115, at 163. The National Coal Association, comprising both Western low-sulfur and
Eastern high-sulfur producers, refused to take a position on scrubbing, leaving individual
companies free to make their views felt. Interview with representative of National Coal
Association, in Washington, D.C. (Sept. 21, 1979).
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committee report, 126  whose language was repeated in the House
report the following year.127 The text, reproduced in the margin,
justifies forced scrubbing by finding six flaws in the existing approach
to NSPS.' 28 Although the critique was written by House staffers with
strong environmentalist reputations, its author might as easily have
come from one of the major coal producers. While the final point in
its bill of particulars attempts an inadequate invocation of technology
forcing,129 the report resembles the standard rhetoric of the Eastern
coal lobby-the need to eliminate unemployment by using "locally
available fuels" and to defeat the energy crisis by burning high sulfur
coal. 30 The committee report, moreover, contains no data to support
this rhetoric and does not discuss the inconsistent analysis that had
been proffered by EPA.
Although the House report established the basis for a clean air-dirty
coal coalition, it remained for the environmental lobby in Washington,
126. 1976 HousE REPORT, supra note 115, at 160.
127. H.R. Rep. No. 294, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 187 (1977).
128. The report argues that the standards of performance for SO, established in
1971, see p. 1485 supra, violate the purposes of the Act because
1. The standards give a competitive advantage to those States with cheaper low
sulfur coal and create a disadvantage for mid-western and eastern States where
predominantly higher sulfur coals are available;
2. These standards do not provide for maximum practicable emission reduction
using locally available fuels, and therefore, do not maximize potential for long term
growth;
3. These standards do not help to expand the energy resources (i.e. higher sulfur
coal) that could be burned in compliance with emission limits as intended.
4. These standards aggravate compliance problems for existing coal burning sta-
tionary sources which cannot retrofit and which must compete with larger, new
sources for low sulfur coal.
5. These standards increase the risk of early plant shut downs by existing plants
(for the reasons stated above), with greater risk of unemployment.
6. These standards operate as a disincentive to the improvement of technology for
new sources, since untreated fuels could be burned instead of using such new, more
effective technology.
1976 HousE REPORT, supra note 115, at 160.
129. The effect of percentage reduction requirements is to discourage the development
of technologies that fail to meet specified levels of percentage reduction. Preclusion of
new processes may occur even though the application of such technologies to lower sulfur
fuels might produce reduced emissions at lower cost than the use of approved technologies
on the high sulfur fuel that would otherwise be used. See generally Oversight: Effect of
the Clean Air Act Amendments on New Energy Technologies and Resources: Hearings Be-
fore the Subcomm. on Fossil and Nuclear Energy Research, Development and Demonstra-
tion of the House Comm. on Science and Technology, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 126-30 (1978)
(statement of James L. Liversman, Dep't of Energy) (percentage reduction requirement may
inhibit development of emerging technologies).
130. See, e.g., Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Environmental Pollution of the Senate Comm. on Environment and Public Worhs, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 90 (1977) (statement of James Laulis, member, West Virginia
House of Delegates) (power plants should burn local coal) [hereinafter cited as Senate
Hearings-1977 Amendments].
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D.C. to accept the political invitation. Though controversies over exist-
ing plants and clean air regions predisposed public interest lawyers
favorably toward the scrubber, leading environmental lawyers were
aware of the heavy costs of imposing particular technologies on industry
rather than permitting them to search out the cheapest way of meeting
emission requirements.' 3 ' They also had a great deal of practice ferret-
ing out assumptions buried in technocratic reports-it would not have
been hard to flush out the EPA's false dichotomy between universal
scrubbing and the preexisting 1.2 standard, which ignored cheaper
alternatives for reducing emissions.
132
Rather than explicitly campaigning for a congressionally mandated
reduction in the 1.2 standard, however, public interest lawyers em-
braced the dirty coal rhetoric. For example, Joseph Brecher, on behalf
of the Sierra Club, condemned the 1971 decision because "eastern high
sulfur coal, which is now available, is having a hard time getting a
market because of the comparative cheapness of bringing in western
low sulfur coal."'133 Richard Ayres, for the Natural Resources Defense
Council, bemoaned the fact "that the Clean Air Act became a factor
influencing the competition in the market for coal, encouraging prac-
tices such as shipping mountain state coal to Illinois and Louisiana,
with attendant use of oil powering the diesel engines used to transport
train after train of coal."' 3 Typically, environmentalists do not protest
when a government initiative forces industry to discard "dirty" inputs
and substitute "clean" ones. In so doing, government is simply
eliminating market distortions and requiring the prices of high-pollut-
ing products to reflect their true social cost.1 5 Rather than condemning
the advantage gained by clean coal as artificial, it is more characteristic
131. See Ayres, suPra note 95, at 476 (agency development of technological expertise
duplicates industry's activities, discourages innovation by industry, and distracts agency
from environmental focus).
132. See p. 1496 suPra.
133. EPA Public Hearing on Coal Fired Steam Generators SQ2 Emissions 1-9 (EPA
Docket No. OAQPS-78-I, Item No. II-G-2) (May 25, 1977); id. at 47, 58-59 (Item No. II-
G-3) (May 26, 1977) (statement of Nancy Bartlit, representing New Mexico Citizens for
Clean Air and Water, Inc., and American Lung Association).
134. Senate Hearings-1977 Amendments, supra note 130, at 180, 209 (1977) (statement
of Richard E. Ayres). Ayres continues to make explicit use of dirty coal rhetoric in the
present controversy, now on appeal to the D.C. Circuit. See the revealing article by Ayres
and Doniger, supra note 7, at 78.
In contrast to the suggestion made by Ayres in the text, it is now predicted that the
free use of low sulfur coal instead of scrubbers will decrease the nation's dependence on
oil. See ICF, INC., THE FINAL SET OF ANALYSES OF ALTERNATIvE NEW SOURCE PERFORMANCE
STANDARDS FOR NEW COAL-FIRED PLANTS 5 (June 1979) (prepared between December 1978
and May 1979).
135. Cf. A. KNEESE, R. AYRES, & R. D'ARGE, suPra note 69, at 2-15 (1970) (discussing
problem of costs generated by high-polluting products).
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for environmentalists to applaud the fact that the "true" costs of dirty
coal have finally been revealed. 136 No matter. With such rhetorical
assistance, the peculiar coalition between the friends of clean air and
dirty coal would be a powerful political force.
Yet rhetoric alone cannot overcome the fundamental conflicts con-
cealed by a marriage of convenience. While both groups wanted
scrubbers, they wanted them for different reasons. Environmentalists
saw scrubbing as a technique for cutting new plant emissions below
1.2 pounds to even lower levels. For example, if a plant using one
pound Western coal was required to scrub at ninety percent efficiency,
only 0.1 pound of sulfur oxide would be discharged.13 7 For Eastern
coal interests, however, scrubbing was desirable only so long as new
plants could keep discharging at the old 1.2 level. If the Administrator
used scrubbing as a reason for lowering the standard dramatically be-
low 1.2, this would, once again, freeze high sulfur coal producers out
of the new plant market.
38
We return, in short, to the master policy problem that the EPA
had finessed in 1971 when it first established new source standards for
coalburners. Given sulfur variability in coal, it is conceptually im-
possible to move unproblematically from the availability of scrubbing
to the acceptable amount of SO2 coming out of the smokestack. In-
stead of focusing on technological means of purification, the critical
question was whether the existing 1.2 ceiling was too high, too low, or
about right. In 1971, the Administrator had resolved the low priority
issue in a mechanical way.' 39 Now that the question was rising in prom-
inence, the peculiar convergence between cledti air and dirty coal
created a political situation in which the combine would avoid con-
fronting the policy problem at all cost. Moreover, the House staff's
drafting strategy made it easy for Congress to avoid a clear policy
directive. By avoiding an explicit statutory amendment and manipulat-
ing legislative history, the House subcommittee could promise both
political actors the best of both worlds. The House report stated that
scrubbing would be required, 40 eliminating utilities' incentive to burn
low sulfur Western coal, and thereby satisfying Eastern coal interests.
On the other hand, the Administrator remained free' 4 ' to use the new
136. See, e.g., Ayres, suora note 95, at 476 (qualified support of pollution tax to in-
ternalize costs).
137. Cf. Ayres & Doniger, supra note 7, at 72-73 (table 1) (appropriate ceiling, based
on 95% scrubbing, would be 0.17 pounds per MBTU).
138. See p. 1551 inIra (discussing coal preclusion).
139. See p. 1485 suPra.
140. See 1976 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 115, at 161.
141. Thus, the House report merely stated that the new NSPS must be at least as
stringent as the old 1.2 standard. Id.
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technology as a reason for cutting back on overall emissions, thereby
satisfying the environmentalists. But this time, when the Administrator
was confronted with the decision, he would no longer be able to finesse
the problem as he had in 1971. Instead, he would confront parties who
thought that their political victories in the committee reports en-
titled them to legal victories in the administrative process.
5. Avoiding Debate: 1976
The premises underlying the "new" section 111 went largely un-
challenged throughout the 1976 legislative process. The partisans of
scrubbing had no incentive to enlarge the debate; high visibility dis-
cussion could only reveal the disparate hopes that bound the clean
air-dirty coal coalition together. Because the utility industry concen-
trated its assault on PSD protection for "clean air areas,"' 42 no signif-
icant lobby invested resources in documenting the shaky relationship
between universal scrubbing and any of the aims that Congress was
considering. Moreover, the technocratic support work failed to signal
the existence of a distinctive policy problem. The EPA study'43 implied
that the debate over universal scrubbing was a garden-variety environ-
mental problem, involving a straightforward trade-off between higher
costs and cleaner air. Nothing was said after the "new" section 111 left
the House committee that reflected a general congressional awareness
of the unnecessary expense, and the doubtful environmental benefit,
generated by requiring nationwide scrubbing. 144
The invisible revision in the language of section 111 passed through
the House untouched; its relative lack of salience was emphasized by
the fact that the Senate committee saw no need to include a com-
parable revision in its legislative proposals. 45 When the conference
142. Interview with representative of Utility Air Regulatory Group, in New Haven,
Conn. (October 22, 1979).
143. See pp. 1495-96 suPra (discussing EPA PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS, supra note 117).
144. At only one point in the committee's work was there any warning sign that
universal scrubbing would not necessarily lead to cleaner air. See 1976 HOUSE REPORT,
supra note 115, at 496-97 (comments of dissenting Congressmen arguing that requirement
would impose unjustifiable burdens). This insight had no perceptible impact on the course
of congressional debate.
145. The 1976 Senate bill, S. 3219, did require the use of "best available control tech-
nology" (BACT) as a part of PSD requirements for sources located in clean air regions.
See S. REP. No. 717, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 139, 158 (1976) (reprinting S. 3219). This BACT
requirement, though, was keyed to the protection of clean air regions and did not require
scrubbing on a national basis. Id. at 157. Moreover, as originally conceived by the EPA,
BACT merely required use of any control strategy sufficient to meet existing NSPS, in-
cluding, for power plants, the use of either low sulfur coal or scrubbers. See 40 C.F.R.
§§ 52.01(f), 52.21(d)(2)(ii) (1976). Since the passage of the 1977 amendments, EPA has not
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committee reported out a compromise set of amendments, 140 the House
amendment to section 111-with its legislative history-was included
without any further elaboration.147 At that point, however, the con-
ference measure encountered determined opposition from Western in-
dustry and automakers. In response to a threatened filibuster, the
Senate leadership shelved the controversy until the following session.
148
C. Midnight Lawmaking: The Problem of Agenda Overload
In 1977, a new Congress and a new President still faced the need to
amend the Clean Air Act. Unhappily, however, the "energy crisis" had
replaced the "environmental crisis" as the central problem on President
Carter's domestic agenda. In turn, this change in executive focus made
it even more difficult for Congress to examine soberly the scrubber's
relationship to basic environmental objectives.
1. Energy Policy Takes Center Stage
The President committed the executive's resources to James Schles-
inger and assigned him the humbling task of devising a "comprehen-
sive" energy plan in ninety days. 149 In this context, scrubbing appeared
once again as an ancillary concern. Independence from foreign oil could
be purchased only by burning more domestic coal. Yet, to make coal
burning politically acceptable, Schlesinger would have to come up with
something that would calm environmental anxieties. Because the en-
vironmental lobby had proved to be a congressional power, scrubbing
appeared an easy way to convert a dangerous opponent into a formida-
ble ally. Not that Schlesinger was ignorant of the costs of scrubbing or
the regional interests involved. 50 But billions of dollars in costs ap-
treated BACT as requiring standards more stringent than NSPS, even where "demon-
strated" technologies are capable of higher percentage reductions than those required by
NSPS. See, e.g., EPA, COMNPILATON OF BACT/LAER DETERMINATIONS 14, 16 (1979) (EPA
Pub. No. 45012-79-003).
146. In an effort to propose its own compromise, the Ford administration offered a
proposal that accepted PSD in principle but delayed the BACT requirement until 1985.
This proposal was quickly withdrawn, however, and had no effect on the evolution of the
Act. See 7 ENvIR. REP. (BNA) 532 (1976).
147. H.R. REP. No. 1742, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 89 (1976) (conference report).
148. The conference compromise was dropped after a filibuster on the last day of the
1976 session. Major opposition came from the auto industry, as well as stationary source
industries. See 7 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 835 (1976).
149. For an informal analysis of the management process that produced the National
Energy Plan, see N.Y. Times, Apr. 24, 1977, § 1, at 1, col. I.
150. Schlesinger's staff produced a briefing paper that emphasized a few essential
points. First, it made clear that a concern with clean air might be better expressed by
reducing the present 1.2 emission level to some lower figure. Second, it revealed the
regional economic conflict. Third, it emphasized that scrubbing "[w]ill raise utility
capital requirements by 3-4% and electricity bills by 2-3%." See 7 ENvIR. REP. (BNA) 1633
(1977) (summary of briefing paper).
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peared insignificant from the Olympian heights of comprehensive
energy planning, especially when a simple solution to the environ-
mental problem promised great political benefits. Universal scrubbing
was therefore attached, as an environmental safeguard, to the steps in
the energy plan that were intended to encourage utilities to increase
their use of coal.15 1
Because scrubbing was now part of Schlesinger's comprehensive
energy plan, it was no longer appropriate for the EPA, or anybody
else in the executive, to ask hard questions about the relationship of
scrubbing to any of the environmental goals before Congress in the
1977 clean air legislation. To the contrary, a carefully coordinated
lobbying effort featuring, among others, Douglas Costle, the Adminis-
trator of the EPA, stressed the ways in which the President's plan was
compatible with the legislation already pending before Congress.' 52
As a consequence, the House subcommittee had no incentive to re-
consider its invisible change in the language of section 111, and the
coal lobby rhetoric of the committee report remained essentially un-
changed. Moreover, the new controls over new power plants were not
the subject of a special vote in the House' 53 but passed as an un-
differentiated part of the legislative package.
151. See Address Delivered Before a Joint Session of the Congress, 1 PUB. PAPERS 663
(Apr. 20, 1977); Address to the Nation, 1 PUB. PAPERS 656 (Apr. 18, 1977). The showpieces
of the program were a series of taxes on consumers and producers of gasoline, some cautious
steps toward deregulation of energy markets, and tax incentives and subsidies for energy
conservation. See National Energy Program: Fact Sheet on the President's Program, 1 PUB.
PAPERS 672, 674-87 (Apr. 20, 1977).
152. See, e.g., 1977 House Hearings, supra note 95, at 1677, 1678 (statement of Douglas
Costie) (supporting use of high sulfur coal and BACT); Coal Conversion Legislation: Hear-
ings Before the Subcomm. on Energy Production and Supply of the Senate Comm. on
Energy and Natural Resources, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 1392, 1393-94 (1977) (statement of
Douglas Costle) (supporting BACT and PSD as mitigating effects of coal conversion); id.
at 1407, 1412 (statement of John F. O'Leary, Administrator, Federal Energy Administration)
(supporting BACT as compatible with energy policy).
These statements revealed influence from above, not expert opinion below. By late
1976, EPA analysts had concluded that universal scrubbing was an environmentally un-
sound policy. See J. Crenshaw, D. Kirchgessner, H. Kuo, C. Miranda, & A. Wehe, Staff
Study: Alternatives for Revising the SO. New Source Performance Standard for Coal-Fired
Steam Generators at i, 33 (October 22, 1976) (EPA Docket No. OAQPS-78-I, Item No. II-
A-7) (concluding that "[i]f the decision is made to revise the NSPS .. ., then the most cost
effective and advantageous approach would be to retain the form of the existing standard
and to lower the allowable emission limit," and that "[t]he principal advantages of this
approach [retention of a simple emission ceiling], other than cost considerations, are that
it would reduce SO, emissions most in the high sulfate region and that it would allow
new plants latitude in determining how they will comply with the regulation.").
153. 33 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 78-H to 80-H (1977) (list of House roll call votes on Clean
Air Act Amendments).
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2. Regional Protectionism in the Open
Although the scrubbing proposal hidden in the legislative history
of section 111 gained no attention, a new initiative forced Congress,
for the first time, to pay serious attention to the peculiar political logic
behind forced scrubbing. The issue of regional protectionism was
raised by the Act's treatment of old plants rather than new ones. En-
titled "Measures to Prevent Economic Disruption or Unemployment,"
the new proposal evolved into section 125 of the Act. It permitted any
Governor, the EPA Administrator, or the President to find that a shift
from "locally or regionally available coal" would result in "significant
local or regional economic disruption or unemployment."'1 4 On such
a finding, either the Governor or the President could order the source
to use regional coal to meet the applicable emission requirement.'5r
Such an order, of course, would have the consequence of requiring a
coalburner to install scrubbers to bail out local miners and mine
owners. The amendment, which gained the explicit endorsement of
the United Mine Workers, represented an enormous step in the evolu-
tion of the Clean Air Act. No longer was the Act's symbolic demand
for the best technology made in the name of cleaning up the air; in-
stead, the symbols of clean air were being manipulated in plain view
on behalf of the coal-mining industry. Despite this fact, its last minute
introduction on the House floor by Congressman Rogers,'50 the floor
manager, prompted no serious discussion. The proposal was adopted in
an unrecorded vote.
1 57
When, however, a nearly identical measure was introduced in the
Senate by Senator Metzenbaum of Ohio, 58 it precipitated the only
thoughtful discussion of the implications of the clean air-dirty coal
coalition.'59 Senator Muskie, one of eleven speakers, noted that the
amendment's "dominant thrust" was "not its relationship to clean air,
but its relationship to the economics of the areas it is designed to pro-
tect."'160 He warned against "regionalization" and announced his op-
154. Pub. L. No. 95-95, sec. 122, § 125(a), 91 Stat. 685 (1977) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §
7425 (Supp. II 1978)).
155. In 1978, Congress further limited executive powers to issue regional coal use
orders under § 125, and removed the power of a Governor to initiate proceedings. See
National Energy Conservation Policy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-619, § 661, 92 Stat. 3206
(1978) (to be codified in 42 U.S.C. § 6215).
156. 123 CONG. Rac. H5026 (daily ed. May 25, 1977).
157. Id. at H5027.
158. Id. at S9449 (daily ed. June 10, 1977) (amendment introduced on behalf of Sen.
Metzenbaum (Ohio), Sen. Randolph (W. Va.), Sen. Bayh (Ind.), Sen. Heinz (Pa.)).
159. Id. at S9452-56.
160. Id. at 89458.
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position to the measure. In response, Senator Metzenbaum pointed to
the support for the amendment expressed by the National Clean Air
Coalition, the Environmental Policy Center, and the Sierra Club,
"prestigious groups who have a concern with the whole question of
clean air."' 6 Artfully, Metzenbaum beckoned his comrades to join
hands with the National Clean Air Coalition in support of the fears of
the United Mine Workers.1
6 2
Moving beyond its "natural" base of support in the Appalachian and
Midwestern mining states, the amendment gained the support of just
enough Eastern and Southern Democrats to offset Muskie's opposition,
joined by the West, by a vote of 45 to 44.163 Minutes later, the Senate
took a step to control the potential for mischief. Senator Domenici of
New Mexico gained unanimous support for a proviso that was accepted
without debate or roll call. 64 Implicitly recognizing section 125's status
as special interest legislation, it stipulated that the Governor, the
President, or the President's designee "shall take into account the final
cost to the consumer" before invoking the section.' 6 5 This proviso made
it clear that scrubbers should not be imposed if their cost was dispro-
portionate to the protectionist benefits generated for local mines.
When put to a highly visible test, then, the clean air-dirty coal coali-
tion could gain only an equivocal and highly qualified victory. Any
market guarantee for dirty coal could be obtained only through a
highly visible procedure in which decisionmakers found a causal link
between pollution requirements and "significant local or regional eco-
nomic disruption" and recognized the heavy costs to consumers that
unnecessary scrubbing might entail. Because there was reason to ex-
pect a substantial increase in demand for Eastern coal over the next
decade,' 66 it was plain that section 125 would, at best, provide limited
areas with temporary relief-and even this was hardly guaranteed. Upon
confronting the question squarely, the Senate gave the dirty coal-clean
air lobby more symbol than substance.
3. The Conference Compromise: Fabricating Legislative History
In contrast, its treatment of the same issue under section 111 could
not stand out in bolder relief. The only unambiguous benefit to be
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at S9459.
164. Id. at S9468. Senator Muskie also supported tie Domenici amendment. Id.
165. Id. (remarks of Sen. Domenici). See also Pub. L. No. 95-95, sec. 122, § 125, 91 Stat.
722 (1977) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7425 (Supp. II 1978)).
166. See, e.g., EPA PRELIIsiNARY ANALYsIS, supra note 117, at V-5.
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gained by forcing all new plants to scrub, rather than use low sulfur
coal, was the very same regional advantage that Senator Metzenbaum
sought to procure. But here the future of scrubbing would not depend
upon a high-visibility demonstration of economic dislocation in par-
ticular cases, but would be mandated on a nationwide basis at a cost of
tens of billions of dollars. 167 Yet, as the bill passed through the Senate,
there was no easy way in which anxieties about the dirty coal-clean air
coalition could express themselves in statutory form. For the Senate
bill, like its 1976 predecessor, proposed no change in section 11 1,
l08
and the Senate report contained nothing resembling the House com-
mittee's low-visibility pronunciamento on behalf of dirty coal. How-
ever, the scrubbing lobby was more than content to evade explicit
senatorial consideration by permitting history to repeat itself-leaving
it to the conference committee to reach a "compromise" in which the
House's legislative history would once again serve to expose the hidden
meaning of section 111.
The fate of the scrubber, then, was to be resolved as part of a final
conference between House and Senate, charged with the task of ham-
mering out a compromise on a host of issues more salient than the one
raised under section Ill-notably the future of auto emissions policy
and the shape of the PSD amendments. 169 The committee gave itself
precious little time, perhaps adopting a Parkinsonian belief that polit-
ical dealing would expand to fill the time allotted. Appointed in mid-
June, it did not meet until July 18,170 despite the House's announced
intention to recess on August fifth. For the next hectic weeks, a chang-
ing cast of harried Congressmen and Senators and tired aides marked up
the proposals before a ring of watchful lobbyists of all persuasions. The
committee ended its deliberations at 2:20 a.m. on August third.1 7 1 Its
final bill and report were typed on August third and approved by the
House and Senate on the fourth in time for adjournment on the fifth.'
7 2
Once again, section 111 occupied its familiar position in the con-
gressional twilight. By this time, however, the first few glimmers of
awareness can be detected. George Freeman, a leading utility lobbyist,
came to realize that the invisible amendment to section 111 might
167. For a fuller discussion of projected costs, see note 258 infra.
168. H.R. REP. No. 564, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 130, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWs 1510 (conference report) (Senate did not change § 111) [hereinafter cited as
1977 CONFERENcE REPORT].
169. See 8 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 155-58 (1977).
170. Id. at 462.
171. Id. at 509.
172. Id. at 568; 123 CONG. REc. H8672 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1977); id. at S13,711.
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constitute a threat in its own right; but he had to devote his main
efforts to PSD. 173 Senator Domenici, having learned of the low-visibility
House preference for scrubbing in the 1976 conference, was better
prepared this time to question the new section 111.17 He considered
universal scrubbing, especially in the West, to be highly wasteful. None-
theless, the House amendment to section 111 was not treated as an
issue of the highest importance when the provision came up in the last
week of the conference. When Domenici voiced his objections, the
proposal was not made the center of a day's discussion-though even
this would hardly do justice to the issue. Instead of this first class treat-
ment, primary responsibility for section 111 was delegated to a handful
of congressional aides whose principals had expressed concern.
Because the House committee had taken an institutional stand, the
House staffers had the advantage of knowing the general position they
were trying to advance. The situation on the Senate side posed a more
complex problem. Even though Domenici was a Republican, his aide
came to the bargaining session with substantial bargaining power, since
the need to prevent a renewed filibuster made every vote important.
But he could not press his views too far. The one thing the conference
did not need was a major political confrontation on an issue that was
generally considered of secondary importance. Also, Domenici did not
have the solid support of his fellow Senators. Senator Randolph of West
Virginia, a coal state, had declared himself in favor of the House amend-
ment; the only real question was how hard he would fight for it. Al-
though Senator Muskie had shown himself unsympathetic to Eastern
coal interests in the vote on section 125, Domenici's aides were uncer-
tain whether he would trade off a concession on section 111 for other
issues he considered more important.
Within this general setting of political uncertainty, a small group
of staffers tried to work out a compromise version of section 111. A
series of legal uncertainties complicated their task yet further. Nobody
could be quite sure what the House committee report would amount
173. Interview with representative of Utility Air Regulatory Group, in New Haven,
Conn. (Oct. 22, 1979). For evidence of the utility industry's early uncertainty over the
actual impact of the 1976 House amendment to § Iii, see Senate Hearings-1977 Amend-
ments, supra note 130, at 289, 296-98 (analysis by George C. Freeman, Jr., discussing am-
biguity of amendments to § Ill in 1976 conference bill).
174. The description of Senator Domenici's actions here and below is derived from
interviews with aides to various senators and representatives on the House and Senate
committees and the conference committee. Notes of interviews on file with Yale Law
Journal. Prior to passage of the Senate bill on June 10, Senator Domenici submitted
additional statements criticizing the House's revision of section 111. 123 CONG. REc. S9477
(daily ed. June 10, 1977).
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to in the cold light of litigation. While Domenici's staff feared that
the courts would give too much weight to the legislative history, the
House staff wondered if it would succeed in using legislative history to
inflate its minor changes in statutory language into a scrubbing require-
ment. Because section 111 would no longer float through conference
unnoticed, they were not averse to raising their hidden agenda to
statutory prominence. Yet, although both sides saw the merit of rework-
ing the language of the House bill, an unambiguous statement of policy
would precipitate the confrontation between their principals that all
sought to avoid.
Senate staffers were successful in making one substantive point. A
new subsection (h) made it clear that Congress did not want the Ad-
ministrator to preempt the discharger's choice of the control technology
that would best permit him to achieve emission limitations. Thus, un-
less it is "not feasible" to permit polluters to choose, the subsection
denies the Administrator the authority to require a particular "design,
equipment, work practice, or operational standard." The new defini-
tion of "not feasible," moreover, makes it plain that facilities like
power plants cannot be subjected to design or equipment standards. 175
Yet, while the Senate achieved this substantive prohibition, the House
achieved a formal victory that looked in the opposite direction. Hence-
forth, the statute would require the Administrator to regulate power
plants differently from other dischargers.' 76 Although the Administrator
was to tell everybody else to reach a specified emission limit, an ac-
ceptable power plant standard also had to require
the achievement of a percentage reduction in the emissions from
such category of sources from the emissions which would have
resulted from the use of fuels which are not subject to treatment
prior to combustionY.
77
175. Section 111(h)(2) defines the phrase "not feasible to prescribe or enforce a standard
of performance" to mean "any situation in which the Administrator determines that (A)
a pollutant or pollutants cannot be emitted through a conveyance designed and constructed
to emit or capture such pollutant.., or (B) the application of measurement methodology
to a particular class of sources is not practicable due to technological or economic limita.
tions." Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, § 109(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7411(h)(2) (Supp. II
1978). Power plants emitting pollutants through a smokestack equipped with continuous
monitors clearly fall outside this definition. This definitional amendment was apparently
intended to resolve the question raised in Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434
U.S. 275, 285-89 (1978) (Administrator's lack of authority to issue work practice require.
ments as standard of performance).
176. Section 111, as amended in 1977, distinguishes between fossil-fired stationary
sources (primarily power plants and industrial boilers) and all other sources. Percentage
reduction requirements apply only to sources in the former category. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)
(1)(A)(B) (Supp. II 1978).
177. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1)(A)(ii) (Supp. II 1978).
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Henceforth, the Administrator must not only require a power plant to
discharge no more than X pounds of sulfur oxide per MBTU, but also
to reduce the sulfur in the coal by Y percent. By setting the percentage
reduction requirement at a level only scrubbers could achieve, eighty-
five percent for example, the Administrator could effectively force all
coalburners to install scrubbers. But the statute falls far short of
mandating such a high percentage. Indeed, it does not even require the
Administrator to establish the same percentage for all coalburners.
Although each plant must be assigned "a percentage reduction" to
achieve, another subsection, unchanged from 1970, expressly au-
thorizes the Administrator "to distinguish among classes, types, and
sizes within categories of new sources for the purposes of establishing
such [NSPS] standards." 17 Hence, the Administrator has the au-
thority to tell users of low sulfur coal to reduce their sulfur content
by Y, percent and require high sulfur burners to eliminate Y2 percent.
Indeed, when viewed within the framework of the section as a whole,
the added provision does not even bar the Administrator from estab-
lishing a reduction of zero percent for low sulfur coal burners. For the
new formal requirements are subject to the old substantive standard
that requires the Administrator to consider "the cost of achieving...
emission reduction[s]" before requiring the use of the "best tech-
nological system." 179 This provision explicitly makes cost a considera-
tion before low sulfur users can be required to install scrubbers. Also,
the statute's reference to the "best technological system" is not to be
understood in its natural sense. It must be read in terms of the technical
statutory definition, which includes "a technological process for . . .
operation by any source which is inherently low polluting or non-
polluting."'80 Although this expansive definition was introduced by
the House staff in 1976,181 the staff failed to modify it in the 1977 rush,
even though it mocked their effort to prevent utilities from using "low
polluting" varieties of low sulfur coal.
Rather than trying to bring the increasingly complex statutory
language under control, the draftsmen turned to their first love: making
legislative history. Once again, the House staff gained a victory in
the conference report that it utterly failed to achieve on the sur-
face of the statute: "The Senate concurs in the House provision with
minor amendments. The agreement . preclude[s] use of untreated
178. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(b)(2) (Supp. II 1978).
179. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1) (Supp. II 1978).
180. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(7)(A) (Supp. II 1978).
181. See pp. 1494-95 supra.
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low sulfur coal alone as a means of compliance."' 8 2 Yet midnight
legislative history is a game any number can play. Aides for Senator
Domenici were quick to add their own opinion in the next paragraph:
"the conferees agreed that the Administrator may, in his discretion, set
a range of pollutant reduction that reflects varying fuel characteris-
tics."'1 3 Given this threat, the House staffers counterattacked with
another tack-on: "Any departure from the uniform national percentage
reduction requirement, however, must be accompanied by a finding
that such a departure does not undermine the basic purposes of the
House provision and other provisions of the act, such as maximizing
the use of locally available fuels."'1 4
These last remarks epitomize the abuses that follow from undisci-
plined legislative history. The only statutory recognition of Eastern
coal interests is to be found in section 125, which does not seek to
"maximize" local production but extends a highly qualified protection
to areas suffering serious economic dislocation that can be demon-
strably linked to pollution regulation. Rather than referring back to
the coal lobby rhetoric contained in the old House committee report,
an interpretation of the statutory language should refer to the aims of
the statute declared in the Act itself-which, apart from section 125,
shows no special solicitude for local coal producers. Just as the con-
ference report fantasizes about the Act's basic purposes, its invocation
of a "uniform national percentage reduction requirement"'18 5 is, as we
have just shown, entirely unsupported by the language and structure
of the statutory text. This extraordinary bit of legislative history can be
understood only as an effort to offset the challenge raised by Senator
Domenici's effort to "amend" the legislative history on his own behalf.
Apparently, the incoherent quality of the legislative history was ap-
parent to the amendment's supporters almost immediately. After spend-
ing all of August third compiling the conference report that had been
completed at 2:20 that morning, the staffers thought it wise to spend
the next day formulating a "Clarifying Statement" while both Houses
were voting their approval of the statutory language.'8 6 Among these
clarifications is one that reflects a continuing effort to wrestle with
182. H.R. REP. No. 564, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 130, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG.
& A. NEws 1510 [hereinafter cited as 1977 CONFERENCE REPORT].
183. Id. at 130, [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 1511.
184. Id.
185. Id. (emphasis added).
186. Clean Air Conference Report (1977): Statement of Intent; Clarification of Select
Provisions, 123 CONG. REc. H8662 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1977), reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWs 1570.
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the confusion. This time it is said that "while the conferees agreed that
the Administrator may set the percentage reduction requirement as a
percentage range, the conferees expect the Administrator to be exceed-
ingly cautious if he should elect to do so. Such range would be allowed
only to reflect varying fuel characteristics and must be based on a care-
fully and completely documented finding ... that [this] does not under-
mine the basic purpose[s] . . . of the House Report."' 87 But alas, the
time had passed for putting such clarifications where they belonged-in
the text of the statute itself.
In short, the draftsmen brewed a mix of statute and legislative history
that was worthy of the occasion. Rather than integrating section 111
into the basic structure of the Act, their task was to avoid a potential
conference impasse by writing a document whose legal meaning was
hopelessly confused. The new section 111 is easier to understand as an
exercise in small-group dynamics than as an effort to guide the bureau-
cratic management of a multibillion dollar problem.
D. Beyond the New Deal: Congressional Performance
Although we shall, in due course,'," speak in detail about the proper
judicial interpretation of section 111, our concerns with the congres-
sional history go beyond this particular legal problem. For our story,
we think, is rich with the symptoms of acute institutional breakdown
that suggest more general lessons about the effort to move beyond the
New Deal. On the one hand, our scrubbing story reveals a failure to
discharge the functions Congress is uniquely equipped to handle in our
system of government. On the other hand, Congress was entirely inept
in discharging a function that could have readily been performed by
an administrative agency.
Taking the first hand first, we understand Congress to be uniquely
equipped to discharge two governmental tasks: first, the reconsidera-
tion of basic policy premises; second, the reflection of changes in pre-
dominant political opinion. Yet our long and complex story does not
reveal any effort to discharge either of these functions. At no point did
anyone use congressional reconsideration as a vehicle for ventilating the
basic premises behind section 111. Was it sensible to divorce new plants
from old plants in the way attempted by the 1970 Act? Were there
innovative ways of regulating new plants that would be more satis-
factory than "technology forcing"? Even if the answers to such questions
187. See id. at H8664, [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 1576.
188. See pp. 1556-66 infra.
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had amounted to nothing more than an endorsement of the status quo,
the ensuing policy discussion might have yielded regulatory rewards in
years to come. Instead of making this effort, however, the House staff
never looked beyond the issues generated by litigation to define the
problems of congressional concern. And even within these narrow
boundaries, there was no inclination to think through the basic policy
issue raised by new coalburners-whether the Administrator's 1.2 limit
was too high or too low or just about right. Rather than refining the
legislative definition of ends, it was necessary to avoid this question at
all costs-lest it break apart the marriage of convenience between clean
air and dirty coal.
Nor did congressional reconsideration of NSPS provide an occasion
for reflecting a change in dominant political opinion about environ-
mental regulation. To the contrary, the incoherent congressional revi-
sion of section 111 is a product of the special interests unleashed-
entirely unconsciously-by the artless way the NSPS statute was written
in 1970. The effort to insulate technology forcing from New Deal
ideals had succeeded only too well. Insulated from the corrosive
questions of means-end rationality, the symbols of environmental purity
had been appropriated by-of all people-the partisans of dirty coal.
Indeed the success of the scrubbing lobby depended entirely on its
ability to avoid a well-focused debate on the basic issues raised by the
peculiar clean air-dirty coal coalition. As we have seen, the only section
that explicitly linked scrubbing to the protection of high sulfur coal
producers-section 125-squeaked through the Senate by a roll-call vote
of 45 to 44. Yet this highly qualified statute, in fact, promised very
little economic relief to Eastern coal.189 Surely this vote did not au-
gur well for a statute that would have required the expenditure of
tens of billions' 9" on scrubbing so as to "maximize the use of locally
available fuels." Such cheap talk could survive in the committee re-
ports only so long as it did not provoke a political confrontation that
would force the issue into the center of congressional consciousness.
Rather than reflecting prevailing political opinion, section 111 could
survive only by deflecting attention to other issues-PSD for the Con-
gress, energy policy for the Carter administration.
Which leads us to the other hand. Rather than discharging its dis-
tinctive functions, Congress operated in this case as a peculiarly inept
administrative agency, trying to resolve a disputable question of in-
189. See p. 1505 supra.
190. EPA, PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS, supra note 117, at V-8 (scrubbing on plants in at-
tainment areas would cost additional $14 to $16 billion by 1990).
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strumental rationality without asking the most obvious questions raised
by the scrubbing issue: What was so bad about sulfur oxide emissions
anyway? Was forced scrubbing the cheapest way to solve the problem?
Just how serious was the economic dislocation imposed by the shift to
Western coal? Were there better ways of cushioning the blow to Eastern
mines than spending billions on scrubbers? Rather than defining ends
with care and articulating cost-effective policies to implement these
goals, the final decision was made amongst a crush of conference com-
mittee compromises. Yet, while so much is obvious, we must move
beyond these symptoms to more basic causes: how could the clean air-
dirty coal coalition induce Congress to act-albeit incoherently-on a
multibillion dollar issue on such an inadequate foundation?
At least part of the answer, we think, can be found in the political
economy of congressional attention. 191 Each subcommittee 92 recognizes
that the capacity of the full house to process issues is such a scarce
resource that only the most salient questions will receive any serious
attention from the great majority of representatives. As a consequence,
each committee is in a position to manipulate the legislative process
to achieve aims that would not survive if they were given clearly focused
legislative attention. The problem is heightened by the proliferation
of congressional staff over the past twenty years.193 Although these
staffers do try to alert their Congressmen to important issues, their
existence also makes it possible for strategically placed interest groups
to generate many more low-visibility congressional initiatives. There
is reason to fear that the demand for low-visibility legislation is out-
stripping the fixed supply of congressional attention.
194
191. For some insightful general remarks, see R. DAHL, AFTER THE REVOLUTION? 42-56
(1970) (time as valuable and scarce resource).
192. See generally N. POLSBY, CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENCY 110 (3d ed. 1976) (increasing
autonomy of specialized subcommittees); Ornstein, Causes and Consequences of Congres-
sional Change: Subcommittee Reforms in the House of Representatives, 1970-73, in CON-
CRESS IN CHANGE 88, 105-110 (N. Ornstein ed. 1975) (reforms guaranteeing budgets, staff,
and specific jurisdiction to subcommittees).
193. Between 1957 and 1976, staffing on congressional committees tripled, and Con-
gressmen's personal staffs grew by 180%. H. Fox & S. HAMMOND, CONGRESSIONAL STAFTS:
THE INVISIBLE FORCE IN AMERICAN LWmAKING 171 (1977). Committee staffing grew by
81% between 1972 and 1976 alone. Id.
194. See generally Senate Committee System: Hearings Before the Temporary Select
Committee to Study the Senate Committee System, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 104 (1976) (state-
ment of Sen. Morgan of N.C.) ("[A] great deal of the legislation in this Congress is initiated
by staff," because Senators "just do not have the time to read the records and to do the
necessary research that is necessary to bring forth meaningful and important legislation.");
H. Fox & S. HAMMOND, supra note 193, at 143-45. For a carefully documented discussion
of the use and misuse of staff work by congressional subcommittees, see M. MALBIN,
UNELECTED REPRESENTATIVES: CONGRESSIONAL STAFF AND THE FUTURE OF REPRESENTATIVE
DEMOCRACY, ch. 5 (forthcoming 1980).
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Given this unhappy political economy, the case we have studied can-
not be dismissed as aberrational. The fact that a low-visibility issue has
not yet been subjected to hard-headed analysis can become a positive
incentive for congressional action. So long as strategically located in-
terest groups can provide superficially appealing symbols, they can
hope that a single subcommittee's approval will not be challenged as
the bill makes its way through Congress. This dynamic of agenda over-
load and symbolic subterfuge represents a challenge to all who wish
to fashion a system of administrative law that represents a serious
response to the admitted failures of the New Deal agency.
The second half of this essay builds on our case study in an effort
to suggest more promising ways to move beyond the New Deal. Rather
than resolving disputed questions of instrumental rationality, Congress
should be encouraged, by all the legal tools at our disposal, to clarify
the controversial ends of environmental policy. By the same token, the
EPA should not be allowed to suppress controversial questions of in-
strumental rationality by casually invoking the well-worn myth of ex-
pertise. Instead, it should be induced to resolve inevitably controversial
questions requiring expertise in high-visibility ways that constantly
force bureaucrats to learn more about the complex areas they hope to
regulate, and teach the rest of us of the costs and benefits of competing
policies. At stake is a framework that supports a sounder institutional
dialogue over time-one where Congress is obliged to reconsider values
in light of emerging facts, and agencies are forced to clarify the costs
and benefits of aims that captured the political imagination of earlier
Congresses.
To put some flesh on these bare bones, we shall examine our par-
ticular problem from four interrelated points of view: First, what does
a singleminded concern with instrumental rationality reveal about coal
scrubbing and the larger issue of sulfur oxides of which it is a part?
Second, how did the EPA, in fact, respond to the congressional initiative
of 1977? Third, what questions should courts ask when called upon
to review EPA decisions of the kind represented by the scrubber? And
finally, what direction should Congress take the next time it is forced
by events to reconsider the Clean Air Act?
III. To What End?
In the first half of this paper, we have shown how very different
actors could come to view the scrubber as a plausible solution to their
political problems. For Eastern coal, the scrubber secured markets
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against Western competition. For environmentalists, the scrubber prom-
ised to provide additional protection to pristine areas in the West. For
the President, scrubbers promised political support for his high-priority
energy program. For the conference committee, scrubbers were a
nuisance that threatened to sabotage a long-delayed and vital agree-
ment. All these interests converged to produce the legally incoherent
message we have analyzed.
Yet, although political cost-benefit analysis explains the outcome,
there is a second way of looking at the issue: What would universal
scrubbing accomplish in reality? Are the benefits worth the costs? What
are the alternatives? Although the New Deal agency often failed to
answer these questions, at least it was expected to ask them. To pursue
our interest in comparative institutional design, we shall look upon the
scrubber as if it were a policy problem confronted by an ideal New
Deal agency charged with the task of selecting the most sensible means
to congressionally approved ends-protecting health and environmental
quality by cleaning up the air. We do not seek to pass judgment on
scientific questions now anxiously debated amongst researchers. In-
stead, we simply draw on the conventional wisdom now current in
the EPA,'9" to reproduce the way a knowledgeable EPA bureaucrat
might analyze the problem if forced to argue in a means-end mode.
A. Defining the Problem: Sulfur Oxides
Begin, then, with the way current law defines the problem that
scrubbing is meant to cure. When the federal government first set a
health-related objective for sulfur oxides in 1969,190 it was obliged to
deal with the desperately primitive character of the prevailing "expert"
understanding. Not only was data on real world conditions terribly
inadequate, 197 but the only available data measured concentrations of
sulfur dioxide, although knowledgeable people recognized that SO2,
195. The regulatory scheme for emissions discharges by old sources is very much based
on a New Deal effort to draft a policy responsive to environmental conditions. See pp.
1476-77 sutpra. Thus, in its efforts to deal with old sources, the EPA has gathered a great
deal of data useful for means-end analysis.
196. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, AIR QUALITY CRITERIA FOR SULFUR
OXIDES (1969) [hereinafter cited as 1969 AIR QUALITY CRITERIA].
197. 1 U.S. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, ANN. REP. 87 (1970) (monitoring
systems "so spotty in coverage that it is very difficult to determine trends in the quality
of air"). Combined federal and state monitoring systems are now far more extensive, with
data recorded by more than 2,600 SO. monitors and 4,000 TSP monitors, which are gen-
erally capable of measuring SO, concentrations. Even today, though, the quality of data
produced by many systems is poor. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT BY THE
COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, AIR QUALITY: Do WE REALLY KNOW WHAT
IT Is? 2, 5-17 (1979) (No. CED-79-4).
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taken by itself, was an inadequate measure of the pollution problem.198
Rather than the product of comprehensive study, the traditional em-
phasis on SO2 was a product of the famous "killer fogs" of London and
Donora. 190 In search of an explanation for these dramatic events of the
1940s and 1950s, epidemiologists made use of available meters to
isolate probable suspects. The monitors rewarded this search by reveal-
ing relatively high concentrations of SO., and particulates in the air of
suspect urban regions in the United States and Europe.2 0 As scientific
activity increased in the 1970s, however, evidence on SO typically
generated no evidence of harmful effects. By 1978, the National Acad-
emy of Sciences could report: "The notion that ordinary concentrations
of sulfur dioxide alone are not likely to injure the lung is common-
place."201
198. See 1969 AIR QUALITY CRITERIA, supra note 196, at 118-19. Few experts ever attrib-
uted the known effects of air pollution solely to SO.. The air quality criteria document
on which EPA's standard for SO, is based explicitly stated its findings in terms of sulfur
oxide and not SO 2. The criteria document itself had to reserve the question of whether
SO2 alone or other air-borne compounds actually caused observed effects, because in al-
most every observation, high levels of SO, occurred in combination with high levels of
other pollutants (typically particulate matter). This problem has continued to plague
epidemiologists. Cf. Ferris, Health Effects of Exposure to Low Levels of Regulated Air
Pollutants, 28 J. AIR POLLUTION CONT. Ass'N 482, 491 (1978) (study finding health benefits
over decade in which particulate levels decreased and sulfur oxide levels increased).
199. See 1969 AIR QUALITY CRITERIA, supra note 196, at 119-26. In the October 1948
Donora incident, 20 people died, 10% of the town's population was severely affected, and
43% was affected to some degree. The London fog in December 1952 resulted in 4,000
more deaths than would have been expected for the two-week period. Most deaths oc-
curred among the elderly and persons with pre-existing pulmonary or cardiac problems.
No pollutant monitors were present in Donora during the incident; a single monitoring
site in London recorded extraordinarily high daily concentrations of SO 2 and particulates.
No measurements were made of particular species of particulates such as sulfates. Other
episodes have occurred in the world's major cities since 1952, but none has been as
serious. See Schimmel, Evidence for Possible Acute Health Effects of Ambient Air Pollu-
tion from Time Series Analysis: Methodological Questions and Some New Results Based
on New York City Daily Mortality, 1963-1976, 54 BULL. N.Y. ACAD. Mao. 1052, 1054 (1978).
200. 1969 AIR QUALITY CRITERIA, supra note 196, at 120-24.
201. NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCEs, SULFUR OXIDES 133, 166-71 (1978) [hereinafter
cited without cross-reference as NAS, SULFUR OxIas]. See also Cooper & Hamilton, At-
mospheric Sulfates and Mortality-The Phantom Connection, reprinted in Oversight,
OTA's Study: The Direct Use of Coal: Hearing Before the Subcomn. on Energy Develop-
ment and Applications of the House Comm. on Science and Technology, 96th Cong.,
Ist Sess. 72, 79 (1979) (reporting respected experts' opinions that present SO, standards are
unduly stringent). Even when subjects were briefly exposed to laboratory concentrations
thirty or more times the primary annual ambient standard, acute effects were only barely
detectible. 1969 AIR QUALITY CRITERIA, supra note 196, at 91-94.
These results might be due to the fact that SO,, a gas, is sufficiently water soluble that
it tends to be absorbed in the respiratory passages. It is unlikely that more than 10% of
inhaled SO, and even less of the SO,, breathed through the nose, penetrates as far as the
larynx. NAS, SULFUR OxmEs, at 134.
Still, some restrictions on peak levels of SO. may be necessary. Laboratory tests of SO2
effects do not replicate ambient air conditions, and few tests have studied the effects of
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In contrast, recent research suggests that a major health hazard may
be posed by sulfates (S0 4)-compounds created by the interaction of
sulfur oxides with sunlight and atmospheric particulates.20 2 As a re-
sult of this process, S02 may be transformed over time into a number of
potentially harmful sulfate compounds, including sulfuric acid.
20 3
Although larger particles are blocked in the respiratory passage before
reaching the lung, micron-size sulfate particles can elude these defenses
and may be breathed deep into lung tissue.2 04 The long-run harm, if
any, caused by present concentrations of these tiny particles is far from
clear, but the question is a central focus of present scientific concern.20 5
The EPA's regulatory program, however, has failed to advance with
scientific understanding. The agency continues to measure polluter
compliance in terms of S02, not SO 4.2 0 6 Moreover, a shift in the
relevant policy parameter would require a massive redefinition of the
health problem posed by power plants. Although S0 2 concentrations
pollutants in combination. Id. at 10. Other pollutants might aggravate the effects of SO2.
Id. at 153-55. Moreover, it is likely that at some point before ordinarily healthy people
are affected, higher SOz concentrations will begin to affect asthmatics and other sensitive
groups. Id. at 158.
202. See note 205 infra (citing sources); NAS, SULFUR OXIDES, at 196-99; Symposium on
Environmental Effects of Sulfur Oxides and Related Particulates, 54 BULL. N.Y. ACAD. MED.
983, 1052-199 (1978).
203. NAS, SULFrR OXIDES, at 150.
204. Id. at 154-55, 158-60; see U.S. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, supra note 1,
at 58.
205. Several recent epidemiological studies have established statistically significant as-
sociations between concentrations of sulfates and regional mortality rates. See, e.g., L.
LAvE 8: E. SESKIN, AIR POLLUTION AND HUMAN HEALTH (1977); Mendelsohn & Orcutt,
An Empirical Analysis of Air Pollution Dose-Response Curves, 6 J. ENVr'L & ECON.
MANAGEMENT 85 (1979). Many epidemiologists question whether these new studies have
adequately demonstrated that the observed effects are caused by the sulfates in the amounts
measured. See, e.g., NAS, SULFUR OXIDES, at 196-98 (assessment of Lave and Seskin); F.
Lipfert, The Association of Human Mortality with Air Pollution 191-92, 196-97 (Ph.D.
dissertation, Union Graduate School, Ohio, 1978) (analysis suggesting small but statis-
tically significant association between mortality and general air pollution levels, but not
between mortality and sulfates). One reason for doubt is that laboratory tests using human
subjects exposed for short periods to sulfate concentrations below twenty times typical
atmospheric concentrations have not shown adverse physiological reactions. See NAS,
SULFUR OxiDEs, at 158-60. More generally, retrospective research of the sort carried out by
Lave and Seskin cannot control for important confounding variables, such as variations in
smoking habits among the populations studied. Therefore, many researchers evaluate the
results as suggestive but inconclusive. See NAS, SULFUR OXIDES, at 196-98; F. Lipfert, supra,
at 182-86.
206. See 40 C.F.R. § 50A-.5 (1979) (national ambient air quality standards for SO.).
Although the PSD system for clean air areas is occasionally a binding constraint as to
the total amount of sulfur oxide produced by a plant, the program directly regulates only
local concentrations of SO2 . 42 U.S.C. § 7473(b) (Supp. II 1978). Although PSD may limit
the amount of sulfur oxide emitted in or near protected clean air areas, it has its greatest
impact on areas with the lowest levels of SO,. EPA, PROTECTING VISIBILITY 1-6(a) (1979)
(EPA Pub. No. 450/5-79-008) (map depicting mandatory class I areas where least air
quality deterioration permitted) [hereinafter cited as PROTECTING VIsIBILITY].
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have declined dramatically over the past twenty years, 207 limited data
suggest that sulfate concentrations have remained constant or have in-
creased slightly. -08 Even more important, the following map dramatizes
the uneven distribution of sulfates in the United States. The health
threat, such as it may be, plainly concerns a twenty-odd state region
east of the Mississippi and north of Tennessee and South Carolina.
Average sulfate concentrations in rural areas in this region, which we
shall call the "Northeast," are twice the typical level found in urban
centers outside the Northeast.
20 9
Within the Northeast, the typical city does not experience vastly
higher sulfate concentrations than parts of the countryside.2 10 This
pattern comes as no surprise, given the gradual way in which SO., dis-
charged from smokestacks combines with other atmospheric ingredients
to form sulfates. Rather than imposing the primary sulfate burden on
the immediately surrounding area, each power plant makes an incre-
mental contribution to a regional sulfate problem, in inverse relation
to its contribution to the local sulfur oxide problem.21' Quite simply,
the more sulfur oxide that drops out within miles of the plant, the less
207. In the Northeast, composite urban average SO. emissions declined from 88 g/rm
in 1964 to 41 Ag/m 3 in 1971. EPA, THE NATIONAL AIR MONITORING PROGRAM: AIR QUALITY
AND ENISSIONS TRENDS, ANNUAL REPORT 4-17 to -19 (1973) (EPA Pub. No. 450/1-73-001-a)
[hereinafter cited as NATIONAL AIR MONITORING PROGRA.T-1973]. Concentrations declined
slightly between 1972 and 1977. EPA, NATIONAL AIR QUALITY, MONITORING, AND EMISSIONS
TRENDS REPORT 3-8 (1978). These declines in SO, concentrations occurred despite all
estimated 45% increase in total nationwide emissions of SO, between 1960 and 1970,
NATIONAL AIR MONITORING PROGRAMI-1973, supra, at 4-3, illustrating the uncertain con-
nection between air quality and absolute emission levels. Tile decline in concentration of
SO is generally explained by reductions in residential and commercial coal burning in
urban areas, increased stack heights, and increased geographical dispersion of sources. See
NAS, SULFUR OXIDES, at 25.
208. Nonurban sulfate concentrations in the Northeastern United States have risen
steadily since the early 1960s. NAS, SULFUR OXIDES, at 21, 25 (based on extremely limited
data). In contrast, urban concentrations, at least in the few locations where they were
monitored, declined sharply during the initial period of urban cleanup in tile 1960s. For
example, sulfate concentrations in New York City declined from about 33 pg/rm3 in 1964 to
about 13 pg/m in 1974. Eisenbud, Levels of ExPosure to Sulfur Oxides and Particulates in
New York City and Their Sources, 54 BULL. N.Y. AcAD. MED. 991, 1003 (1978). Since 1970,
however, urban sulfate levels, as measured by tie National Air Surveillance Network
(NASN), have remained generally constant, and nonurban levels have risen slightly, NAS,
SULFUR OXIDES, at 25, even though total emissions declined slightly, EPA, MONITORING
AND AIR QUALITY TRENDS REPORT, 1974, at 125-26 (1976) (EPA Pub. No. 450/1-76-001) (1970
to 1974 estimates).
209. EPA, AIR QUALITY FOR NONMETALLIC INORGANIC IONS, 1971 THROUGH 1974: FROMT
THE NATIONAL AIR SURVEILLANCE NETWORKS 55-70 (1977) (during periodic episodes of air
stagnation when sulfate levels greatly increase, concentrations in Northeast are also higher
than in other regions).
210. Id.
211. EPA, SULFATES IN THE ATMOSPHERE: A PROGRESS REPORT ON PROJrr MISTT 18-25
(1977) (EPA Pub. No. 600/7-77-921); NAS, SULFUR OXIDES, at 50-56 (describing modes of
SO, deposition).
1518





Reprinted with Permission of authors from: N. Frank & N. Possiel, Seasonality and Re-
gional Trends in Atmospheric Sulfates (paper presented at American Chemical Society,
San Francisco, Cal., Aug. 30-Sept. 3, 1976) (figure 2)
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that remains for gradual transformation into sulfates over longer dis-
tances. 212 Moreover, each plant's impact on the health of people
hundreds of miles away depends upon a variety of geographic and
meteorological conditions.213
At this point, one can begin to glimpse the opportunity lost when
the parties began to focus upon technological means (the scrubber)
rather than ultimate ends (public health). Imagine that in the face of
these evolving "facts," a New Deal agency had tried to justify billions
of dollars of scrubbing by pointing to the clear and present danger to
health posed by sulfur dioxide alone. Such a move, predictably, would
have been reversed as "arbitrary or capricious" by any court of appeals
in the land.21 4 Indeed, as a result of the dramatic decline in S02 since
the early sixties, even the most "polluted" areas only rarely register
violations of the EPA's SO 2 standard.
2 15
Not that these facts would, by themselves, destroy the environ-
mentalists' love affair with the scrubber. But if forced to pursue their
ends in a New Deal decisional structure, they would have selected a
very different argumentative strategy. To make the New Deal case for
the scrubber, it would be essential to attack, on all fronts, the EPA's
continuing fixation with SO 2 and to point with alarm to SO 4 as the
real danger.2 1 6 For it is only then that a multibillion dollar effort to
reduce sulfur discharges yet further would seem at all plausible. This
external attack would have met with great sympathy amongst the
212. See EPA, supra note 211, at 24-25; NAS, SULFUR OxIDEs, at 41-49 (describing trans-
formation process).
213. NAS, SULFUR OXIDES, at 37-40.
214. Many scientists have stated that there is no need to tighten present ambient SO,
standards. Cooper & Hamilton, supra note 201, at 79 (standards probably too stringent);
Ferris, supra note 198, at 493-94 (standards "reasonable"); see NAS, SULFUR OXIDES, at
166. New plants meeting the pre-1977 NSPS would generally not cause increases
sufficient to violate the regional ambient SO, standards, unless they were situated in close
proximity to existing emission sources. See 1978 SO-_ BACKGROUND INFORMATION, supra note
65, at 6-12 (percentage of ambient limits contributed by different sizes of power plants).
215. In 1974, 3% of the monitoring stations recorded violations of the primary ambient
standard of 80 jg/m', in contrast to 16% in 1970. NAS, SULFUR OXIDES, at 24. The most
serious problems today occur in areas affected by smelters, U.S. COUNCIL ON ENVIRON-
MENTAL QUALITY, supra note 1, at 45, which are free to obtain postponements for com-
pliance with SO, standards. 42 U.S.C. § 7419 (Supp. II 1978).
216. To their very great credit, environmentalists have indeed sought to force the EPA
to promulgate a sulfate standard under sections 108 and 109. Although the EPA has,
predictably, resisted this effort, see Sierra Club v. Train, No. 76-0656 (D.D.C., filed Apr.
20, 1976; dismissed with prejudice, Jan. 19, 1978) (attempt to force promulgation of sulfate
standard), it would be a mistake to think of the EPA as if it were some immovable object
incapable of adaptation under stress. If the enormous amount of environmental energy
devoted to the scrubbing controversy had been channelled toward the sulfate problem, it
is quite possible that bureaucratic inertia might have been mastered.
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scientifically trained agency staff, who are perfectly aware of the chang-
ing direction of expert understanding.
Challenged from without and prodded from within, high-level ad-
ministrators might have been induced to take the hard steps required
to redirect regulatory activity. At present, the EPA divides the country
into 236 air quality control regions, 217 each of which is responsible for
forcing local polluters to meet local ambient standards. A rational
approach to SO 4 , in contrast, would require dividing the country into
a smaller number of larger regions to take into account the realities
of long-distance transport. Any such change would encounter strong
bureaucratic resistance; yet, because the debate was shifted from the
EPA to Congress, no one perceived, let alone emphasized, the need for
overcoming this resistance. Although there is evidence of congressional
staff awareness of the emerging sulfate problem, 218 the clean air-dirty
coal coalition had everything to lose, and nothing to gain, from a sober
analysis of ecological realities. Rather than directing congressional at-
tention to the need for a regional response to protect the East, the sulfate
menace was used as a makeweight in the rhetorical case for forced
scrubbing.
B. Protecting Health and Environment in the East:
The Perils of Scrubbing
Assume, next, that our hypothetical New Deal agency has managed
to redirect its policy objective from SO2 to S04 in line with prevailing
scientific opinion. How would it go about appraising the threat posed
by sulfates?
Although the impact of sulfates on humans remains uncertain,
there is little question of their harmful impact on some non-human
species. As a result of increased sulfur and nitrogen emissions, pH
levels in rainwater have noticeably declined over the last several
decades. 219 Long-distance transport from the Midwest and East creates
the most acute effects in northern New York, New England, and
eastern Canada.220 In freshwater lakes that serve as collectors of acid
rain and stormwater runoff, increased acidity has eliminated many fish
217. 40 C.F.R. §§ 81.12 -.267 (1979) (defining air quality control regions).
218. The legislative history of the 1977 amendments provides evidence of this con-
gressional concern in its consideration of a number of the Act's new sections. See, e.g.,
H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 191 (1977) (NSPS); id. at 122-24 (PSD); id. at
83-84 (ICS); cf. 42 U.S.C. § 7423 (Supp. II 1978) (limit to stack heights). For a good
history of the public debate concerning sulfates, see R. ToBIN, THE SOCIAL GAMBLE:
DETERMINING ACCEPTABLE LEVELS OF AIR QUALITY 127-56 (1979).
219. NAS, SULFUR OxmEs, at 52-54.
220. See id. at 65 (reporting measured increase in acidity of lakes).
1521
The Yale Law Journal
species.221 The effects of acid rain are most pronounced in those
geologoical regions where the characteristic rock types are highly resis-
tant to weathering, with the result that acids are not effectively neu-
tralized before reaching the lake ecosystems. 2 22 Many ecologists suspect
that acid rain has the capacity to affect significantly the structure
and function of terrestrial ecosystems as well, possibly resulting in re-
duced timber and agricultural production.2 2 3 However, given the
spatial and temporal variability in these systems, anything short of
dramatic environmental consequences will be difficult to detect. -2 2-4
There is cause for concern, and room for further research. -2 2 5
The primary task, however, is to fashion an action program that
responds sensibly to the dangers we perceive and allows us to define
these risks with increasing precision over time. How does a scrubbing
requirement for new plants fit into these larger ends?
1. Short-Term Action
A sensible short-term strategy for the Northeast must focus, first and
foremost, on old plants, not new ones. For the foreseeable future, the
bulk of sulfur oxides in the Northeast will be produced by presently
existing plants. 220 Moreover, SIPs often permit old plants to emit four
or five pounds of sulfur per MBTU, 2 7 while the old NSPS held new
plants to a 1.2 pound per MBTU ceiling. It is hardly apparent that
221. Id. at 70-71.
222. Likens, Wright, Gelloway, & Butler, Acid Rain, SCIENTIFIC AmERICAN, Oct. 1974,
at 43, 49-50.
223. See, e.g., NAS, SULFUR Oxmas, at 80-82, 112-115; Likens & Bormann, Acid Rain: A
Serious Regional Environmental Problem, 184 SCIENCE 1176, 1178 (1974).
224. NAS, SULFUR OXDES, at 80-81, 112-15.
225. Recent legislation provides up to $50 million for a ten-year study of acid rain.
Acid Precipitation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-294, 94 Stat. 770 (to be codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 8901-8905).
226. Although some debate exists, many scientists now believe that much of the
sulfate concentration in the Northeast originates in the Midwest. (This article uses the
term "Midwestern" to describe power plants in the Bureau of the Census' East North
Central region (Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, and Wisconsin).) See, e.g., U.S. DEPT OF
ENERGY, REGIONAL ISSUE IDENTIFICATION AND ASSESSMENT: FIRST ANNUAL REPORT 1-10, 2-8,
3-7 (1979) (modelling results predicting that sulfur oxides transported from Midwest
significantly affect SO, concentrations in New England, New York, and mid-Atlantic areas);
Wolff g: Lioy, Transport of Suspended Particulate Matter into the New York Metropolitan
Area, 54 BULL. N.Y. ACAD. MED. 1032-44 (1978) (suggesting that transport of SO, from
Midwest associated with certain weather patterns significantly increases SO, levels in New
York City area); General Discussion: Session 1, 54 BULL. N.Y. ACAD. MED. 1045-51 (1978)
(defense of Wolff & Lioy, supra, by one of its authors). Even if all Midwestern plants
subject to the new (1979) NSPS were allowed to emit at 1.2 pounds per MBTU, these
plants would emit only 11% of the sulfur oxides produced by utilities in the Midwest in
1995. ICF, INC., supra note 134, at C-II-3a. Overall, in 1995, new plants emitting SO, at a
rate of 1.2 pounds per MBTU would produce 28% of the sulfur oxides produced by
utilities east of the Mississippi. Id. at C-II-3a to -3b.
227. See note 40 supra.
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short-term cutbacks could be purchased most cheaply by making rela-
tively clean new plants even cleaner. Unfortunately, however, the Clean
Air Amendments of 1970 discouraged knowledgeable analysis of
this trade-off between old and new plants; with old plants regulated
through the New Dealish SIP process and new plants by an agency-
forcing Congress, there was no forum in which the trade-off question
might be considered as a part of the ordinary course of business.
Nonetheless, such an expert comparison would yield large rewards.
Although old plants can often achieve reductions by installing con-
trol equipment, important gains may also be obtained by washing
sulfur pyrites from pulverized coal at the mine site. Although wash-
ing does not remove sulfur organically bonded to the coal, modern
methods do remove twenty to forty percent of the total sulfur con-
tent of coal currently mined in high sulfur Eastern regions.228 At
present, however, a leading EPA expert estimates that only forty per-
cent of Eastern coal is washed before it is burned,220  and EPA
consultants estimate that universal washing could reduce present East-
em emissions by more than two million tons a year.230
Moreover, the marginal cost of achieving this emission reduction
seems far lower than anything attainable by forcing new plants to
scrub. According to a leading EPA expert, the cost of washing high
sulfur coals ranges from two to nine cents a pound of SO2 removed,
compared to a cost range of seven to forty-five cents a pound for a
ninety percent scrubbing system.231 If the present sulfate threat jus-
228. See J. Kilgroe & J. Strauss, supra note 55, at 2, 10 (table 3).
229. See J. Kilgroe, Coal Cleaning for Sulfur Oxide Emission Control 20 (Apr. 8-9,
1980) (unpublished paper presented at Acid Rain Conference, Springfield, Va.) (on file
with Yale Law Journal).
230. Estimates by Versar, Inc. (May 1980) (supplied to the authors by EPA) (on file
with Yale Law Journal). Versar reports that a reduction of 2.8 million tons a year is
achievable by washing all cleanable steam coals mined in 1976 in major Eastern and
Midwestern coal producing states. Because American utilities consumed 78% of avail-
able supplies of nonmetallurgical (steam) coal in 1976, 2 U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION AD,1N.,
ANN. REP. To CONGRESS 91-93 (1978), 2.2 million tons of this reduction may be assigned
to utilities. Because utilities classified as existing sources will consume roughly as much
coal in 1995 as in 1975, ICF, INc., supra note 134, at C-II-5, the same reduction from
existing plants can be achieved at least as late as that year.
231. J. Kilgroe & J. Strauss, supra note 55, at 22-23. Note the wide range in marginal
costs pievailing under both scrubbing and washing. Large scrubbers have low marginal
costs, thanks to economies of scale. Id. at 23. Scrubbing costs also vary with changes in
sulfur content and degree of scrubbing. See note 233 infra. Washing high sulfur coal is
cheaper than washing lower sulfur varieties, J. Kilgroe & J. Strauss, supra note 55, at 22,
because increased costs involved in crushing and separating pyritic sulfur are not pro-
portional to increases in the sulfur content of the coal. Thus, washing 30% out of a nine
pound coal could generate three times the sulfur reduction achieved by washing 30% out
of a three pound coal without proportional increases in cost. Indeed, the Kilgroe and
Strauss estimates seem to understate washing's relative cost advantage. As they explain,
washing coal increases boiler reliability, decreases maintenance, and reduces the cost of
fly ash removal. These non-environmental benefits reduce the net cost of the technology.
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tifies a serious short-term response, it is the less costly method-wash-
ing-that should be employed first.
All the more so because increased coal washing in existing plants will
bring sizable S02 reductions far sooner than scrubbing in new plants.
Students of coal washing think it realistic to believe that at least a
"1 to 2 million" ton reduction is achievable by 1985.232 In contrast,
facilities regulated by the new NSPS will begin to come on line in the
late eighties, and forced scrubbing in the East will not achieve a re-
motely comparable impact upon the overall SO 2 load before the mid-
nineties. Worse yet, by adding up to fifteen percent to the cost of new
construction 2 33 forced scrubbing will give utilities an economic incen-
tive to run their old plants longer than they otherwise would. Because
old plants are often permitted to emit four or five pounds of S02 per
MBTU, one old plant produces as much S02 as three or four new ones
subject to a 1.2 ceiling. Thus, even if a relatively small fraction of old
plants are induced to stay on line for an extended period, the overall
impact could be quite serious. Indeed, in the industrial Midwest, the
old-plant effect swamps the extra reductions achieved by forcing all
new plants to scrub-causing the Midwest to impose 170,000 more tons
on the Northeast in 1995 than it would have under the old 1.2 NSPS.
2 34
The old-plant effect is not so strong in other parts of the East. As a
consequence, forced scrubbing does yield a net reduction east of the
Mississippi by 1995 of slightly less than one million tons, compared to
the old 1.2 standard.2335 This is to be compared to the "1 to 2 million"
tons promised by washing in 1985.
Id. at 26 (table 5), 27. In contrast, scrubbing generates no similar savings in ordinary
plant operation.
Although Kilgroe and Strauss' optimistic assessment of coal washing seems generally
supported by the studies they cite, there are studies that suggest a smaller cost advantage
in favor of washing. For example, a recent TVA study suggests that the average cost of
scrubbing at 85% is only slightly greater than washing at about 35%. See J. Kilgroe, supra
note 229, at 24-26. Kilgroe, however, does not reconcile this study's conclusions with the
work that supports the cost comparison cited in the text. More generally, the data base
on washing costs seems weak-reflecting the low institutional priority given the question
until very recently. Similarly, the second-order environmental effects of disposing of waste
products generated by various washing and scrubbing systems deserves more focused study
than it has received. Finally, the cost estimates presented here ignore the savings attain-
able by substituting lower sulfur coals for treatment technologies.
232. J. Kilgroe, supra note 229, at 22; see id. at 28 (3 to 5 years to put coal cleaning
plant into operation). At least one EPA consultant estimates a potential reduction exceed-
ing two million tons a year. See Estimates by Versar, Inc., supra note 230.
233. See EPA, CosT ANALYSIS OF LiME-BASED FLUE GAS DESULFURIZATION SYSTEMIS FOR
NEw 500-MW UTILITY BOILERS 4-24 to 4-32 (1979) (EPA Pub. No. 450/5-79-003) (estimates
by PEDCo Environmental, Inc.) The cost of a scrubber for a given plant varies with the
sulfur content of the fuel burned and the degree of scrubbing required.
234. ICF, INC., supra note 134, at C-VIII-21.
235. Id. (960,000 tons). This figure may overstate relief to the Northeast because it
includes reductions in several Southeastern states, whose contribution to the Northeast's
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Coal washing, then, seems the short-term strategy of choice: it
promises bigger gains sooner and more cheaply. How sad, then, that
thanks to our effort to move beyond the New Deal, our policy has
evolved in just the opposite direction. While policymakers rushed
toward scrubbing in new plants during the late seventies, they al-
lowed the SIP process to remain focused upon the attainment of
local SO2 , rather than regional SO4, air quality goals. As a conse-
quence, old coalburners have been permitted to keep on burning
unwashed coal so long as their locality satisfied their SO2 target.
An expert agency concerned with a cost-effective response to the
emerging sulfate problem would have made the opposite choice.
Suppose, next, that our hypothetical agency concluded that the
near-term sulfate problem was so serious that it demanded that the
Northeast's present load236 be quickly reduced by more than the
"1 to 2 million" tons generated by increased coal washing. Even
on this policy assumption, however, forcing all new plants to install
scrubbers would seem a silly way to achieve greater cutbacks. Rather
than imposing a high technology requirement on the utility indus-
try, the goal should be to force utility executives to seek out the
cheapest way of achieving further cutbacks. If reductions can be
achieved more cheaply by altering the operation of old plants or
by buying low sulfur coal, then it is these strategies that should be
pursued. Moreover, the regulatory tools necessary to encourage utili-
ties to search for the cheapest control measures are now very familiar
in the pollution control literature. 23 7 A host of market-like schemes
have been proposed to force polluters to recognize the social costs
of their emissions and take efficient steps to control further dis-
charges. Under these systems, the burden of designing a cost-effec-
tive response is placed where it belongs-on the polluters themselves,
not on some government bureaucrat.
sulfate problem is unclear. Moreover, before 1995, full scrubbing promises even smaller
gains. The EPA's consultants predict that, in 1990, a 90% scrubbing requirement will
generate an extra reduction of only 390,000 tons east of the Mississippi. Id. at C-VIII-21.
236. In 1975, power plants emitted 16.0 million tons of sO. east of the Mississippi. Id.
at C-II-3a to -3b. This, once again, includes emissions from the Southeast. See note 235
supra.
237. See W. BAUMOL & W. OATES, ECONOMICS, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY, AND THE QUALITY
OF LIFE 209-369 (1979); Fisher & Peterson, The Environment in Economics: A Survey, 14
J. EcON. LITERATURE 1, 12-14 (1976). For the reasons discussed in B. ACKERMAN, S. ROSE-
ACKERMAN, J. SAWYER, & D. HENDERSON, THE UNCERTAIN SEARCH FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
QUALITY 260-81 (1974), we favor a system allowing the sale of pollution rights to the highest
bidder over an effluent tax. In particular, it is easy to modify the auction system to take
into account the fact that new plants need to buy rights for longer periods of time than
old plants require. See id. at 268.
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Even if, however, an agency rejected such cost-effective regula-
tory systems and imposed a special emission ceiling on new plant
emissions, forced scrubbing is plainly inferior to other regulatory
strategies. Rather than requiring the installation of scrubbers, it would
be far more sensible to reduce the emission ceiling required of new
plants. Assume, for example, that the ceiling had previously been
set at 1.2 pounds per MBTU. Then it is easy to imagine cases in
which the addition of a requirement that polluters scrub ninety per-
cent of the sulfur out of their coal yields absolutely no emission reduc-
tion. If cheap high sulfur coal is readily available, cost-minimizing
utilities may continue to discharge 1.2 pounds per MBTU and simply
substitute higher sulfur coal for the more expensive low sulfur vari-
eties they might otherwise burn. In contrast, lowering the 1.2 ceiling
guarantees lower emissions from new plants while inviting utility
executives to define the cheapest way of meeting the new target.
Given this contrast, no agency concerned with the cost-effective pur-
suit of clean air would have any trouble preferring a lower ceiling
to forced scrubbing as a regulatory option.
Finally, forced scrubbing suffers a low-visibility disadvantage when
compared to strategies that permit polluters to meet their obliga-
tions the natural way by burning low sulfur coal. Quite simply, a
universal scrubbing requirement threatens to overwhelm the exist-
ing enforcement system; if this occurs, a symbolically satisfying ges-
ture will serve to cloak a very different reality. Once a scrubber is
installed in a new plant, a utility will be free to buy high sulfur coal
on the expectation that it will be scrubbed down to the 1.2 require-
ment.238 If, however, the scrubber fails to operate, all the sulfur will
go out the smokestack. The greater the efficiency demanded of the
scrubber, the greater the pressure placed on the enforcement system.
If the EPA requires ninety percent scrubbing, and a utility achieves
only eighty percent, the plant's emissions will be twice the legal limit.
2 30
The only way to assure serious compliance is through constant day-
to-day oversight. If utility executives are quickly placed on notice of
238. EPA models predict that the great majority of coal burned in Midwestern plants
subject to mandatory scrubbing would have a sulfur content betwcen 3.3 pounds and 5.0
pounds, ICF, INC., supra note 134, at C-VIII-8a to -8b. Without forced scrubbing, 69% of
Midwestern plants are predicted to burn coal that naturally emits less than 1.2 pounds of
SO2. Id. at C-II-8b to -8c (remaining plants predicted, for economic reasons, to use high
sulfur coal with scrubbing).
239. Scrubbing at 90% removal efficiency allows the release of 10% of the SO, original-
ly in the flue gas; 80% removal allows the release of 20%-or twice the legal amount.
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equipment failures as they arise, it is not too unrealistic to expect good
faith efforts to obey the law.2 40 But constant oversight requires a
reliable monitor in each smokestack, recording and reporting day-to-
day operations. These monitors are being developed, but their dur-
ability and day-to-day reliability remain to be established. 241 In ad-
dition, the EPA and state agencies must analyze the data promptly and
dispatch trained inspectors to conduct spot checks when excess emis-
sions are detected. Whenever a meter registers a potential violation,
there are always two possibilities-either the scrubber, or the meter, is
malfunctioning. Some official must then personally determine what is
actually going on in the smokestack.
There is every reason to believe, however, that the EPA and the
states do not intend to organize the necessary enforcement effort. Today,
inspection visits are few and far between; usually, the EPA has only
unverified data from polluters themselves, and much of it is never
entered into EPA computers for analysis.2 42 As a result, the EPA has
recently found that many systems thought to be in compliance are in
fact violating present requirements. 243 Nonetheless, the bureaucracy
intends to continue to rely on the polluters themselves to supply data
on their scrubbing efficiency.244 This means that the regulators will
240. To the extent that current operating problems experienced by scrubbers result
mainly from insufficient attention to the design and operation of control technology, cf.
note 243 infra (improper design and operation of control equipment found to be major
source of excess emissions), simple good faith efforts might represent a significant advance
over current practices. The EPA has long asserted that proper operation could significantly
reduce the problems experienced by scrubbers. See generally FGD SYSTEMt CAPABILITIES,
supra note 56, at 4-2 to 4-14.
241. See ENTROPY ENVIRONMENTALISTS, INC., AN EVALUATION OF THE CONTINUOUS MON-
ITORING REQUIREMENTS OF THE SEPTEMBER 19, 1978 SUBPART DA NSPS PROPOSAL 33-38
(1979) (reporting 1978 studies showing monitors available for use only 51% to 57% of
period studied). The cited authority was submitted to the EPA docket on behalf of the
utility industry, but relies in part on earlier studies done by Entropy Environmentalists
for the EPA. Id. at 33-35. The EPA now generally agrees with Entropy's analysis of
monitor reliability, and in its 1979 NSPS decision revised its proposed monitoring re-
quirements in an attempt to take monitor outages into account. See 44 Fed. Reg. 33,580,
33,610 (1979).
242. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT BY THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE
UNITED STATES: IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED IN CONTROLLING MAJOR AIR POLLUTION SOURCES 7-8,
11-13 (1979) (No. CED-78-165).
243. See Complying Power Plants Exceed Air Limits by 25 Percent, Drayton Tells
Chamber, 11 ENvIR. REP. (BNA) 5 (1980) (reporting 71% of "complying" sources studied
experienced incidents of excess emissions; excess emissions from plants not in compliance
averaged 25% of amount allowed by emission standards). The EPA attributes roughly
two-thirds of the excess emissions to either improper design or improper operation of
pollution control equipment. Interview with analyst, EPA Planning Office, in Washington,
D.C. (June 25, 1980).
244. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 60.47a -A9a (1979) (monitoring and reporting requirements for
1979 NSPS). Direct responsibility for the enforcement of NSPS may belong to either the
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be unable to distinguish reliable from unreliable information; and
without credible information, the threat of sanction is incredible.
Absent constant enforcement pressure, it will be all too easy for the
scrubbing operation to serve as the public utility industry's Siberia-a
place where employees unfit for moneymaking tasks are sent when it is
inconvenient to fire them. The threat posed by incompetent or lack-
adaisical employees is especially serious when it is recognized that their
tasks will not be restricted to mechanical maintenance operations.
Scrubbers will constantly be demanding creative tending when they
become clogged, corroded, or generally ornery.2 45 A conscientious,
highly competent staff is an absolute requirement. 246 Given corporate
incentives to place scrubbing on the backburner, it is especially im-
portant for the agency to create an administrative infrastructure equal
to the challenge of enforcement.2 47 Otherwise, the result will be a lot
of junk in the smokestack and a lot more sulfur in the air.
In contrast, a strategy emphasizing the use of low sulfur coals places
far smaller burdens on the enforcement system. Meeting the 1.2 stan-
dard the natural way means that there is no need to monitor complex
machinery on a daily basis. All that is required is a regular sampling
of the sulfur content of coal going into the plant, rather than the smoke
coming out of the smokestack. Although even this may be beyond the
present effort forthcoming in many areas, it does not seem too much
to hope that officials may, from time to time, be able to collect chunk-
lets of coal for laboratory analysis.2 48 When the realities of enforcement
are taken into account, low sulfur strategies seem even more attractive
than they appear in ordinary cost-benefit analysis.
EPA or to state enforcement agencies, depending on whether or not the EPA delegates
its own authority. See 42 U.S.C. § 7414(b) (Supp. II 1978) (authority to delegate enforce-
ment duties to states). The effectiveness of state enforcement systems varies widely.
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 242, at 8-9.
245. See FGD SYSTEM CAPABILITIES, supra note 56, at 4-2 to 4-9.
246. See M. Maxwell, Sulfur Oxides Control Technology in Japan at 21, 23-24 (Inter-
agency Task Force Report, June 30, 1978) (attributing successful operation of scrubbers
in Japan in part to careful operation and special training of staff); RFPORT OF THE HRAR-
ING PANEL, supra note 49, at 29 (suggestion that American utilities have failed to hire
sufficient qualified personnel).
247. Commentators have attributed the successful use of scrubbers in Japan to the
strength of the Japanese enforcement program. The Japanese operate central research
centers, which are usually linked directly via telemetry to stations monitoring emissions
from major sources. M. Maxwell, supra note 246, at 24.
248. Although the enforcement problem is far more tractable under a low sulfur
strategy, it still exists. Even coal from the same mine may vary substantially in sulfur
content. For a discussion of regulatory problems created by sulfur variability, see Mem-
orandum from Walter C. Barber, Director, Office of Air Quality, Planning and Standards,
EPA, to Barbara Blum, Deputy Administrator, EPA (Dec. 6, 1979), reprinted in 10 ENvIR.
REP. (BNA) 1872, 1873 (1980).
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2. Long-Term Responsibilities
But what about a cleaner tomorrow? Don't we owe something to
the Easterners who will be breathing the air in the year 2000?
Certainly. 49 But once this is granted, the question of instrumental
rationality remains to be asked: What steps should we take today on
behalf of the Easterners of the next generation?
Beginning, once again, with the obvious, we do not now know
enough about how sulfates of different kinds and quantities harm
us.250 There is still much to be learned about what quantities there are
of each type,251 where the particles are produced, and how they are
transformed during long-distance transport.252 A generously funded,
long-term research operation is needed to fill the large gaps in our
knowledge.25 3 Yet the EPA is planning to spend only fifteen million
dollars a year on its Sulfur Research Strategy for fiscal years 1980 to
1982, and only nine million dollars in 1983,254 at a time when future
consumers are being asked to spend three or four billion dollars a year
on behalf of universal scrubbing.25 5 This is a disgraceful failure to re-
spond to the true interests of the next generation. Lon-term research
provides the only way we shall ever clarify the health risks generated
by alternative energy sources. Surely we owe this to our children, what-
ever measures we take in the short term. An adequate research budget
should be at least ten times its present fifteen million dollars. Even at
this price, it would cost no more than three medium-sized scrubbers.256
Although research is a first priority, we must also confront the fact
that plants built today will last until the year 2020. It hardly follows,
however, that immediate scrubbing is the best way to take account of
this fact. If the EPA maintained the 1.2 ceiling and merely required
present-day designers to plan for possible scrubber retrofits, the mar-
ginal cost of adding scrubbers at a later date would be relatively
249. See B. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 111-13, 202-17 (1980).
250. NAS, SULFUR OxDES, at 180-204. See also Ferris, supra note 198, at 493-94.
251. NAS, SULFUR OXIDES, at 40-41.
252. Id. at 41-51.
253. See STATIONARY SOURCE EMISSION CONTROL, supra note 43, at 148; Rail, Review of
the Health Effects of Sulfur Oxides, 8 ENVT'L HEALTH PERSPECTIVES 97, 117 (1974) (plan for
distinguishing effects of various pollutants). For a discussion of research policy that points
in the same direction, see R. TOBIN, supra note 218, at 160-64.
254. EPA, SU.FATES RESEARCH APROACH 3 (1977) (EPA Pub. No. 600/8-77-004). The
Department of Energy and the Electric Power Research Institute also spend significant
amounts on research on sulfur oxides.
255. See p. 1541 infra.
256. See ICF, INC., STILL FURTHER ANALYSES OF ALTERNATIVE NEW SOURCE PERFORMANCE
STANDARDS FOR NEW COAL-FIRED POWERPLANTS B-15 (Jan. 1979) (prepared between Septem-
ber and December 1978) (estimating cost of scrubber for 500-MW plant at $56 million).
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small. 257 It thus makes eminent sense to avoid the short-term environ-
mental dangers posed by a universal scrubbing requirement and leave
it to the next generation to make up its own mind about its future.
With high interest rates, the loss caused by wasteful current invest-
ment 258 will be especially great. Twenty years from now, moreover,
technology may have moved far beyond the scrubber in its search for
clean air.259 At the very least, it will be possible to retrofit spanking
new 2010 scrubbers into 1990 plants, rather than rely on creaky museum
pieces. Why, then, act now?
Perhaps such a hasty, ignorant, and costly step might be morally
required if a failure to scrub imposed risks on the next generation
far greater than those that we ourselves must accept. The best avail-
able predictions, however, suggest that no such reckless disregard of
posterity is in question here. Even if we retain the "old" NSPS, EPA
models suggest that overall SO 2 loads in the East will be no higher
in 2010 than they are today.260 Although the number of coalburners
will increase, the replacement of 4-pound old plants by 1.2 pound
new plants will completely offset the effects of increased coal use.
Thus, even without scrubbing, we are not ruthlessly sacrificing the
interest of the next generation to the convenience of this one. To
the contrary, scrubbing not only is a costly way of providing the next
generation with museum pieces, but will expose present-day Midwest-
erners to greater harm than they would otherwise suffer.
Instead of relying on technological symbols, the task is to direct
bureaucratic energy toward building ecologically sophisticated struc-
tures for sulfate control. The process of controlling sulfates should
begin long before any smokestacks are built. As we have seen,2 10' the
257. No formal studies on the costs of planned retrofit exist. An engineer active in the
field of scrubber research expressed confidence, in an interview, that so long as space is
provided for potential retrofitting, the extra costs of later installation will be relatively
modest.
258. The new EPA standard will require 526 billion more in capital costs for scrubbers
by 1990 than the 1971 1.2 standard, which allowed utilities to use untreated low sulfur
coal or to scrub at a percentage less than 90%. ICF, INC., supra note 256, at C-IV-19.
259. Both government and private industry are currently engaged in research to im-
prove sulfur removal technologies. See generally Gage, Remarks, in FGD SYmPosium,
supra note 56, at 2, 3-7; Laseke & Devitt, Status of Flue Gas Desulfurization Systems in
the United States, in FGD SyMposium, supra note 56, at 22, 43-49; Morasky & Dalton,
EPRI's Flue Gas Desulfurization Program, Results, and Current Worh, in FGD Sysm-
PosiuM, supra note 56, at 96, 96-117. Indeed, EPA officials are already expressing op-
timism over the development of new, improved technologies that are readily retrofittable.
See EPA Says New Technology May Provide Much Cheaper Sulfur Dioxide Removal, 11
ENvIR. REP. (BNA) 63-64 (1980) (development of "exciting" new technology that can be
retrofitted for 20% of present cost of scrubber retrofit).
260. See ICF, INC., supra note 134, at C-II-3a to -3b, D-la (SO. emissions east of the
Mississippi predicted to decline from 16.0 million tons in 1975 to 13.1 million tons in 2010).
261. See pp. 1518-20 supra.
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same discharge of SO2 can generate very different amounts of sulfate in
very different places depending on a host of geographic and meteoro-
logical conditions. Hence a critical part of sulfate planning comes in
judicious site selection-the more SO2 that settles in nearby unpopu-
lated areas, the less that remains for long-range transport in the form
of sulfates. If, for example, a power plant can be sited in unpopulated
hill country, this would go a long way toward reducing its impact on
regional health.
2 62
Even after a site is selected, the design of the plant will influence its
sulfate contribution. For example, the higher the smokestack, the lower
will be nearby S02 readings, but the greater the plant's load of long-
range S0 4.263 Although, as we have noted, 264 conventional wisdom now
belittles the effect of low-level concentrations of SO 2 , nonetheless there
is a point where higher concentrations will begin to affect asthmatics
and other sensitive groups.2  Rather than looking exclusively at the
scrubber in the smokestack, an intelligent long-range plan must try to
define the extent to which the size of smokestacks can be reduced in
the name of sulfate control without imposing unacceptable pollution
levels near the plant.
2 60
Finally, a bit of long-range planning may greatly ease the chronic
enforcement problem afflicting present-day control efforts. When a
utility decides to build a new plant, it either builds a "captive" mine
or contracts for a guaranteed long-run supply.267 It is at this point-
years before the first coal is burned-that enforcement agents may in-
262. On the broadest inter-regional level, prevailing meteorological patterns may
cause some areas of the nation to be more desirable sites for power plants than others.
See Ball g. Matheny, Impediments to Air Quality Control: The Problem of Long Range
Transport (Proceedings, Institute of Environmental Science) (n.d.) (figure 4) (ton of sulfur
dioxide produced in heavily industrialized areas of Midwest may expose two to five
times as many people to given concentration of sulfate as same amount emitted in most
areas of New England). It may be possible to locate plants so that the bulk of their sulfate
loadings descend on unpopulated areas, or even the Atlantic Ocean.
In some areas, such as New England, relatively short distances separate sites with rela-
tively large differences in population exposure. For an excellent study of control alterna-
tives in one metropolitan area, on a plant-by-plant basis, see R. MENDELSOHN, TowARDs
EFFICIENT REGULATION OF AIR POLLUTION FROM COAL-FIRED POWER PLANTS 138-60, 177
(1978) (concluding that siting considerations minimize cost of abatement on local level
under certain conditions).
263. See EPA, supra note 211, at 24-25.
264. See p. 1516 & n.201 sulra.
265. NAS, SULFUR OxmEs, at 158.
266. Decreasing stack height will also increase local concentrations of other pollutants
produced by power plants, such as nitrogen oxides and particulates. The relative effect
of increased levels of these pollutants, must, of course, also be considered. Cf. Rall, supra
note 253, at 117-18 (advocating research strategy designed to determine relative impor-
tance of various pollutants by selectively altering pollutant concentrations).
267. U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMM'N, STATUS OF COAL
SUPPLY CONTRACrS FOR NEW ELECTRC GENERATING UNITS: 1977-1986 at 3 (Supp. 1978).
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tervene. To the extent possible, steps should be taken to assure that the
"captive" mine site will yield coal that will uniformly satisfy the
Clean Air Act's requirements. 268 Such steps should ameliorate, if not
solve, the problem posed by plants receiving shipments of coal that
vary greatly in sulfur concentration.
The next generation, then, will have just cause for resentment if we
fail to resist the urge to scrub. Rather than leaving our children some
odd museum pieces scattered in the smokestacks of the year 2000, we
might have handed them a far worthier inheritance: a deeper under-
standing of the risks involved in coal burning; a subtle mechanism for
siting and designing plants to do the least harm; a mechanism for limit-
ing the risks of inevitable enforcement lapses. With such help from the
present, the future would be in a position to take care of itself far better
than we can protect ourselves today.
C. Beyond the East: The Problem of Visibility
While the Northeast is the critical problem area for health and acid
rain,269 a final problem requires a shift of geographic focus to the
West. The same discharge of sulfur oxide will have a vastly different
impact on visibility270 depending on the background level of light-
extinguishing particles in the air. As particles are added to pure air,
visibility declines at an exponential rate.2 7 1 Thus, where visibility is
already impaired by the particle-producing activities of an urbanized
and humid region like the Northeast, the marginal impact of power
268. Due to the effects of sulfur variability on the regulation of power plants, see
Memorandum from Walter C. Barber to Barbara Blum, supra note 248, EPA has recently
begun extensive work on the problems of predicting both the long- and short-term
average sulfur content of known coal reserves. See J. Kilgroe & J. Strauss, supra note 55,
at 21-22 (citing sources). Given the size of America's coal reserves, such work is only
beginning. Nonetheless, some progress is being made. For example, it now appears that,
where variability is a problem, coal cleaning may not only reduce average sulfur content,
but its associated variability as well.
269. In the foreseeable future, sulfate levels west of the Mississippi will not approach
prevailing Eastern levels. See p. 1519 supra (sulfate distribution map). We should not
worry about the health of Westerners until the risk to Easterners has been reduced to
Western levels.
270. The most commonly discussed aspect of visibility is visual range. Visual range
is usually defined as the distance at which a typical observer, under daytime conditions,
can distinguish a target on the horizon with a visual contrast of 2% (the theoretical con-
trast limit of the human eye). Experimental data have suggested, however, that the typical
human eye may not detect contrasts smaller than 5%. 2 A. STERN, AIR POLLUTION 14, 17-18
(3d ed. 1977); see W. MIDDLETON, VISION TxROUGH THE ATMOsPHERE 92-95 (1952). The un-
certainty introduced by this and other choices of assumptions used in empirical studies is
substantial. See note 272 infra. Nevertheless, a 2% limit for "standard" observers is com-
monly assumed by researchers. See PROTECTING VISIBILITY, supra note 206, at 8-10.
271. 2 A. STERN, supra note 270, at 5-9, 14.
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plants on visibility is relatively small. In contrast, if particles are in-
troduced into pure air, 7 2 even slight increases in emissions may have
highly visible effects.273 Although no area is completely particle-free,
the Rocky Mountain states and the Southwest do enjoy large areas of
extraordinary visibility, 27 4 which may suffer perceptible impairment
if particle concentrations are increased.
Power plants may pose two different threats to Western visibility,
requiring different methods of control. On the one hand, each plant
contributes to the overall level of "background" particles throughout
a large region surrounding the plant-the background problem. On
the other hand, each plant has a more concentrated impact on the
narrow strip of territory downwind from its stack-the plume effect.275
Turning first to the plume, the visibility problem posed by sulfur
oxides is not a matter of belching smokestacks. SO2 , the only sulfur
oxide emitted directly by power plants, is a colorless gas.2 70 Visibility is
impaired by the slow and long-distance transformation of gaseous SO2
into SO 4 particles. Thus, the plume has a perceptible impact on
visibility only when it remains concentrated long enough for sub-
stantial SO4 formation to occur.
2 77
For an ideal New Deal agency, the first step in mitigating the plume
effect would be to shift enforcement efforts from average SO2 levels
measured over long periods2 78 to the concentration of SO 2 on the days
272. Maximum visual range, in air completely free of particles, is approximately 200
miles assuming the human eye has a 2% contrast limit, see note 270 supra, or approxi-
mately 150 miles if the contrast limit is 5%. See PROTECrING VISIBILTY, supra note 206, at
2-18, 2-23 (calculations based on equation therein; calculations disregard complications
produced by curvature of earth). In pure air, visibility is impaired only by "blue sky"
or Rayleigh scattering-the scattering of light produced by "air" molecules themselves.
2 A. STERN, sura note 270, at 5.
273. At 8 miles of visibility, typical in urban areas in the East, an increase of 4 pg/m'
in sulfate levels will reduce visual range by less than half a mile. In contrast, if the air
were perfectly particle-free, the same sulfate concentration would reduce visibility by
half, from about 200 to 100 miles. (Calculations based on assumption that each pg/m 3 of
SO, increases the visual scattering coefficient by 0.04 X I0-1m-;//g/m'.)
274. The EPA presently estimates median visibility in the Southwest to be 65 to 80 miles
at most sites away from large urban centers, with visibility at nonurban locations ex-
tending to 90 to 115 miles 10% of the time. EPA, VISIBILITY IN THE SOUTHWEST: AN
EXPLORATION OF THE HISTORICAL DATA BASE 37 (1978) (EPA Pub. No. 600/3-78-039) [here-
inafter cited as VISIBILITY IN THE SOUTHWEST].
275. See generally PROTECTING VISIBILITY, supra note 206, at 5-1 to 5-4.
276. IX ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 661 (15th ed. 1974). The smoke seen pouring out
of the stack is composed of water vapor, nitrogen oxides, and particulates.
277. See PROTECTING VISIBILITY, supra note 206, at 5-10 to 5-11. Other pollutants-
especially nitrogen oxides-probably produce far more noticeable plume effects than
sulfur oxides within 30 miles of the plant. Id. at 5-11 to -13.
278. Current enforcement is based on figures for annual average discharges. Mem-
orandum from Walter C. Barber to Barbara Blum, supra note 248. The EPA proposes to
enforce emission limitations for NSPS using monthly averages. 40 C.F.R. § 60.43a(c) (1979).
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when meteorological conditions permit the plume to retain its integrity
for substantial periods of time for distances of fifty to a hundred
miles. 279 Rather than spending billions to scrub tenths of pounds out of
low sulfur coal, it makes more sense to spend millions on a beefed-up
enforcement system that assures day-to-day compliance with visibility
objectives. 2 0 In addition, a rational policy for preserving visibility
would establish varying ceilings for plants of different sizes. The overall
quantity of SO 2, not the amount of SO2 per MBTU, determines the
size of the plume. A 2000-megawatt plant limited by a 0.6 pound
per MBTU ceiling creates the same plume effect as a 1000-megawatt
plant regulated by a 1.2 pound per MBTU ceiling.
Moving beyond present polluters, we need guidelines for building
new plants. The height of their smokestacks will affect the concentra-
tion of SO 4 and visibility hundreds of miles away.
281 Moreover, trade-
offs between nearby SO2 and distant SO4 pose even fewer dangers here
than in the East. Because Western power plants are often located in
remote regions, they can use short stacks to enhance visibility without
health effects. Finally, better scientific models are urgently required
to predict a future plant's plume effect.2812 Such modeling, in con-
junction with study of the meterological conditions at particular po-
tential sites, may reveal sites where plumes will diffuse with minimum
impact on protected "clean air regions" or populated areas.
After a plume disperses, it adds to the "background" SO4 level over
a large region. In some parts of the West, particularly Arizona, diffused
emissions from a few large smelters have perceptible effects on visibility
over large areas,283 even though background levels, by Eastern stan-
dards, remain low. More generally, Western smelters produce several
279. See PROTECTING VISIBILITY, supra note 206, at 5-18 (significant reduction in visi-
bility possible at distances in excess of 100 miles).
280. Even intermittent controls may be desirable if enforceable. The EPA in the past
prepared regulations for intermittent controls that were tentatively endorsed by the
National Academy of Sciences. See STATIONARY SOURCE EMISSION CONTROL, suPra note
43, at 216.
281. EPA, supra note 211, at 24-25; PROTECTING VISIBILITY, suPra note 206, at 2-36 to -38.
282. Models used for the consumption of PSD increments merely predict SO2 con-
centrations to a distance of 30 miles. Interview with a representative of EPA Office of
Air Quality, Planning and Standards, in Research Triangle Park, N.C. (June 9, 1980).
The impact of SO4 on visibility occurs only at 50 or more miles from the plant. PROTECTING
VISIBILITY, supra note 206, at 5-11. Models for predicting plume effects at these distances
have yet to overcome a number of technical problems, and regional-scale models have
yet to be validated. Id. at 5-20 to -24.
283. During a nine-month copper strike which closed Western smelters, sulfate levels
in Arizona dropped by 60% to 67%, and visibility improved across the state by 8% to
29%. See VISIBILITY IN THE SOUTHWEST, supra note 274, at 88-89, 92-93.
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times the amount of S02 generated by the region's power plants. 28 4
Hence, the small incremental reductions obtained by full scrubbing
will have little effect on regional emissions of SO2 for the next gen-
eration.28 5 Conversely, the EPA predicts that, even with less than full
SO2 control, visibility in the region will improve by 1995280 if smelters
institute statutorily mandated emission reductions.2 87 Thirty years
from now, power plants will play a larger role in the overall SO4 pic-
ture in the Southwest and greater concern may prove justified. 88
Therefore, it may make sense to impose a retrofit design requirement. 28 9
At present, however, the background problem cannot rationally justify
billions of dollars of scrubbing, especially when the smelting industry is
permitted, thanks to another 1977 amendment, to delay compliance
until the year 1988, and may succeed in deferring compliance to an
even later date.290
Finally, we must devote more resources to research on the basic
facts concerning visibility. 291 We are not even confident, at present, of
the basic equation that purports to explain how far the eye can see in
a pollution-free world. 92 And it is plain that visibility is a complex
psychological-aesthetic concept that must be measured with great sen-
sitivity in a number of different locations.2913 Scrubbing cannot sub-
stitute for this complex work.
So far as the West is concerned, scrubbing is an exceedingly ex-
pensive way of achieving minor reductions in S04;294 in the East,
284. In 1976, smelters in the eight-state Rocky Mountain region emitted 2,484,000
tons of SO, versus 430,000 tons emitted by power plants. EPA, 1976 NATIONAL EMISSIONS
REPORT 15, 40, 78, 187, 198, 211, 318, 360 (1979) (EPA Pub. No. 450/4-79-019).
285. See Memorandum from John Bachmann, Air Office, to Walter C. Barber, Air
Office (Mar. 7, 1979) (EPA Docket No. OAQPS-78-I, Item No. II-B-37) (figure 1, table 1)
(difference in emissions between partial and full scrubbing equal to 300,000 tons in 1995
would have no perceptible effect on visibility).
286. Id. at 4-5 (tentative findings).
287. The 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments provided existing smelters with deadlines
for reducing SO, emissions that may be extended as late as 1988. 42 U.S.C. § 7419(c)
(Supp. 11 1978).
288. Memorandum from Walter C. Barber, Air Office, to David G. Hawkins, Air Of-
fice, at 1 (Apr. 12, 1979) (EPA Docket No. OAQPS-78-I, Item No. IV-B-87). This supple-
mental analysis predicted that use of partial rather than full scrubbing would produce
perceptible differences in visual contrast by the year 2010, precisely because visibility
would be improved by that year. Id. at 2 (for worst case power plant conditions, and
assuming large reductions in smelter emissions).
289. See pp. 1529-30 sup ra.
290. See note 287 supra.
291. See PROTEcTING VISIBILITY, supra note 206, at 5-20 to -26 (areas requiring fur-
ther research).
292. See notes 272-73 suPra.
293. See PROTECTING VISIBILITY, supra note 206, at 2-13 to -22, 5-21.
294. There is a final Western interest implicated by the scrubbing controversy. En-
vironmentalists have favored scrubbing high sulfur Eastern coal in an effort to reduce
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scrubbing is not only far more expensive, but may be positively coun-
terproductive. Even on optimistic assumptions, forcing new plants to
scrub will lengthen the life of dirty plants and generate slight in-
creases in sulfates in the populous Midwest. And once a realistic
view of enforcement is taken, forced scrubbing may make the sul-
fate problem worse, not better, in even larger portions of the na-
tion's vulnerable Northeastern quadrant. There must be better ways
of moving beyond the New Deal.
IV. Expertise in the Service of Politics
We can now reconstruct the basic problem confronting the EPA
when Congress delivered itself of its "clarifying" amendments on
August 4, 1977. On the one hand, EPA policymakers could have looked
upon the incoherent last-minute statutory revision of section 111 as an
invitation to analyze the scrubber carefully by exploiting the sub-
stantial talent and insight present at the middle and lower ranges of
the bureaucracy. On the other hand, policymakers could have looked
behind the statutory language to the legislative history and sought to
implement the will of the clean air-dirty coal coalition that had lobbied
the change through Congress. Although the EPA ultimately adopted
the second view of its mission, this was hardly the result of a single
self-conscious decision. Instead, the rejection of New Deal ideals was the
outcome of a complex process of bureaucratic struggle and political
intervention.
A. EPA at War with Itself
Almost immediately, the EPA found itself divided along lines that
reflected Congress' problematic attempt to move beyond the New Deal.
the impact of strip mining in the West. See, e.g., Federal Coal Leasing Program: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Minerals, Materials and Fuels of the Senate Comm. on Interior
and Insular Affairs, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 275-79, 420-25 (1974) (statement of Katherine
Fletcher, Environmental Defense Fund); id. at 484-500 (statement of representatives of
several environmental groups, including Sierra Club). It is not obvious, however, that
the environmental damage caused by Eastern coal mines should warrant less concern
than those in the West. Moreover, forced scrubbing provides a singularly ineffective way
to protect the West. Even if scrubbers are installed, the EPA predicts that Western produc-
tion will boom in any event. See ICF, INC., supra note 134, at A-lb to -7b. The best
way to respond to the very real problems caused by strip mining is through creative
efforts at reclamation. Moreover, this need has been increasingly recognized both on the
federal level, with the passage of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of
1977, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (Supp. II 1978), and on the state level, with the enactment of
increasingly high severance taxes and other devices to assure responsible reclamation
practices. See, e.g., 15 MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-103 (1979) (imposing 30% severance tax on
coal produced in state by strip-mining); 82 MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-113 (1979) (establishing
special fund for land reclamation).
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On one side, the Office of Air, Noise, and Radiation (Air Office), run
by Assistant Administrator David Hawkins,295 viewed section 111 in
political terms. In this view, the critical point was that the clean air-
dirty coal lobby had succeeded in pushing something through Con-
gress. Unless something spectacular was shown, it was wrong for an
administrative agency to deny political activists the fruits of their con-
gressional victory. At the very least, section 111, and especially its legis-
lative history, had created a strong presumption for nationwide scrub-
bing, which was not to be offset by some technocratic mumbo-jumbo.
On the other side, the Office of Planning and Management (Planning
Office), headed by Assistant Administrator William Drayton, repre-
sented the technocratic view. This office is composed principally of
economists and policy analysts professionally predisposed to considera-
tions of cost effectiveness. They saw forced scrubbing as a pure waste
of scarce economic resources. If scrubbing was the cheapest way of
meeting the NSPS standard, polluters would scrub without the need
of an EPA command. Only when cheaper ways of meeting NSPS
existed did the EPA's edict become significant. Moreover, the statutory
language-in contrast to the legislative history-made it clear that the
Administrator must take "into consideration the cost of achieving...
emission reduction" before imposing any requirement under section
111.296 Given this fact, the agency's job was not to follow through
mindlessly on the congressional "decision" but to explore its policy
justifications.
The conflict between the political and technocratic sides took shape
early. As the bureaucratic home of the Office of Air Quality, Planning
and Standards, Hawkins' Air Office had the inestimable advantage
of setting the terms of intra-agency debate by making the first
proposal. During late fall of 1977, the Air Office circulated a rec-
ommendation for "full scrubbing" that required all coal-burning plants
not only to meet the old 1.2 limit but also to scrub ninety per-
cent of the sulfur content out of their coal. 29 7 In response, Drayton's
Planning Office relied on a computer model to determine the costs of
forced scrubbing.
298
295. Although the authors attempted to discuss NSPS with Mr. Hawkins during May of
1978, this proved impossible. The descriptions of his actions were compiled through other
interviews and documents available in the EPA docket.
296. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1)(C) (Supp. II 1978).
297. See New Source Standards Considered for Utility Steam Generating Units, 8
ENVIR. REp. (BNA) 1173 (1977) (summarizing recommendation).
298. At the Planning Office's request, the EPA hired a Washington consulting firm,
ICF, Inc., for modeling work that began in October 1977. An EPA official confirms that the
Planning Office was the source of the proposal. Interview with EPA policy analyst, in Wash-
ington, D.C. (June 12, 1980). ICF eventually produced four separate analyses of proposed
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Because the Planning Office merely responded to the Air Office
proposal, its analysis suffered from two fundamental problems. First, it
did not refine the agency's understanding of the benefits of scrubbing.
All NSPS proposals were analyzed exclusively in terms of SO2 even
though the modelers knew of the emerging links between SO4 and
more serious environmental hazards.2 99 This focus on SO., also obscured
the very different interests at stake in the different regions. Rather than
examining impacts on health, acid rain, and visibility, the model re-
ferred only to reduction of S0 2.300
Second, the modelers examined a remarkably limited range of policy
alternatives. They ignored the possibility of more sophisticated siting
or design strategies. Nor did the computer study explore any option
which allowed any new plant to avoid the immediate construction of
scrubbers. No consideration was given, for example, to the possibility
of requiring 1990 plants to burn low sulfur coal in the short term and
install scrubbers in 2010, even though it was recognized that immediate
NSPS standards: EFFECTS OF ALTERNATIVE PERFORMANCE STANDARDS FOR COAL-FIRED UTILITY
BOILERS ON COAL MARKETS AND ON UTILITY CAPACITY EXPANSION PLANS (Sept. 1978) (pre-
pared between October 1977 and April 1978) [hereinafter cited as ICF I]; FURTHER ANALY-
SES OF ALTERNATIVE NEW SOURCE PERFORMANCE STANDARDS FOR NEW COAL-FIRED POWER-
PLANTS (Sept. 1978) (prepared between April and September 1978) [hereinafter cited as
ICF II]; STILL FURTHER ANALYSES OF ALTERNATIVE N E SOURCE PERFORMANCE STANDARDS
FOR NEW COAL-FIRED POWERPLANTS (Jan. 1979) (prepared between September and Decem-
ber 1978) [hereinafter cited as ICF III]; and THE FINAL SET OF ANALYSES OF ALTERNATIVE
NEW SOURCE PERFORMANCE STANDARDS FOR NEw COAL-FIRED POWERPLANTS (June 1979) (pre-
pared between December 1978 and May 1979) [hereinafter cited as ICF IV]. Some results
from ICF I and ICF II appeared after further analysis in ELECTRIC UTILITY STEAM GEN-
ERATING UNITS: BACKGROUND INFORMATION FOR PROPOSED SO, EMISSION STANDARDS 2-I to
3-28 (Supp. 1978) (EPA Pub. No. 450/2-78-007a-1) [hereinafter cited as 1978 SO2 BACK-
GROUND INFORMATION (Supp.)] and in the EPA's September 1978 proposal for SO, emission
limits, 43 Fed. Reg. 42,165-68 (1978). Preliminary results from ICF III appeared in a sup-
plemental notice, 43 Fed. Reg. 57,857-59 (1978), immediately prior to public hearings held
on the proposal in December 1978. A summary of the results of ICF IV is reprinted in
the EPA's publication of its decision. 44 Fed. Reg. 33,608-09 (1979).
The model's predictions varied from analysis to analysis but the trends from the various
reports that are described in the text generally remained constant. For example, all the
studies show the same general pattern of regional emissions. To simplify the reader's
task in following the decisionmaking process, we have consistently used figures from the
final analysis, ICF IV (using wet scrubbing cost assumptions, see p. 1554 infra), eveI
though ICF IV was not available to decisionmakers until spring of 1979. Where this
ahistorical simplification significantly distorts the description of events, we refer to
earlier analyses.
299. See POSITION PAPER, supra note 88, at xiii-xiv, xvi-xvii. The agency restricted its
analysis of the effect of NSPS on air quality to the regulation's impact on SO, concen-
trations, making no reference to the relationship between SO, and SO,. See 1978 SO 2
BACKGROUND INFORMATION, sulpra note 65, at 6-11 to -13.
300. See, e.g., 44 Fed. Reg. 33,605-07 (1979) (justifying 1979 NSPS simply in terms of
nationwide SO, emissions). The modelers did take a step in the right direction by pro-
jecting regional emissions of SO-although the regions were defined in puzzling ways.
Thus, the critical Ohio Valley was divided into two different regions, following state
lines rather than meteorological realities. See ICF III, suPra note 298, at 15 (figure 1).
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scrubbing would induce utilities to keep their dirty old plants on line
longer.30 ' Instead, the modelers contented themselves with modest
variations on Hawkins' "full scrubbing" theme.30 2 They focused ex-
clusively on the costs to be saved by allowing some scrubbers to reduce
SO.5 discharges by something less than ninety percent. Even this cost
analysis was limited by the fact that the most lenient partial scrubbing
option seriously considered, permitting twenty percent scrubbing,30 3
still required all plants to make a very heavy initial investment in
technology, and only saved some of the operation and maintenance
cost of intensive ninety percent use. Finally, the model provided an
unrealistic view of enforcement; by assuming perfect compliance, it
failed to alert policymakers to the danger that forced scrubbing might
dramatically worsen the East's sulfate problem.
In constructing its model, the Planning Office was constrained not
only by the Air Office proposal but by institutional realities as well.
The people at EPA best qualified to analyze environmental benefits
were the agency's technical staff in North Carolina. Yet much of it was
301. The environmental groups were particularly critical of the assumption discussed
above, see p. 1524 supra, that utilities would stretch out the lives of old plants when
faced with increased costs for new plants. Natural Resources Defense Council & Environ.
mental Defense Fund, Comments on Proposed Standard of Performance for New Electric
Utility Steam Generating Units, at V-3 to -6 (1978) (EPA Docket No. OAQPS-78-I, Item
No. IV-D-631) [hereinafter cited as NRDC & EDF Comments]. This is admittedly a crucial
assumption. We think it is a reasonable one.
302. The modelers' praiseworthy effort to take some important variables into ac-
count should not be entirely ignored, however. An effort was made to consider the
sensitivity of model conclusions to change in such variables as the growth in de-
mand for power, the amount of nuclear capacity constructed, the prices of oil and
coal, scrubber costs, and coal transportation costs. When comparing alternative stan-
dards, the model's predictions are relatively sensitive to changes in some of these assump-
tions-especially the costs of oil and scrubbers. See ICF III, supra note 298, at 29-31.
Environmental groups strongly criticized assumptions used in the model as unjustifiably
biased against full scrubbing. See NRDC & EDF Comments, supra note 301, at V-1 to -24.
See also ICF III, supra note 298, at 23, 36 (analysis of alternative standard using NRDC's
preferred assumptions which reduced emissions and increased costs in 1990 relative to
standards modeled using different assumptions). Even the computer runs favored by en-
vironmentalists could not conceal the fact that forced scrubbing imposed billions of
dollars more than a cost-minimizing strategy.
303. The agency itself proposed no standard requiring less than 33%. See ICF III,
supra note 298, at 12-17; ICF IV, supra note 298, at 3-4. The standard mentioned above
was proposed by the utility industry's lobbying organization, the Utility Air Regulatory
Group (UARG). See National Economic Research Associates, Inc., Comments on the Eco-
nomic Impacts of EPA's September 19, 1978 Proposed Revision to New Source Performance
Standards for Electric Utility Steam Generating Units 2 (Jan. 12, 1979) (EPA Docket No.
OAQPS-78-I, Item No. IV-D-611 app. D) (discussing UARG proposal). Even so, consid-
eration of scrubbing at levels as low as 21% was restricted to relatively uncommon, low
sulfur coals (less than 0.8 lb. per MBTU). See ICF III, supra note 298, at B-21. For more
common types of low sulfur coal (content of roughly 1.2 lb. per MBTU), all standards
modeled, other than the then-current 1.2 standard, required at least 33% scrubbing. See id.
at B-13 to -21.
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under the bureaucratic control of Hawkins, and it would be naive to
imagine that he would appreciate efforts to arm his bureaucratic op-
ponents. Thus, the Planning Office looked outside the agency for much
of its analytic assistance. It persuaded the agency to commission a Wash-
ington, D.C. consulting firm, ICF, Inc., to play a central role in build-
ing the basic model. Although this firm was well known and highly re-
garded for its models of coal supply and energy production, it did not
have similar experience with the environmental dimensions of the
problem. 30 4 In addition, the model's focus on coal supply encouraged
the energetic participation of staffers from the Department of Energy,
who saw the scrubber as a serious obstacle to energy independence. 30°
As a consequence, the institutional stage had been set for a computer
analysis rich on costs but impoverished on the benefits that putatively
justified all the activity. As a result of the Air Office's political orienta-
tion, the EPA would invest millions of dollars on an analytic enterprise
that did not attempt a sophisticated advance in the environmental
dimensions of the policy problem.
Yet despite its flaws, the model gave the Planning Office a powerful
weapon. Even when so many critical issues had been defined out .of
existence, the dubious virtues of full scrubbing could not be entirely
concealed. First, the model reported that full scrubbing would yield
only modest nationwide gains in SO2 as late as 1995.306 This small drop
emphasized the relatively small role new plants played in the total
emissions picture, as well as the fact that Eastern plants would respond
to forced scrubbing by using higher sulfur coal. Regional breakdowns
made the picture even less attractive. They showed that SO2 loadings
would slightly increase in the Midwest,307 thereby illustrating the new
304. This characteristic was reflected in the fact that although the ICF model had
been used by federal agencies to predict gross amounts of SO2 produced under various
scenarios for energy development and environmental control, see, e.g., ICF, INC., IssuEs AND
IMPACTS ASSOCIATED WITH PROPOSED PREVENTION OF SIGNIFICANT DETERIORATION (1976), it
was unable to estimate how emissions of SO. translated into concentrations of SO, see
ICF, INC., COAL AND ELECTRIC UTILITIES MODEL DOCUMENTATION I-I to -11 (1977) (sum-
marizing model capabilities). This transformation posed a key health question. See p.
1517 supra.
505. Full scrubbing promised to increase oil consumption by roughly 250,000 barrels
a day compared to most other compliance strategies, see ICF IV, supra note 298, at 5, which
is roughly 1% of current American consumption, see ENERGY FUTURE: REPORT OF THE
ENERGY PROJECT AT THE HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL, suPra note 5, at 15 (table I-1) (1977
daily consumption of petroleum equivalent to 18.4 million barrels of oil). See pp. 1542, 1553
infra (discussing DOE participation).
306. See 1978 SO 2 BACKGROUND INFORMATION (Supp.), suPra note 298, at 3-5 (table 3-2)
(predicting less than 5% difference in emissions nationwide between standards requiring
nearly universal use of 90% scrubbing and alternative "partial" scrubbing options).
307. See ICF IV, supra note 298, at C-II-3a, C-VIII-3a (predicting 3% increase in emis-
sion tonnages in East North Central region by 1995). The East North Central region in-
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incentives that scrubbing would give utilities to keep their old, dirty
plants on line longer.308 The model also revealed that full scrubbing
was one of the costliest ventures ever imposed in the name of a cleaner
environment. Full scrubbing would cost 4.1 billion dollars a year by
1995309 and even more in later years as more new plants were built.
As the computers clacked on, the agency began to confront yet
another congressional constraint on its discretion. As part of its
last-minute activity, the conference committee had imposed a one-year
deadline for the EPA to implement the revised version of section
111.310 When it became clear in July 1978 that regulations would not
be proposed, let alone promulgated, by the deadline, the Sierra Club
successfully obtained a court order requiring an EPA decision by June
1979.311 This timetable required rapid publication of a notice of pro-
posed rulemaking; thus, during the summer of 1978, the scrubbing
issue began to loom large on Administrator Costle's personal agenda.
Moreover, intra-agency conflict had the great merit of forcing Ad-
ministrator Costle to give more time to the issue than any previous
policymaker of like stature-either in Congress or the executive branch.
Yet the dispute reached Costle through the distorting institutional
prism bequeathed by the congressional effort to move beyond the
New Deal. On the one hand, the Air Office kept its eyes firmly
fixed on the legislative history and so believed that a sophisticated
analysis of environmental consequences was unnecessary for its ex-
treme position on behalf of full scrubbing. On the other hand, the
Planning Office, together with its consulting firm, expatiated on
the costs with only the most meager institutional capacity to speak
cludes Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, and Wisconsin. When speaking of air quality, we
will refer to this region as the Midwest. When coal-producing regions are described, Ohio
is part of the Appalachian region, not of the Midwestern region. The EPA, in its
September 1978 notice, used a slightly different definition of "Midwestern," resulting in
a slight decrease in predicted emissions from the "Midwest." 43 Fed. Reg. 42,165 (1978).
308. See 44 Fed. Reg. 33,607 (1979) (higher pollution control costs of new plants induce
utilities to use older plants).
309. See ICF IV, supra note 298, at 5. The September notice predicted an increase of
$2.6 billion. 43 Fed. Reg. 42,168 (1978) (table 8). Cost figures here and elsewhere are
incremental annualized costs relative to the 1.2 standard. They include annualized capital
costs as well as operating and maintenance costs. These figures do not represent the
total annualized investment that utilities will make for pollution control in 1995, in that
the costs necessary to reach the 1.2 standard are not counted. Other consultants have
predicted that continued use of the 1971 NSPS would cost about $6 billion in 1990 (in
annualized 1977 dollars). See 1978 SO, BACKGROUND INFORIATION (Supp.), supra note 298,
at 3-28.
310. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, § 109(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7411(f)(1) (Supp. 11 1978).
311. Sierra Club v. Costle, No. 76-1297 (D.D.C., Aug. 25, 1978) (stipulation) (EPA
Docket No. OAQPS-78-I, Item No. II-F-I, IV-J-25); see 9 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 543, 544 (1978).
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intelligently on the question whether the costs were worth bearing.
Rather than a coordinated institutional effort to define short- and
long-term strategies to cope with the sulfate problem, Costle was
presented with dollar figures, on the one hand, and clean air rhet-
oric, on the other.
B. Executive Intervention
In deciding on the proposal that the EPA would announce in the
Federal Register, Costle was hardly operating in an insulated bureau-
cratic environment. From the time the Air Office circulated its first
internal memo on behalf of full scrubbing, outsiders were informed
of agency policy through agency leaks or by BNA's Environment
Reporter. 12 Thus, they could intervene informally even before the
EPA proposal was published on September 19, 1978.
The critical mover at this stage was the Department of Energy
(DOE). Once the scrubbing issue was isolated from the swirl of com-
prehensive energy planning, the DOE staff could assert its continuing
doubts about scrubbing.313 As Costle approached his decision in the
summer of 1978, DOE opposed the Air Office proposal in increasingly
aggressive ways314 and endorsed partial scrubbing. In a memorandum
presented at an August White House meeting, Costle asserted that the
statute contained a presumption favoring full scrubbing, but admitted
that further analysis could overcome that presumption.31 5 Rather than
choose sides, Costle permitted the agency's formal notice to reflect the
bureaucratic impasse. 316 The notice announced the Air Office require-
ment that all new plants reduce sulfur content by ninety percent in
addition to complying with the old 1.2 ceiling,317 but it also reported
312. In addition, the EPA routinely submitted its proposals to other executive offices
for review. See, e.g., Letter from Don R. Goodwin, Air Office, to Addressees in other Ex-
ecutive Agencies (Dec. 1, 1977) (EPA Docket No. OAQPS-78-I, Item No. I1-F-1) (enclosure
of draft NSPS provisions).
313. See, e.g., Letter from John F. O'Leary, DOE Deputy Secretary, to Douglas C.
Costle, EPA Administrator (July 6, 1978) (EPA Docket No. OAQPS-78-I, Item No. II-F-4);
Letter from John F. O'Leary to Douglas C. Costle (Aug. 11, 1978) (EPA Docket No.
OAQPS-78-I, Item No. II-F-5).
314. See, e.g., 9 ENvIR. REP. (BNA) 436-37 (1978) (summarizing DOE opposition); id.
at 660 (reviewing letter from O'Leary to Costle, favoring sliding scale emission standard).
315. See id. at 819; id. at 860 (reprinting memorandum).
316. See 43 Fed. Reg. 42,154 (1978) (principal issue to be resolved in rulemaking is
whether full scrubbing of low sulfur coal is required). The EPA's eventual decision to
propose a standard-full scrubbing-rather than simply state the alternatives being con-
sidered, was influenced by a provision of § 111 which subjected plants to the revised NSPS
from the date of proposal, not of promulgation. See 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(2) (Supp. 11 1978);
9 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 861 n.l (1978).
317. The September notice actually proposed a 1.2 ceiling with certain exemptions
and scrubber performance averaging 85%-measured on a daily basis. See id. at 42,158.
Most alternative standards considered after September 1978 were formulated in terms
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the dismal story that the model was telling about full scrubbing.318 To
make matters even clearer, Costle had publicly declared that his mind
was open.310 Scrubbing would finally be given the high-visibility at-
tention it deserved.
C. Technocratic Ascendancy
Their work now acknowledged by the Administrator, the computer
modelers proceeded in earnest and produced an alternative to the Air
Office's full-scrubbing proposal. Although the Planning Office had
already narrowed its inquiry greatly, there was one well-known theme
that could be played in countless variations.
1. The Rise of Partial Scrubbing
It is the old siren song of Pareto efficiency. It is child's play to show
that any emission reduction achieved by ninety percent scrubbing can
be achieved more cheaply by more intelligent regulation. As we have
seen, when Eastern coalburners are forced to scrub at ninety percent,
they will sometimes respond by buying cheap high sulfur coal, thereby
offsetting the scrubber's emission reduction by increasing the total
sulfur content of the fuel consumed. This simple point suggested the
possibility of a Pareto-efficient bargain, a "sliding scale" approach to
emission reduction. For example, if the utility promised to discharge
only 0.8 rather than 1.2 pounds per MBTU, then the EPA might agree
to forgo its ninety percent scrubbing requirement and permit some
lower level of percentage removal, say thirty-three percent. Under this
alternative, the environment would gain a little by means of the re-
duction from 1.2 to 0.8, and the utilities would gain because scrubbing
at thirty-three percent was less expensive than scrubbing at ninety
of monthly or yearly averages. In general, a standard expressed as a daily average ap-
pears to be less stringent than the same standard expressed as a long-term average. For
example, EPA analysts interviewed stated that they had generally considered the Sep-
tember notice's 1.2 standard (with exemptions) to be equivalent to approximately a 0.8
pound annual average. During the modeling process, a requirement that a scrubber reduce
emissions by an average of 85% every day was generally considered to be equivalent to
a requirement that it reduce emissions by an average of 90% over a longer period such
as a month or a year. See, e.g., ICF II, supra note 298, at A2. For the reader's convenience,
the authors have translated percentage reduction requirements into equivalent long-term
averages throughout. Where the text refers to 90% scrubbing, long-term averages should
be assumed unless otherwise noted.
318. See 43 Fed. Reg. 42,166-67 (tables 4, 5) (1978) (showing little change in new
plant SO 2 emissions in most of country from different scrubbing standards).
319. See 9 ENVIR. RPE. (BNA) 861 (1978) (reprinting Costle memorandum declaring
that September notice will seek further information to help EPA make decision).
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percent.3 20 Only sellers of the dirtiest coals could possibly lose. More-
over, because the agency computer model was relatively sophisticated
in its treatment of coal production, it could predict confidently that
partial scrubbing options would do no serious economic harm to
Eastern coal. Indeed, major increases in overall Eastern coal produc-
tion were anticipated.
3 21
There was, however, one interest that could not be accommodated
by the use of the sliding scale. In the West, a ninety percent scrubber
did imply a ninety percent reduction in new plant emissions since only
low sulfur coal was readily available. Gains from ninety percent
scrubbing would be offset by increased use of old plants, but the model
still predicted a modest reduction in Western SO2 loadings by 1995.322
Modelers seeking Pareto superiority therefore made a regulatory dis-
tinction between East and West: Easterners might be allowed the
benefits of the sliding scale, while Westerners might be forced to accept
the rigors of full scrubbing. Here, finally, was something that made
nobody worse off and that had the advantage of providing both
branches of the EPA with a face-saving compromise. Yet although
this "Eastern sliding scale-Western full scrubbing" proposal was Pareto
superior to the full scrubbing proposed by the Air Office, it emphasized
the bizarre quality of the entire exercise. After all, it was the East
that suffered more severely from acid rain and the possibility of
health impairments. Nonetheless, the East-West split would permit
many Eastern plants to keep discharging at 1.2 when all Western
plants were discharging at 0.2.
Although this bizarre solution did not force the reconsideration of
basic premises, it did lead the technocrats to favor an alternative
proposal that would tolerate some increases in S02 in the West while
reducing Eastern loads more significantly. Moreover, this solution had
the virtue of administrative simplicity and served to emphasize the
economists' main insight. Why not simply reduce the old 1.2 emission
320. Because partial scrubbing options reduced the cost of new plants, and thus en-
couraged the retirement of dirtier, old plants, partial scrubbing could produce net re-
ductions in emissions, even where its use did not reduce emissions from individual plants.
See p. 1524 supra.
321. Nationwide coal production was expected almost to triple between 1975 and 1995.
Even under the 1.2 standard, ICF predicted that over those twenty years production
would increase by 25% in Appalachia, by 190% in the Midwest, and by 750% west of
the Mississippi. ICF IV, supra note 298, at C-II-9.
322. The reduction was modest because smelters, not power plants, contribute most of
the region's SO2. See notes 284-85 supra. ICF predicted, though, that under some partial
scrubbing options, power plant SO. emissions might be 50% greater than under a full
scrubbing standard. See ICF III, supra note 298, at D-III-2.
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ceiling to some lower number, say 0.55,323 which would force everyone
to scrub somewhat since no coal could pass the lower ceiling without
advanced technology? Despite this radical reduction of the output ceil-
ing, costs would nonetheless be reduced so long as polluters were
allowed to decide for themselves how to mix lower sulfur coal and
higher scrubbing percentages to reach the 0.55 ceiling. Compared to full
scrubbing, the simple proposal to lower the ceiling to 0.55 promised
savings of hundreds of millions of dollars a year, lower SO2 emissions
nationwide, and significant emission reductions in the areas east of the
Mississippi where the health threat was most serious.324
By January 1979, opinion within the Planning Office was converging
strongly upon this simple "ceiling reduction" proposal. Rational
analysis had paid off: no serious person could think that the Air Office's
proposal for full scrubbing was superior to the simple expedient of
lowering the ceiling to 0.55. And it was at just this point that the
technocrats in the agency gained important reinforcement from on
high, as the White House staff added its weight to the technocratic
counterattack.
2. The View from the Center
In the early days of the Carter Administration, center stage was
occupied by Schlesinger's heady energy program; by 1978, however, the
scrubber was worthy of attention in its own right. As the White House
staff became familiar with their offices, they tried-as have so many
predecessors-to gain control over the sprawling bureaucracy around
them. The organizational initiative of greatest interest here is the
White House effort to implement a 1978 executive order, requiring
the agencies to conduct an "economic impact analysis" for every "signif-
icant" regulation.3 25 The core of this effort was the so-called Regulatory
323. The 0.55 pound standard discussed here and below was based on an annual aver-
age. The Air Office proposal was equivalent to roughly a 0.8 to 1.0 pound standard on an
annual basis. See note 317 supra.
324. According to the model, a simple 0.55 limit was cheaper than full scrubbing
with washing credit by $800 million a year in 1995. At the same time, nationwide SO.
emissions from power plants went from 20.5 million tons under full scrubbing to 20.3
million under the lowered ceiling. The low ceiling, more importantly, reduced Eastern
loadings by 740,000 tons in 1995, from 15.6 million tons to 14.9 million tons. See ICF III,
supra note 298, at D-III-1 to -2 (net difference obtained using independent rounding). In
contrast, emissions in the West, where sulfur oxide levels are lower than in the East, rose
by only 560,000 tons, from 4.9 million tons to 5.4 million tons. Id.
325. Exec. Order No. 12,044, 3 C.F.R. 152 (1979). "Significant" regulations are those
that impose costs of $100 million annually, or that have major impacts on individual
industries, levels of local government, or geographic regions. Id. at § 3(a)(1), 3 C.F.R. 152,
154 (1979).
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Analysis Review Group (RARG)-a bureaucratic box in which Execu-
tive Office economists confronted ambassadors from Cabinet-level
agencies. 326 Formally speaking, the RARG job was to review the analysis
generated by the front-line agency in defense of its proposed initiative,
and publish a report of its findings for inclusion in the agency's rule-
making record.32 7 Although this makes the RARG potentially signif-
icant in the practice of judicial review, 32 8 our present concern is with
its direct impact on policymaking.
NSPS was an ideal candidate for RARG review. Its multibillion
dollar annual price tag naturally invited inquiry from the cost-benefit
analysts in the Executive Office. DOE opposition suggested the need
for central coordination. Finally, expressions of concern from the
business community329 signaled the presence of political interests not
readily appreciated by the EPA. Accordingly, RARG dispatched a
single junior lawyer-economist, Robert Litan, for a three-month tour
with the EPA's modelers. Litan and other lawyer-economists then
worked with William Nordhaus, a senior member of the Council of
Economic Advisers, to prepare a RARG report on NSPS.
The report330 suggested the value of review by technocratically com-
petent staff operating outside the control of the agencies.331 It
brought to the surface some of the larger questions that had been
326. RARG is chaired by the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers and
includes "economic" and "regulatory" members. Representatives of CEA, the Office of
Management and Budget, and the Departments of Commerce, Labor, and Treasury
constitute the "economic" group. "Regulatory" members are representatives of the Health
and Human Services, Housing and Urban Development, Interior, Justice, and Transporta-
tion Departments, and the EPA. The Office of Science and Technology Policy participates
in RARG ,as a member, and the President's Domestic Policy Staff and the Council on
Environmental Quality participate as advisers. See Procedures of the Regulatory Analysis
Review Group (Nov. 1978) (unsigned memorandum) (on file with Yale Law Journal).
327. RARG reports are formally submitted by the Council on Wage and Price Sta-
bility (COWPS), which operates with explicit statutory authority to intervene in the
rulemaking of agencies in order to present its views on the inflationary impact of de-
cisions. See 12 U.S.C. § 1904 (Supp. 1I 1978). Presumably this reliance on COWPS is
intended to minimize questions of the improper use of executive power to influence
regulatory decisions.
328. See pp. 1561-62 infra.
329. See Letter from George C. Freeman, Jr. to Stuart Eizenstat (Aug. 18, 1978) (EPA
Docket No. OAQPS-78-I, Item No. II-D-433) (restating concern expressed at July 13 meet-
ing with Eizenstat); Letter from Barbara Blum, Deputy Administrator, EPA, to James
Schlesinger (July 6, 1978) (EPA Docket No. OAQPS-78-I, Item No. II-F-7) (referring to
meeting on NSPS with President, Schlesinger, and Business Roundtable).
330. Council on Wage and Price Stability, Environmental Protection Agency's Proposal
for the Revision of New Source Performance Standards for Electric Utility Steam Gen-
erating Units, Report of the Regulatory Analysis Review Group (Jan. 15, 1979) (EPA
Docket No. OAQPS-78-I, Item No. IV-H-12) [hereinafter cited as RARG Report].
331. See B. AcKmfAN, S. ROSE-AcKERMAN, J. SAWYER, & D. HENDERSON, supra note
237, at 156-71.
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suppressed by the bureaucratic struggle within the EPA. Most impor-
tant, the report focused on the peculiar fact that the EPA had failed to
illuminate the environmental dimensions of the problem in a sophisti-
cated way. It challenged the EPA's concentration on S03 rather than on
SO4.332 Moreover, it showed the irrationality of examining total pounds
of S02 emitted without taking account of the number of people
actually exposed to emissions and recommended further analysis of
health and exposure effects before embarking on a massive program of
forced scrubbing.333 The RARG report did not, however, make a sys-
tematic effort to measure scrubbing against the various goals-human
health, ecological integrity, aesthetic visibility-relevant in a compre-
hensive analysis. Instead, it concerned itself primarily with the battle
already raging within the EPA and came out in favor of the Planning
Office proposal to lower the ceiling from 1.2 to some lower number
and to permit utilities to mix scrubbing and low sulfur coal in the
way that would most cheaply meet the output ceiling.3 34
All in all, RARG did a remarkably good job with the resources at
its disposal. It discharged the most fundamental reviewing task, chal-
lenging the agency's narrow definition of its problem, and pointing
out concrete ways in which the problem might be redefined usefully.
In addition, given the way the problem had been defined, RARG
properly placed the burden of justification on the side that seemed to
have the worst of the technocratic argument. Finally, unlike judicial
review, RARG review came at a time before bureaucratic positions had
hardened beyond alteration. The RARG report was filed on the last
day for public comment on the EPA's September proposal. 335 The
time had come for Administrator Costle to make up his mind.
D. Agency Decision
As the comment period closed on January 15, 1979, the agency's
perception of NSPS had matured significantly in the year since Haw-
kins' Air Office first proposed its full scrubbing-high ceiling option.
RARG's narrowly focused rejection of full scrubbing on behalf of a
lowered ceiling had a sizable impact. It enhanced the internal credi-
332. See RARG Report, supra note 330, at 29.
333. See id. at 26-35, 42. Although representatives of the Council of Economic Ad-
visers had earlier requested the EPA to conduct a benefits study as part of the NSPS
rulemaking, the Air Office opposed committing resources to such a study. See Memoran-
dum from Walter C. Barber, Air Office, to Roy N. Gamse, Planning Office (Aug. 9,
1978) (suggesting feasibility problems of such study) (on file with Yale Law Journal).
334. See RARG Report, supra note 330, at 2, 13-14.
335. Id. (report submitted January 15, 1979).
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bility of the EPA's Planning Office and demonstrated that other bu-
reaucracies, notably DOE, would have significant support in the White
House if the EPA entirely ignored their opposition to full scrubbing.
Moreover, the technocrats had plainly made a powerful case for the low
ceiling strategy. Analysis suggested that the 0.55 ceiling would reduce
1995 nationwide emissions by 0.2 million tons more than full scrubbing
while costing $800 million dollars a year less.336
1. The High Tide of Instrumental Rationality
If the symbol of full scrubbing were to emerge victorious, something
new would have to be added to the bureaucratic equation. And this
"special something" was precisely what Hawkins' Air Office tried to
provide. So far as a committed environmentalist was concerned, there
was nothing wrong with the Planning Office's proposal to lower the
ceiling from 1.2 to 0.55. But it would be even better to add a full
scrubbing requirement on top of this, thereby reducing Western
emissions yet further to 0.2 pounds of SO2 per MBTU.337 Thus, during
January and February, the Air Office independently began to study a
low ceiling-full scrubbing proposal as an alternative to the Planning
Office's low ceiling-partial scrubbing competitor. While Planning
Office computer projections concentrated on the year 1995, the Air
Office focused on 2010 or later.338 By looking far into the future, the
Air Office modeling effort magnified the significance of the difference
between 0.2 and 0.55 in the West.339 By 2010, the model predicted that
Western power plants would generate 4.4 million tons of SO 2 under a
0.55 limit, while only three million tons would result under a ninety
percent scrubbing standard.3 40 Hence, according to the Air Office, the
need for full scrubbing had been reestablished on firm technocratic
ground.
The unreality of these projections, however, was easily unmasked
when they came to Planning Office attention in February 1979. Be-
cause NSPS would be reconsidered between now and 2010, it was wrong
336. See ICF III, supra note 298, at 37. The difference in emissions is 1% of pre-
dicted nationwide emissions, and may not be significant.
337. In December 1978, ICF predicted that in 1995 a low ceiling-full scrubbing option
would yield 500,000 tons less in emissions nationwide than the 0.55 limit alone and would
increase annualized costs by $1 billion. See id. Almost all of the decrease in emissions
would occur west of the Mississippi. See id. at D-III-1.
338. For this reason, the Planning Office criticized the projections as unfair. See
Memorandum from Roy N. Gamse, Planning Office, to Walter C. Barber, Air Office
(Feb. 28, 1979) (on file with Yale Law Journal).
339. See id.
340. See ICF IV, supra note 298, at D-la.
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to ignore the possibility of tightening up more in the future even if the
1980 NSPS was "only" set at 0.55.341 Moreover, in its zeal to establish
the benefits of full scrubbing in 2010, the Air Office had entirely failed
to estimate the costs imposed on new plants built between 1995 and
2010. Later on, these added costs were placed at six billion dollars a
year.342 Finally, the Air Office failed to note the overwhelming con-
tribution of smelting to Western sulfur loadings. Because the smelters
were expected to reduce their discharges substantially over the next half
century, it was likely that even with the 0.55 limit, overall SO2 loads
would remain constant, or even decline.343 These flaws undermined
the Air Office's belated effort to defend itself with the flashy weapons
brandished by its opponents.
A related clean air effort, however, did manage a brief moment in the
sun. During February, the EPA circulated a partial scrubbing-low ceil-
ing proposal to other executive departments for comment.344 In re-
sponse, the Department of the Interior expressed concern about future
visibility in the Western national parks in its bureaucratic bailiwick.345
Because Interior's mission did not oblige it to take any of the other
costs, environmental or financial, into account, there was nothing pre-
venting it from pronouncing itself in favor of full scrubbing. Not con-
tent with a paper statement, Secretary Andrus met with Administrator
Costle to express his opposition to partial scrubbing.346 Shortly there-
after, Interior made a formal presentation to the EPA's Air Office,
dramatizing its concern with a slide-show depicting on separate slides
a hazy Grand Canyon and belching smokestacks. Unfortunately, how-
341. See Memorandum from Roy N. Gamse to Walter C. Barber, supra note 338.
342. See ICF IV, supra note 298, at D-la.
343. In 1975, smelters emitted 2.2 million tons in the Rocky Mountain and Pacific
regions, and power plants emitted only 0.6 million tons. See Memorandum from David
W. Tunderman, Planning Office, to William Drayton, at 3 (Mar. 9, 1979) (figure 1) (on
file with Yale Law Journal). By 1995, smelter emissions are expected to decline by an
amount between 1.1 and 1.6 million tons. Under a 0.55 standard, SO 2 emissions from
utilities in the Western regions should increase by only 0.6 million tons between
now and 2010-thus suggesting there will be little change in emissions in the Rocky
Mountain and Pacific states. See id. (showing smelter emissions decline); ICF IV, supra
note 298, at D-la (showing increase in SO. emissions).
In contrast to the West, states lying between the Mississippi and Rockies (the model's
Central West region) might experience an increase in emissions of an additional 800,000
tons, assuming partial scrubbing and no NSPS revisions. See ICF IV, supra note 298, at
D-la.
344. See Memorandum from Walter C. Barber, Air Office, to the Files (undated) (EPA
Docket No. OAQPS-78-I, Item No. IV-E-16) (report of EPA briefing held for Office of
Management and Budget and Departments of Agriculture and Interior, Feb. 16, 1979).
345. See id. (attachments D, E) (summarizing briefing of Interior and other depart-
ments on NSPS and attaching Interior material on visibility problem).
346. See Memorandum from Walter C. Barber to the Files (May, 1979) (EPA Docket
No. OAQPS-78-I, Item No. IV-E-18) (summarizing meeting).
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ever, Interior was entirely unable to establish any causal link be-
tween the two halves of its slide-show. As we have seen, the smoke-
stack's visible plume is not the product of SO2; 3 4 7 moreover, given
present emissions, it is Arizona's smelters, not coalburners, that may
be responsible for a hazy Canyon-if the haze is to be explained prin-
cipally by man-made sources.3
48
Quickly discredited, the visibility argument on behalf of full scrub-
bing dropped out of sight during the last hectic months349-only to
reemerge at the final press conference, when slides of smoggy Western
wonders once again graced the walls as Administrator Costle announced
the EPA decision.
2. Political Counterattack
By mid-March, then, the clean air wing of the government had failed
to sustain its opposition to a technocratic solution of section 111. The
time had come for the second half of the clean air-dirty coal coalition
to make itself felt. So far as Eastern coal interests were concerned,
lowering the emission ceiling to 0.55 deprived them of their hard
fought victory in the committee rooms of Congress. Such a low ceiling
would make it impossible to scrub the higher sulfur Eastern varieties
into compliance; and the EPA retreat to partial scrubbing continued
to allow utilities to look westward for low sulfur coal when this
minimized their costs.
The coalition between dirty coal and clean air that influenced the
congressional struggle of 1977 could not fulfill the coal lobby's needs
in 1979. Environmentalists saw full scrubbing as a symbolically effective
way to minimize emissions. For them, the new section 111 succeeded
insofar as it induced the EPA to reduce the ceiling from 1.2 to 0.55.
Although they preferred to go further and require full scrubbing in
the West, they abandoned the 1.2 ceiling,35
In contrast, the utilities welcomed their errant friends from the coal
industry back into a dirty coal-dirty air alliance to resist the low ceiling.
To the utilities, reducing the ceiling from 1.2 to 0.55 imposed crushing
expenses; and they were happy to make the Eastern mining com-
347. See p. 1533 supra.
348. See pp. 1534-35 suPra; PROTECTING VISIBILITY, supra note 206, at 6-5 to -7 (dis-
cussing contribution of windblown dust to visibility impairment).
349. See Memorandum from Walter C. Barber to David G. Hawkins, supra note 288
(opinion of experts that difference between full and partial scrubbing would have no
perceptible region-wide effects in 1995).
350. See NRDC & EDF Comments, supra note 301, at IV-6 (advocating 95% scrubbing
with ceilings from 0.4 to 0.12 lb).
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plaint a part of their own rhetoric, with utility spokesmen decrying the
preclusionary effect of a lower ceiling on Eastern coal.351 Although the
formal comment period had closed in January, the fact was that the
EPA's low ceiling proposal had only matured more recently. As a conse-
quence, the EPA responded to the coal lobby protest by holding a pub-
lic meeting on April 5, at which the National Coal Association (NCA)
presented an estimate that a 0.55 limit would preclude from seventy-five
to one hundred percent of the coal produced in five Eastern regions.352
This counteroffensive hardly took EPA's technocrats by surprise. The
Planning Office computer runs had included a careful study of NSPS's
impact on Eastern coal mining, and these projections had consistently
shown increases in Eastern coal production through 1995.353 Because
most existing power plants would not be retired before 1995,354 their
demand for high sulfur products would remain intact.355 In addition,
the plants of the early- and mid-1980s, regulated by the old NSPS of 1.2,
would add to the demand for Eastern coals in the mid-sulfur range.356
Even if Planning Office simulations had gone haywire, the NCA's
definition of mining regions was artfully devised to exclude major
Eastern zones of low sulfur coal; hence its claims of seventy-five to
one hundred percent preclusion exaggerated the low ceiling's impact.357
351. See 9 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 2100 (1979) (statement of George C. Freeman, Jr.).
352. See Minutes of April 5, 1979 Meeting Concerning Coal Reserve Data and Appli-
cation of Physical Coal Cleaning Credits (attachment 8) (EPA Docket No. OAQPS-78-I,
Item No. IV-E-1). The NCA survey included reserves from Ohio, Illinois, Indiana, north-
ern West Virginia, and western Kentucky, and was based on an assumption of 85%
scrubbing.
353. See ICF IV, supra note 298, at A-lb to A-7b. Even under a 0.55 ceiling, Eastern
coal production was predicted to increase by 55%. See id. at A-3b (1995 figures); id. at
C-II-9 (1975 figures).
354. See id. at C-II-15.
355. Id.
356. Existing plants (including plants converted from oil) and old NSPS plants will
together require 40% more coal in 1995 than power plants consumed in 1975. See id. By
themselves, plants subject to the 1979 NSPS will, in 1995, consume more coal than all
utilities did in 1975. Id.
357. The NCA survey ignored southern West Virginia and eastern Kentucky. In
these two regions 92% of the reserves could meet a low ceiling, even using conservative
assumptions. See M. WELLS, R. CHAPMAN, R. YEAGER, V. NEREO, & V. MATUCHA, COAL
RrSOURCES AND SULFUR EMISSIONs REGULATIONS 6-3 (1980) (table 6-1) (Teknekron Report
to EPA, Contract No. 68-02-3136) (data showing 92% of coal reserves (weighted aver-
age) in these two regions has sulfur content of 3.0 lb per MBTU or less (0.55 ceiling
can be met by using coal containing 3.67 lb per MBTU or less)). Although the EPA did not
emphasize this omission, it did counter with an analysis that, by redefining relevant coal
reserves and mining regions, suggested that a low ceiling precluded no more than 35%
of reserves in the Appalachian region (Ohio, northern West Virginia, and Pennsylvania),
and no more than 75% in the Midwest (Illinois, Indiana, and western Kentucky). See
Minutes of April 5, 1979 Meeting, supra note 352 (attachment 3) (Memorandum from John
D. Crenshaw to John Haines (Mar. 30, 1979)). More realistic assumptions reduced precluded
reserves to 25, or less in both regions. See id.
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What is more, the NCA's entire conceptual exercise was radically
misconceived. Measuring preclusion in percentage terms ignores the
fact that, given the East's rich reserves, even a small percentage will
keep miners fully occupied for a long time; thus, 1978 Eastern pro-
duction was 0.17 percent of total reserves.358 So long as we assume
that the technology of 2050 will be vastly superior to the scrubbers
of today, it seems fair to leave the higher sulfur coal to tomorrow's
treatment.
In making these points, we do not mean to suggest that the NCA
presentation fooled anybody. To the contrary, the inadequacies of the
preclusion analysis were well recognized by the EPA bureaucracy. None-
theless, the agency was not in a position to give this special pleading the
treatment it deserved. First, the congressional action of 1977--whatever
its proper interpretation-was widely perceived as mandating a concern
for "locally available fuels" as much as a desire for clean air. Second,
and even more fundamentally, the agency thought that it could frame
a new NSPS standard without engaging in a careful instrumental study
of the benefits it would yield.3 59 When faced with the inevitable cries
of discomfort from cost-bearers, it could not now defend itself by ex-
plaining why the costs were worth bearing. Instead of countering the
preclusion issue by pointing to the environmental benefits of a low ceil-
ing, the EPA found the issue being defined in terms of political cost-
benefit. So far as the coal industry was concerned, the EPA was break-
ing a promise explicitly made in the legislative history. And it would
take energetic steps to bring the technocrats back into line with con-
gressional intention.
As April moved on, the big political guns moved in. Senate Majority
Leader Robert Byrd of West Virginia met with Costle and Eizenstat at
the White House on April 23360 and with other EPA officials on May
2.3 61 After the first meeting, Costle indicated that the agency did not
intend to rule out large portions of Eastern or Midwestern coal re-
358. See Memorandum from John D. Crenshaw to Walter C. Barber (May 11, 1979)
(EPA Docket No. OAQPS-78-I, Item No. IV-B-72) (using regions surveyed by NCA, plus
Pennsylvania).
359. See Memorandum from Walter C. Barber to Roy Gamse, supra note 333 (refusing
Council of Economic Advisers' request to do benefit analysis).
360. See Memorandum from David G. Hawkins to NSPS Docket (Apr. 26, 1979) (EPA
Docket No. OAQPS-78-I, Item No. IV-E-13).
361. See Memorandum from David G. Hawkins to Walter C. Barber (May 3, 1979)
(EPA Docket No. OAQPS-78-I, Item No. IV-E-24). Other coal state Congressmen supported
Senator Byrd. The EPA docket contains over a dozen communications (by letter) between
concerned Representatives and the EPA. See EPA Docket No. OAQPS-78-I, Item Nos. IV-
D-764 to -880 (interspersed comments of individual Congressmen).
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serves. 36 2 Capitulation followed. Not only did the EPA retreat from the
0.55 standard to the old 1.2 ceiling,363 it also resolved technical am-
biguities surrounding the old 1971 number in ways that permitted
new plants to increase legal discharges by as much as fifty percent.3 6
At this new level, only three percent of Eastern coal would be precluded
from the market,36 5 leaving the nation free to choose its 0.2 percent
annual requirement from the remaining ninety-seven.
The political whirlpool was propelling Administrator Costle back to
the 1978 Air Office proposal, which required everybody to use ninety
percent scrubbing under a 1.2 ceiling. Yet too much had happened to
make this giant step backward easy to manage. Not only were there
reams of computer printout detailing the weaknesses of the Air Office
approach, 366 but powerful bureaucracies were committed to the print-
out. Within the agency, a full scrubbing decision under external
political pressure would demoralize the Planning Office. Outside the
agency, the Department of Energy remained adamantly opposed to a
proposal that would place a four billion dollar annual burden on
energy independence by 1995.367 Finally, the technocrats in the Execu-
tive Office were willing to defend its RARG report at any final con-
frontation.
But no bureaucrat likes confrontation. At the same time the EPA
was propitiating Senator Byrd, it also tried to do homage to the gods
of economic rationality. Ten days after the formal National Coal As-
sociation presentation, an internal memorandum suggested the high
362. See Memorandum from David G. Hawkins to NSPS Docket, supra note 360.
363. The rationale for the retreat to 1.2 is explained in Memorandum from John D.
Crenshaw to Walter C. Barber, supra note 358. The technical analysis underlying the
Crenshaw memorandum was completely developed by the May 2 meeting, when it was
distributed to attendees. See Memorandum from David G. Hawkins to Walter C.
Barber, suPra note 361 (enclosing distributed material). The docket does not indicate
whether the Administrator at that time indicated his decision to adopt the new 1.2
standard. The EPA has since reported that the Administrator had already concluded that
"anything more than minimal preclusion" would have been inconsistent with the pur-
poses of the 1977 Amendments. See 45 Fed. Reg. 8215 (1980).
364. The 1971 NSPS did not explicitly state the period of time during which a plant
was required to maintain the 1.2 emission ceiling. However, a new plant was required to
pass a three-hour performance test. See 40 C.F.R. § 60.45(g)(2)(i) (1979). If this three-hour
test had been incorporated in the new regulations, the effective results would have been
far more restrictive than the new regulation-which only requires plants to meet a 1.2
monthly average. 40 C.F.R. § 60.43a(c) (1979). The 50% figure presented in the text is
based on interviews with experts both in and out of the agency.
365. Memorandum from John D. Crenshaw to Walter C. Barber, supra note 358, at 6.
366. See ICF III, supra note 298, at 19, 21 (figure 2) (concluding that proposed 1.2-90%
standard was least efficient of those modeled between September and December 1978).
367. For a clear statement of many of the objections raised by the DOE to full scrub-
bing, written by an active participant in the rulemaking, see Badger, supra note 7.
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level "discovery" of a new face-saving solution to the NSPS problem.36s
Relying on sketchy cost data provided by its Office of Research and
Development, the EPA began to promote a new technology called the
"dry scrubber."30 9 The dry scrubber had a huge regulatory implication.
Preliminary research indicated that dry scrubbing could operate more
cheaply than old-fashioned wet scrubbing if it were not required
to eliminate more than seventy percent of a coal's sulfur content.370 The
dry scrubber thus provided a symbolically satisfying way to justify
partial scrubbing. Because a guiding theme of section 111 is technology-
forcing,37 1 would it not be counterproductive to insist on ninety per-
cent scrubbing and "preclude" a promising new technology?
The computers were rushed into action: how much would it save if
coalburners could use dry scrubbers to reduce sulfur by seventy per-
cent? To emphasize the environmental promise of the new technology,
the proposed regulation would allow seventy percent scrubbing only
on condition that a power plant would meet a low ceiling of 0.6, rather
than the 1.2 tolerated for ninety percent wet scrubbing.372 In this
way, the bureaucratic forces for a low ceiling got half a loaf; and when
the computer results came rolling in, they revealed that the costs of a
dry scrubbing-wet scrubbing sliding scale were far lower than the
standard full scrubbing option and almost as low as the 0.55 ceiling.
Moreover, given the 0.6 emission limit tolerated for dry scrubbing, the
new proposal also generated lower SO2 discharges than its full-scrub-
bing competitor.
373
368. See An Alternative Standard Keyed to Wet and Dry Scrubber Technology (un-
signed memorandum) (Apr. 16, 1979) (on file with Yale Law Journal).
369. A dry scrubber is very similar to a wet scrubber, but the chemical reaction in a
dry scrubber produces a dry powder rather than a liquid as in a wet scrubber. See Dry
SO. Control at 1-2 (unsigned, undated memorandum) (supplied to authors in May 1978 by
members of EPA Office of Research and Development) (on file with Yale Law Journal),
reprinted in part in Memorandum from Walter C. Barber to the Files (May 24, 1979)
(EPA Docket No. OAQPS-78-I, Item No. IV-E-21). Dry scrubbing processes are mechani-
cally simpler than wet processes and should prove more reliable. They consume less water
(an important consideration in the West), and should create fewer sludge-handling
problems than wet scrubbers currently do. See id. at 14; An Alternative Standard Keyed
to Wet and Dry Scrubber Technology, supra note 368, at 1.
Formal mention of dry SO, scrubbing had been made in the EPA's September proposal,
and commenters advocated the use of dry scrubbing at the December 1978 hearings. See 45
Fed. Reg. 8216 (1980). Although there were a few signs of growing awareness of dry
scrubbing by February 1979, our interviews indicate that serious high-level interest in
the technology did not appear until April 1979.
370. See Dry SO, Control, supra note 369, at 5-14.
371. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 417 (1970) (advocating frequent
revision of NSPS to provide incentives for constant improvement of control technology).
372. See 44 Fed. Reg. 33,614 (1979) (codified in 40 C.F.R. § 60.43a(a)(2) (1979)).
373. The EPA estimated that a standard permitting 70% dry scrubbing would save
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With computer printouts like this,37 4 Costle could go to the White
House with new confidence. Not surprisingly, resistance within the
Executive Office quickly faded. After all, it is embarrassing for the
White House staff to urge the President to overrule a Cabinet-level
officer on a subject within his agency's jurisdiction. Now that Costle
had moved away from full scrubbing toward RARG, the White House
staff had gained a sufficient victory. And so, when a meeting before the
President was finally held in early May, only Energy Secretary Schles-
inger announced his commitment to the RARG low ceiling option-and
even he, from the reports we have received, was not outspoken.
Although the dry scrubber solved the Administrator's political
problem, its relationship to sulfur removal is far more problematic. At
present, there is no dry scrubber operating on a full-sized power
plant anywhere in the United States.37 5 Some experts we have talked
to liken present knowledge of dry scrubbing to the level of understand-
ing of wet scrubbing prevailing in the early 1970s-when costs were
thought to be only one half of what we now know them to be.376
Whether the dry scrubber will suffer a similar fate-indeed, whether it
will work at all under field conditions-only time will tell.
We do not mean to condemn a high-level decision to reach deep
within the innards of the EPA for intelligent guesses about the future.
Instead, our point involves the kind of guesses high-level decisionmakers
thought relevant to their policymaking predicament. If the EPA had
been required to justify its decision in terms of environmental benefits,
Administrator Costle would have had to call on agency modelers special-
izing in the long-distance transport of sulfates, rather than on agency
experts in frontier technologies. Doubtless the models produced would
have been imperfect, requiring innumerable guesses before the link
between Midwestern smokestacks and Eastern ill health could be
elucidated. Doubtless the coal companies and Senator Byrd would have
attacked nonetheless. At least, though, we would have been arguing
about the right questions and doing so in the open: How serious is the
almost $1.2 billion a year by 1995, while reducing nationwide emissions by 250,000 tons
below the full-scrubbing 90% option. See ICF IV, supra note 298, at 5 (using dry scrub-
bing cost estimates).
374. The modeling results actually shown White House aides seem to have differed
slightly from those published later in more formal documents. See Memorandum from
Walter C. Barber to the Files, supra note 369 (table 3) (discussing May 1, 1979 meeting).
375. See 44 Fed. Reg. 33,582 (1979). The nation's first three full-scale dry scrubbers
were being installed in 1979. See id.
376. Compare 37 Fed. Reg. 5769 (1972) (estimated scrubber costs of $30 or $45 per
kilowatt in 1978 dollars) with ICF III, supra note 298, at B-21 (estimated scrubber costs
as high as $90-113 per kilowatt).
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risk to human health? Are Eastern lakes being irreversibly damaged by
acid rain? If we are to spend billions, should they be spent on new
plants or old ones?
Although any answer to these questions is inevitably controversial,
at least such a controversy would force policymakers to consider the con-
sequences of their actions in the real world outside of Washington,
D.C. By moving beyond the New Deal, we have moved away from a
successful effort to understand the environment.
V. Agency-Forcing Statutes and the Role of Courts
At present, the EPA's NSPS decision is on appeal.3 7 Our case study
supplies several guidelines for the court reviewing the Administrator's
decision.
At the center of our story is a distinctive legal creature, which we
have called the agency-forcing statute. Agency forcing provides a means
for removing an issue from the general run of agency discretion, direct-
ing policy in a particular direction. At the same time, however, it signals
a congressional recognition that, after all, the issue requires the exercise
of expert judgment that cannot be applied directly from Capitol Hill.
Thus, rather than setting down regulatory policy in explicit statutory
terms, the agency-forcing statute contemplates careful policy reappraisal
by the agency before the congressional initiative gains the force of law.
Our present task is to define a role for courts that permits judges to
check the worst abuses generated by agency forcing without pretending
to a policymaking competence that outstrips judicial capacities.
A. The Principle of Full Inquiry
To begin, reflect upon an obvious danger generated by agency forc-
ing. Simply put, it is the old Alphonse-Gaston problem: one player,
Congress, enacts an agency-forcing statute with the expectation that
the other will subject a particular policy to hard-headed consideration.
The other player, the agency, thinks that Congress has already made
the policy judgment and confines its policy review within narrow
bounds. As a consequence, each player allows the other to drop the
ball: an important policy is adopted without the hard thinking that
should be required of a sound law-making enterprise.
To avoid such breakdowns, the court must adapt a classic function
377. See Sierra Club v. Costle, No. 79-1565 (D.C. Cir., filed June 11, 1979). The EPA
denied requests for reconsideration of the standards in February 1980. See 45 Fed. Reg. 8210
(1980).
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of judicial review to the agency-forcing context. Traditionally, courts
have been alert to the importance of scrutinizing administrative pro-
cedures to assure the full airing of policy options before agency decision.
Given agency-forcing statutes, however, this focus on agency pro-
cedures-although still important-is no longer sufficient. The classic
judicial concern with a full policy airing must also inform the court's
approach to problems that arise in the interpretation of the agency-
forcing statutes themselves. Agency-forcing statutes should be read in
the light of the principle of full inquiry-requiring the fullest possible
agency inquiry into competing policy approaches consistent with the
text of the agency-forcing statute.
378
To make this principle more precise, distinguish several kinds of
statutory interventions within the agency-forcing category. The first,
and most modest, statute simply forces the agency to focus decision-
making attention on a particular question, the desirability of scrubbing
for example, rather than the countless other policy questions that might
have occupied its time.37 9 In contrast to this agenda-forcing function,
more aggressive statutes aim to give a particular policy solution special
salience in the agency's deliberations-call this solution forcing. Vocabu-
lary taken from the law of evidence can help analyze these more ag-
gressive efforts. The most modest statute might simply allocate the
burden of coming forward380 without affecting the ultimate burden of
persuasion. For example, Congress might instruct the EPA to select
the full-scrubbing option if it could not generate a credible techno-
cratic analysis to inform its deliberations. More active legislative in-
volvement comes through shifting the burden of persuasion.381 The
agency might be instructed to accept full scrubbing unless it is per-
378. Cf. Blumrosen, Toward Eifective Administration of New Regulatory Statutes, 29
AD. L. Rv. 87, 89-100 (1977) (agency administrators should be required to construe
reform legislation broadly).
379. Many of the Clean Air Act's sections carrying statutory deadlines fall into this
category. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7409(d)(1) (Supp. II 1978) (duty to review NAAQS at least
once every 5 years); id. § 7411(b)(1)(B) (duty to review NSPS); id. § 7422 (duty to review
health effects of certain unregulated pollutants); id. § 7408(c) (duty to review air quality
criteria and revise criteria for NO,).
380. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78g(a)-(b) (1976) (Federal Reserve Board may set margin
requirements for securities purchases lower or higher than congressional standard if appro-
priate in light of general credit situation).
381. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 655(a) (1976) (requiring Secretary of Labor to promulgate
"national consensus standard" or "established Federal standard" as occupational safety
or health standard "unless he determines that the promulgation of such a standard would
not result in improved safety or health for specifically designated employees"); 15 U.S.C.
§ 2605(e) (1976) (Administrator shall ban polychlorinated biphenyl if not totally enclosed,
unless he finds that use will not present unreasonable risk of injury to health or
environment).
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suaded that the policy is unwise. Finally, the agency-forcing statute may
alter the burden of proof. It may specify that the EPA shall impose
scrubbing unless the agency is convinced beyond all reasonable doubt
that scrubbing is unwise.
38 2
Although these distinctions are familiar, they have not customarily
been invoked in the interpretation of agency-forcing statutes-not least
because the distinctive character of these statutes has been insufficient-
ly appreciated. Yet, having imported these familiar concepts into a new
area, it is possible to define the principle of full inquiry in judicially
manageable terms. In a nutshell, courts should not be quick to read the
more aggressive forms of agency forcing into ambiguous statutory
language. A congressional instruction that may be read simply as an
exercise in agenda forcing should not be escalated into a form of solu-
tion forcing. A statute that may be read as allocating the burden of
coming forward should not be blown up into a congressional judgment
about the burden of persuasion. And so forth. Easy escalation runs the
risk of an Alphonse-Gaston mistake. In contrast, the risk of error in-
volved in an interpretive policy of deescalation is far smaller. Suppose,
for example, that Congress "really" intended to shift the burden of
proof on scrubbing while the courts interpret the statute to require
only agenda forcing. If, in response, the Administrator finds scrubbing
a wrongheaded policy, this will merely force Congress to focus more
seriously than it might otherwise on the hard facts that lie beneath the
pretty symbols.
383
A similar perception lies at the core of Judge Leventhal's landmark
decision in International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus. 384 Congress had
ordered the automakers to reduce automobile emissions by 1975, but
allowed the Administrator to defer this legislative solution by one year
if the carmakers satisfied four stringent criteria. 38 5 The Administrator
denied the companies' request for a deferral, relying on a restrictive
382. Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(c) (Supp. II 1978) (requiring promulgation of three-hour
standard for nitrogen oxide unless the administrator finds "no significant evidence that
such a standard for such a period is requisite to protect public health").
383. The House has approved of the use of full inquiry to promote fuller use of
agency expertise. See H.R. R P. No. 1013, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1974] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. Naws 3281, 3292 (voicing House approval of Judge Leventhal's interven-
tion in International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973)).
384. 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973); see South Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646, 665-
67 (Ist Cir. 1974) (setting aside EPA-promulgated transportation control plan for Boston
area due to insufficient justification of standards).
385. Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, sec. 6(a), § 202(b)(5)(D)(i)-(iv),
84 Stat. 1676 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7521(b)(5)(C)(i)-(iv) (Supp. II 1978)) (setting
forth criteria).
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view of the range of inquiry that the statute permitted him.38 6 This was
unacceptable to Judge Leventhal, who detected the risk that a decision
with serious impact on the nation's economy was being generated by
an Alphonse-Gaston process. Rather than run this risk, Leventhal in-
terpreted the statute as requiring a broader administrative inquiry.387
The principle of full inquiry develops Leventhal's insight into the risks
of agency forcing into a more general guideline-preventing the agency
from arbitrarily constricting the range of policy choices left open
by the statutory text.
In the present case, the principle of full inquiry requires a strong
remand to the EPA for further consideration. Rather than interpreting
section 111 as an agenda-forcing provision, the EPA read it as a strong
form of solution forcing. The agency only considered whether some
plants should be permitted to scrub less than others; it completely
failed to consider whether it would be both cheaper and environ-
mentally sounder to permit plants to dispense with scrubbing entirely
and meet the NSPS by burning low sulfur coal.
Yet, as we have shown, a reading of the statutory text hardly required
this narrow focus. Not only is the Administrator explicitly required to
consider costs, but the statutory text gives no indication of a solution-
forcing intention. 388 The new amendment to section 111 merely
changes the form of EPA regulation, requiring the agency to set per-
centage treatment requirements for coal burning. Although this new
formal requirement certainly counts as agenda forcing, it violates the
principle of full inquiry to permit the agency to promote it into the
strongest form of solution forcing by excluding low sulfur coal, without
analysis, from the range of policy options.
B. The Principle of Textual Priority
At this point, the court will confront a characteristic difficulty. The
partisans of the policies behind the agency-forcing statute will try, as
best they can, to inflate the proportions of their legislative victory.
Rather than directing agency attention in a particular direction, they
naturally wish to portray the decision as if it had been completely re-
solved by Congress. Moreover, given the extremely weak controls im-
posed on the content of committee reports, they will often be in a posi-
tion to make legislative history for themselves in ways that move far
386. See International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 624 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
387. See id. at 633-41.
388. See pp. 1508-10 supra.
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beyond a minimalist interpretation of the statutory language.38 9 How
should courts view such committee room triumphs?
They should ignore the committee report and read the text of the
statute in the minimalist fashion prescribed by the principle of full
inquiry. It is only by insisting on explicit statutory language that courts
can assure themselves that the committee report represents more than
a successful effort by a handful of insiders to exploit the overloaded
congressional docket.390 The regular application of this principle of
textual priority will, over time, bring home to the staff and lobbyists
on Capitol Hill that there is only one way to force an agency to do their
bidding-and that is to engage in the full debate traditionally associated
with explicit statutory amendment. Textual priority is especially im-
portant in the interpretation of a large and complex statute like the
Clean Air Act. Such statutes have their own distinctive architecture-
with a few basic principles motivating the often intricate gTound plan.
Although particular agency-forcing provisions may sometimes explicitly
require regulators to depart from basic statutory purposes, courts should
not destroy the statutory ground plan on the basis of subterranean
legislative history.
The present case provides a textbook example of the dangers to
democratic principle that flow from the abuse of legislative history. In
1977, the clean air-dirty coal lobby would have vastly preferred a single
statutory phrase commanding full scrubbing to a ream of legislative
history in praise of "locally available" coal. The reason the lobby
settled for less is that it feared it would lose if it went for broke. More-
over, such fears seem perfectly rational when the 45 to 44 Senate victory
of section 125 is recalled. Here was a section that explicitly authorized
the use of scrubbing for the protection of Eastern coal; yet, although
it was hedged about with all sorts of checks, it gained the narrowest
of victories. This fact speaks louder than ten thousand words of legisla-
tive history. If it was so hard to gain the largely symbolic relief for
Eastern coal promised by section 125, why should a court presume that
Congress "intends" the expenditure of tens of billions of dollars when
this intention has not yet achieved clear expression in the text of
section 111?
389. Although we do not wish to approve the mechanistic approach to textual analysis
recently favored by the District of Columbia Circuit in Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 606
F.2d 1068 (D.C. Cir. 1979), the decision does represent a turn away from casual reliance
on low-level legislative history; to that extent, it does support the principle presented here.
390. In the words of Justice Frankfurter, "[]oose judicial reading makes for loose
legislative writing." Frankfurter, supra note 116, at 545.
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To endow our point with the dignity of a platitude: the basic pur-
pose of the Clean Air Act is to clean the air.391 Reading the "new"
section 111 as an agenda-forcing statute will serve this basic purpose,
encouraging EPA to invest more of its resources in sensitive long-range
planning. Reading section 111 as if it were a solution-forcing statute
will, in contrast, subvert the basic purpose of the Act. Instead of clean-
ing the air, such a reading requires the Administrator to bail out
the producers of polluting products. When confronted with a clear
affirmation of this policy, as in section 125, both agencies and courts
may have no choice but to give way. In the absence of a clear statutory
text, however, neither agency nor court should read section 111 as
encouraging a massive bailout for sectional interests.
C. The Coordination Principle
Agency forcing not only raises distinctive problems of congressional-
administrative coordination but also places special pressures on the
executive branch. Forcing an issue onto one agency's agenda will
predictably generate ripple effects as other agencies respond to the
agency forced into action. These responses, in turn, impose pres-
sures on the White House to help shape the congressional initiative
into a policy that gives due regard to the missions of other agencies
that may be sacrificed by too narrow an inquiry. As a consequence,
an agency may find itself awkwardly placed between a congressional
directive, on the one hand, and an executive mandate, on the other.
Such contretemps can obviously raise constitutional issues. 392 Yet
before a court forces a confrontation to this level, it first should search
for a plausible statutory interpretation that renders it unnecessary.
This search may prove especially rewarding in the agency-forcing con-
text. After all, in refraining from specifying a final solution, Congress
itself has recognized the need for further agency study. And if agency
analysis reveals a sharp conflict with the goals of other agencies-goals
that Congress has also recognized in other statutes-courts should not
be quick to say that the agency-forcing statute forbids policymakers
to take these competing goals into account. Otherwise, a narrowly fo-
cused statutory directive may undermine policies that Congress might
well have valued more highly if it had fully appreciated the effect of
its agency-forcing mandate. This principle of coordination is particu-
391. See 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1) (Supp. II 1978).
392. See generally Bruff, Presidential Power and Administrative Rulemaking, 88 YALE
L.J. 451, 498-508 (1979).
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larly appropriate when reading statutes, like the Clean Air Act, that
explicitly require interagency cooperation.
3 3
From this point of view, the present case permits an especially easy
application of the principle of coordination. On some occasions this
principle might suggest that a court require an agency to undertake
the bureaucratically difficult task of considering a legislative goal far
removed from its ordinary mission. In the present case, however, this
was not the nub of the White House's complaint about EPA conduct.
Instead, the RARG report focused upon the agency's failure to bring
to bear its environmental expertise upon the problem at hand. In es-
sence, RARG was saying that before the EPA imposed a multibillion
dollar burden on the congressionally approved goal of energy indepen-
dence, it should, at the very least, show how this would yield a better
environment. 30 4 Rather than deploying its expertise to coordinate pol-
icy in this minimal way, the EPA responded by reading section 111 in a
way that made environmental sophistication unnecessary. Although this
reading is untenable under the first two principles of statutory inter-
pretation, the court should look upon the RARG report as an in-
dication that the EPA's question-begging analysis generated real prob-
lems of coordination in the executive branch; and that, when the issue
returns to the agency, it should make a good faith effort to discharge
its statutory obligation to take costs "into consideration" in the only
sensible way-by trying to define the net costs of the scrubber when
it is compared to alternative ways of achieving the same environ-
mental objectives. More particularly, the court should encourage the
EPA to make use of its latent expertise and consider the possibility
that there are cheaper, quicker, and more certain ways of responding
to the only environmental problem that would remotely justify forced
scrubbing-the risks that sulfates, not sulfur dioxides, pose to Eastern
health and ecology as well as to Western visibility.
393. 42 U.S.C. § 7417(c) (Supp. II 1978).
394. Cf. Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 387 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974) (EPA should consider cost-benefit studies submitted to it);
Kennecott Copper Corp. v. EPA, 462 F.2d 846, 850 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (requirement that
EPA supply sufficiently detailed explanation of basis of promulgated standard for court
to review). The agency, in its promulgation, offered no response even to the crude ex-
posure index developed by RARG. See 44 Fed. Reg. 33,602-08 (1979). We do not mean to
suggest that the EPA pretend to a clear understanding of pollutant effects where only
uncertainty exists. It seems clear, though, that even given current limits to scientific
knowledge, the EPA could offer a far more coherent explanation of what it hopes to
accomplish with the new NSPS than it has to date. Such an explanation would pre-
sumably begin by focusing on desired health and ecological effects, not meaningless com-
parisons of nationwide emissions of SO.2. See pp. 1515-36 supra.
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D. Beyond Formalistic Review
Our case study suggests an additional ground for judicial interven-
tion. Although the agency responded to the evolving controversy in
creative procedural ways, it could have imposed even more stringent
formalisms on the process we have described. For one thing, the heavy
reliance on dry scrubbing was hardly anticipatable from a careful read-
ing of the September notice of proposed rulemaking. Perhaps, then, the
EPA should be required to reissue a new proposal and go through
another round of comment? Similarly, the agency's treatment of a host
of "outsiders," ranging in substantive views from Senator Byrd to
Secretary Andrus, might be challenged and any number of new
formalisms proposed.395 We believe, however, that the judges should
resist these familiar temptations. Although some minimal procedural
forms are necessary to assure fairness, their proliferation will have very
unfortunate consequences.
To glimpse the first danger, consider the relative innocence with
which the EPA viewed the scrubbing problem at the time it filed its
September notice in the Federal Register. At that point, the agency
had only begun to redeem a decade's neglect. While the computers
were humming, the results had not yet been assimilated. Now imagine
that Administrator Costle had known, in September, that he would
be obliged to go through yet another round of notice-and-comment rule-
making if the September-January round actually generated some new
insights and proposals. Would he have authorized the Planning Office
to proceed with its modeling activity? After all, there is always one
way to assure that nothing new will come out of a rulemaking proceed-
ing, and that is to refuse to invest analytic resources in the learning
process. Agency learning should not be penalized when it actually un-
covers something new. There are enough temptations to ignore eco-
nomic and ecological realities without the law making learning costly.
Yet the threat to agency learning is only one half of the price of
undue formalism. Paradoxically, formalism will also endanger the very
values of fair notice and effective participation it seeks to assure. At
present, EPA officials often meet with outsiders at both technical and
policymaking levels, getting new ideas and informally gauging response
395. Participants in the rulemaking have argued that Senator Byrd's meeting with
agency officials was improper both because it constituted a prohibited ex parte contact,
see Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 57 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1030
(1972), and because it allowed the Senator to influence the rulemaking by use of political
pressure, see D.C. Fed'n of Civic Ass'ns v. Volpe, 459 F.2d 1231, 1245-46 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (in-
validating administrator's decision based partially on political pressure). For the EPA's
response to these arguments, see 45 Fed. Reg. 8214-15 (1980).
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to possible regulatory initiatives. A formalistic approach to "outside
intervention" would jeopardize this rich set of informal contacts, de-
stroying a vital supplement to the inevitably inadequate publications
in the Federal Register. The National Coal Association, for example,
was able to intervene effectively in the NSPS decision because of the
informal notice-and-comment mechanism evolving at the EPA. Rather
than hiding behind the formal closing of the comment period and re-
fusing to discuss the impacts of its chosen standard on an important
industry, the EPA allowed the NCA, in the presence of its opponents,
to advance its coal preclusion argument. An agency that responds in
this creative fashion should not be subject to Monday morning quarter-
backing from the bench.
We take a similar view of even the most dramatic forms of "outside
intervention" revealed by our case study. Although we believe it was
wrong for the agency to cave in to Senator Byrd, this is not because a
few officials actually spoke to the Senator in the White House. A
similar meeting, after all, could have been arranged by inviting EPA
staff to testify before the Senate Committee on Environment and
Public Works, which is chaired by the other Senator from West Vir-
ginia.396 In any event, the Administrator would undoubtedly know
the opinion of the Senate majority leader on an issue of such impor-
tance to his home state.
Moreover, so long as one concedes the relevance of the legislative
history, Senator Byrd had a good point: was the EPA, in proposing a
low ceiling, doing all it could in the name of "locally available" coal?
If the question is legally relevant, we can think of nobody more appro-
priate to raise it than the Senator from West Virginia.39 7 Because the
Senator's meetings were entered in the docket, everyone had notice of
their existence.
3 98
396. In fact, Congressmen questioned EPA officials, sometimes quite sharply, on several
occasions about NSPS during hearings held while the rulemaking studied here was still
in progress. See, e.g., Executive Branch Review of Environmental Regulations: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Environmental Pollution of the Senate Comm. on Environment
and Public Works, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 252-53 (1979) (statement of Douglas Costle) (answer-
ing question critical of protecting Eastern coal); Cost of Government Regulations to the
Consumer: Hearings Before the Subcomm. for the Consumer of the Senate Comm. on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 323-26 (1978) (statement of
Walter C. Barber) (answering questions critical of sludge produced by scrubbers).
Courts have traditionally been reluctant to reverse administrative decisions on the basis
of exchanges between administrative officials and Congressmen in their official capacities.
See, e.g., American Pub. Gas Ass'n v. Federal Power Comm'n, 567 F.2d 1016, 1067-69 (D.C.
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 907 (1978); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 563
F.2d 588, 610-11 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1062 (1978). But see Pillsbury Co.
v. FTC, 354 F.2d 952 (5th Cir. 1966).
397. Except perhaps the Senators from Ohio.
398. The EPA contended both before and after the meeting with Senator Byrd that
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The problem with Byrd's intervention was not procedural but sub-
stantive. It was simply another battle in the war begun by the clean
air-dirty coal lobby in 1976 to escalate its carefully drafted legislative
history into law. The agency was wrong to give it heed for the same
reason it was wrong to allow the committee report rhetoric to narrow
its scrubbing inquiry. The capitulation to a powerful Senator only
dramatizes the danger of moving beyond the text of an agency-forcing
statute.399
The court's main concern should not be with the NGA presentation
or the Senator's protest but with the EPA's narrow conception of its
mission. Section 111 did not force a solution on the EPA. It only re-
quired that the agency give the scrubber high priority on its decision-
making agenda. Congress intended the agency to use its expertise to
determine whether the scrubber made environmental sense given its
costs. The agency's last minute capitulation to Senator Byrd was only
a symptom of its larger failing to discharge its planning functions. It
was not incorrect for the Administrator to speak with members of the
body that supervised his exercises in policymaking. Criticism is properly
due the agency for failing to relate its scrubbing decision to what the
Act plainly requires: cleaning the air in a cost-effective way that yields
real environmental benefits.
We should be clear about what we have not been saying. At no point
have we suggested that the courts should take primary responsibility
for the development of substantive policy under the Act. Instead, the
objective of judicial review remains as it was under the classical New
Deal conception-to assure a full and focused airing of plausible policy
options before officials make decisions of consequence. 40 0 The move
beyond the New Deal agency requires, however, that courts delicately
calibrate Congress-agency relationships to prevent mindless decision-
making. Careful employment of the three maxims of full inquiry,
its actions were designed to be consistent with Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d
9, 57 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977). See Executive Branch Review of
Environmental Regulations: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Environmental Pollution
of the Senate Comm. on Environment and Public Works, subra note 396, at 242 (state-
ment of Douglas Costle); 45 Fed. Reg. 8214-15 (1980) (denying petitions for reconsidera-
tion). The fact that the EPA recorded a significant number of ex parte contacts in the
rulemaking docket tends to support this assertion.
399. It is also rumored that Senator Byrd threatened to vote against the SALT II
treaty if the EPA did not retreat to a 1.2 ceiling. We have found no hard evidence to
support this rumor and our analysis makes it unnecessary for the court of appeals to give
it any weight. Even if Byrd did not make this threat and restricted himself to arguments
on behalf of Eastern coal, the agency was wrong to give way before him. Until Eastern
coal succeeds in revising the statutory text, its interests are not entitled to special prom-
inence in the Administrator's comprehensive analysis of the costs of the NSPS decision.
400. Cf. Kennecott Copper Corp. v. EPA, 462 F.2d 846, 850 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (requiring
sufficiently reasoned explanation of basis of standards for informed judicial review).
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textual priority, and coordination will avoid needless and costly dis-
appointments resulting from the effort to venture beyond New Deal
ideals.
Applied to the present case, these principles suggest a strong remand
to the Administrator. On reconsideration, he should not take the as-
serted threat to Eastern coal as a reason for requiring scrubbing. Nor
should he ignore RARG's insistence that before the agency imposes
the multibillion-dollar cost of scrubbing on the American people, it
should point to environmental benefits that remotely justify the
burden.
VI. Ends and Means in Administrative Law
The ultimate question raised by our case study is the wisdom of the
Clean Air Act's effort to move beyond the New Deal ideal. The story
we have told serves as an ironic tribute to discarded New Deal virtues.
The Act discarded the idea that policymaking should be insulated
from direct congressional intervention. But instead of providing a solu-
tion responsive to the evolving will of a national majority, congressional
intervention mixed clean air symbols and dirty coal self-interest in a
way that invites cynicism about democratic self-government. The Act
rejected the idea that responsible policymaking required a careful
sifting of the facts so that regulatory means will be carefully crafted to
achieve desired ends. Yet the legislative affirmation of technology
forcing only raises doubts about technology's ability to answer our
ecological predicament.
The Clean Air Amendments of 1970 went wrong not in their basic
diagnosis, but in the particular cure prescribed for the disease. In
1970, the country was ready for an aggressive effort to reduce pollution.
Environmentalists correctly saw the need to ensure that administrative
inaction did not sabotage this effort. The innovative idea of agency
forcing responded to this need.
Agency forcing can proceed in two ways, however, and it was in this
choice that the congressional cure turned on itself. In "means-oriented"
agency forcing, Congress takes the agency by the hand andtells it
precisely which regulatory means to use to reach stated policy objec-
tives. The congressional approach toward new coalburners, which
gave undeserved prominence to high-technology solutions, reflects this
means-oriented approach. Under the contrasting form of agency forcing,
Congress requires the agency to define its ends aggressively and to take
those steps that promise to reach those goals effectively. This approach
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was taken by sections 108 and 109 of the Act, 401 requiring the Ad-
ministrator to establish ambient air quality standards "to protect the
public health" and establishing 1977 as the date by which the United
States was to reach these initial clean air objectives. Unlike its com-
petitor, "ends-oriented" agency forcing does not require Congress to
indulge in instrumental judgments of a kind far beyond its capacity.
Instead, ends forcing generates a process that clarifies the ultimate aims
of environmental policy.
Consider, for example, the way in which Congress' ends-oriented
exercise of 1970 was rewarded in 1977 by increased sophistication in the
specification of environmental aims. By 1977 the Administrator's efforts
to specify air quality objectives and to prod the states into speedy com-
pliance had generated some simple, but important, lessons. First, the
original congressional effort to specify objectives had failed to consider
the peculiar values at stake in the clean air regions. Thus, 1977 became
an occasion for clarifying new objectives for environmental policy.
Second, reaching the old objectives turned out to be far more costly
and difficult than imagined. Thus, 1977 became a time for reappraising
old objectives and deciding how forcefully to pursue them in the future.
The legislative history reveals the seriousness with which Congress
considered the global trade-offs involved in these problems of ends
specification.
402
Contrast this success with the sorry effort in 1977 to engage in means
forcing-which permitted the dirty coal lobby to exploit the technical
incompetence of Congress to further ends peripheral to the main goals
of environmental law. Although there is no undoing the past, surely
we can hope in the future to come to terms with the complexity of
agency forcing-building upon the ends-oriented achievements of the
past while trying to ameliorate the harms generated by the means-
oriented approach. From an ecological point of view, a pound of pollu-
tion is a pound of pollution, regardless of the age of the polluter. Means-
oriented agency forcing should not be allowed to generate a never-
never world where this basic ecological fact is obscured from view. A
long-term strategy for new plants must be combined with a short-term
strategy allowing polluters to trade off costly technology in new plants
against cutbacks in pollution coming from old plants. Although this
401. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7408-7409 (Supp. II 1978).
402. See, e.g., Senate Hearings-1977 Amendments, supra note 10, at vi-xxi (1977) (sum-
mary of testimony prepared by Congressional Research Service); 1977 House Hearings,
supra note 95, at 240-62 (statement of Carl M. Shy, American Lung Association) (focusing
on health effects of various pollutants); id. at 1250-1329 (statements of representatives of
numerous industry organizations focusing largely on question of Act's proper ends).
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"offset" principle has already gained some statutory recognition, 403
courts should support the EPA efforts to make offsets operational and
to broaden their application to new plants.404 By emphasizing the trade-
off between old and new plants, the EPA will save money while ed-
ucating Congress to the hazards of means-oriented agency forcing.
In addition, Congress must build upon its genuinely valuable exer-
cises in ends-oriented agency forcing. We must learn to look with a
critical eye upon instructions, like that found in section 109, to set
ambient air standards in a way that "protect[s] the public health"
while "allowing an adequate margin of safety ... ." Such vague formu-
lae represent the unhappy legacy of a New Deal past that too readily
delegated basic value choices to bureaucratic "experts." Rather than
speaking vaguely of the "public health," the task is to define clear and
operational goals through the democratic process and then challenge
the experts to meet these goals in a fair and efficient fashion by a date
certain.405
Imagine, for example, an amendment that required the Adminis-
trator to "achieve ambient air quality improvements that promise to
add at least 25,000 years to the life expectancies of the American
people by 1984." Such a statute would have forced agency action of
a kind very different from the sort described in our case study. To
begin, the statute would have forced agency policymakers to ask
themselves which of countless possible regulatory initiatives could
403. Section 173 of the Act allows continued economic growth in areas that have not
attained clean air targets by allowing the construction of a new plant on the condition
that the plant obtain offsetting emission reductions from existing plants in the area. 42
U.S.C. § 7503(1)(A) (Supp. II 1978).
404. Most recently the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit sustained
the EPA's decision to allow offsets between different facilities within the same plant as
part of the agency's "bubble" concept. See Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 606 F.2d 1068
(D.C. Cir. 1979).
Prior to Alabama Power Co., a majority of a panel of the same circuit concluded that
the EPA had the authority to authorize offsets between facilities of the same plant, even
though it had not used that authority properly in the case before it. ASARCO, Inc. v.
EPA, 578 F.2d 319, 330-31 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (Leventhal, J., concurring, and MacKinnon, J.,
dissenting). Judge Leventhal's opinion in ASARCO is an instructive example of the
agency-forcing principles outlined above. Judge Leventhal's approach first required the
Administrator to use the agency's expertise to identify situations in which innovative
plans like an offset policy would further underlying statutory goals, such as reducing
emissions from modified sources in a way that best took costs into account. In ASARCO
itself, Judge Leventhal found that the EPA had not made a full enough inquiry into the
merits of an offset policy to justify its use. See id. at 331. Importantly, however, Judge
Leventhal found textual authority, under § 1ll(b)(2), for the use of offsets between fa-
cilities of the same plant if sufficient study occurs, and thus offered the possibility of more
far-reaching innovations.
405. Although their particular proposals are different, the need for more operational
targets in the Clean Air Act is also emphasized by J. KaiER & E. URSIN, POLLUTION AND
Ponicy 327-45 (1977).
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plausibly be related to the "25,000 life-year" goal. As soon as the matter
was framed in this way, decisionmakers would become acutely aware of
the state of our ignorance about the health effects of air pollution. Yet
the fact that the statute would require the agency to engage in high-
visibility guesswork is not an argument against ends-oriented agency
forcing. To the contrary, this is its greatest institutional strength for
two reasons. First, with the need for guessing on the table, it may no
longer be so embarrassing to admit that some guesses have turned out
wrong. To take an example from our case study, it is now conventional
wisdom within the agency staff that SO 4 , not SO2, should be the sulfur
oxide of primary concern. Nonetheless, thanks to the freezing of hard
variables, it is not clear when-if ever-this recognition will be fully
reflected in the ambient standards that purportedly protect "the public
health." In contrast, new bureaucratic incentives would emerge under
the 25,000-years approach. Here, if there were reason to argue that
S04 control would help the agency present Congress a better progress
report in 1984, there would be increased incentives to overcome
agency inertia, change the pollution target, and design a program that
may be credibly related to the "25,000 year" target.
Second, high-visibility guesswork would require high policymakers
to take the question of research priorities far more seriously than they
do at present. Whatever may be said about the "myth" of administrative
expertise in other areas, the EPA today has the capacity to launch an
enormously useful research enterprise. And there is no better way to
interest policymakers in the direction of research policy than by link-
ing their reputations to the data that are gathered and analyzed.
Not that ends-oriented agency forcing is offered as a panacea. The
present state of model building, even data monitoring, permits a wide
range for agency discretion. And agencies will use this discretion in
ways that will generate good report cards when the time comes for
congressional oversight. Thus, it is a good bet that if the "25,000 year"
goal had been announced in 1977, the EPA would have found a way
to have its computers declare that its policies had saved far more than
"25,000 years" in 1984. Nonetheless, our case study suggests that it is
better to give an optimistic answer to the right question-what is hap-
pening to the air?-than to engage in a desperate attempt to answer the
wrong question-how well do scrubbers work?
Although ends forcing promises, over time, to improve the quality
of EPA decisionmaking, perhaps its most important contribution will
be to the quality of future congressional deliberation. If the Congress
of 1977 had set the "25,000 year" target, the debate of 1984 would have
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naturally focused upon the ends that had been specified. Agency self-
interest would have motivated an EPA demand for expanded opera-
tional goals, framed, in keeping with the ends-forcing orientation, in
terms of physical discomfort and aesthetic affront. In contrast, groups
representing energy users would have banded together to weaken the
goals. Rather than inviting bizarre coalitions between clean air and
dirty coal, the focus on operational goals would have invited a demo-
cratic test of opinion between pro- and anti-environmental forces. 400
Once again, we do not want to paint too rosy a picture. Doubtless
the Senate of 1984 will contain two advocates of the West Virginia coal
mines. Doubtless they will try to exact an "understanding" about scrub-
bing as a condition for aiding the campaign for a "pro-environmental"
specification of EPA ends. Nonetheless, a shift in the form of agency
forcing would focus congressional debate on the issues Congress is most
competent to handle. Rather than indulging in a hurried pseudo-tech-
nocratic judgment about the scrubber, Congress would focus on funda-
mental issues. Are we doing too much or too little in the way of en-
vironmental protection? What real world interests-in terms of health
and other amenities-should be emphasized? How well is the EPA really
doing in meeting its operational goals and setting new objectives that
seem sensible?
It is not enough, however, for Congress to monitor agency per-
formance at regular intervals and set operational goals for the next
septennium. Beyond the next decade, there is the next generation. And
our case study gives eloquent testimony to the ease with which long-
range planning can be sacrificed to meet the middle-range goals set
by Congress. To discharge a minimal obligation to the future, we
must assure that they will have a better understanding of the world
we have bequeathed them. In pursuit of this end, Congress must mas-
sively increase funds for monitoring and modeling the environment.
And at every septennial review, a special branch of the EPA charged
with long-run planning should be invited to focus attention upon the
most salient policy redirections suggested by the direction of scientific
research.40 7 In terms of our present case study, what seems most urgent
406. Moreover, once environmental advocates in Congress began specifying their goals in
operational terms, it is possible that their opponents would respond by specifying their
goals in a like fashion. Thus, instead of a simple requirement to save 25,000 life-years,
our hypothetical statute might read "save 25,000 life-years in 1984 by requiring polluters
to spend no more than $25 billion a year in air pollution control costs." See generally
Regulatory Budgeting and the Need for Cost-Effectiveness in the Regulatory Process: Hear-
ings Before the Joint Economic Comm., 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
407. Congress in 1977 established a National Commission on Air Quality to advise it
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now is a redefinition of the sulfur oxide problem so as to emphasize
sulfates, rather than sulfur dioxides, and the organization of a set of
regional institutions capable of handling the problem of long-range
transport. But it is always possible that ten years more of research will
make this now-conventional wisdom as dated as the EPA's fixation on
SO.- seems today. What is required is a branch of the EPA that does
not see obsolescence as a bureaucratic threat but as a source of institu-
tional power.
Once again, it is more important that this planning branch force
decisionmakers to ask the right questions than to guarantee the "right"
answers. For there are no "right" answers to the ultimate questions of
environmental policy-only questions that breed more questions.
We do not mean to be too harsh in our judgment of the congressional
draftsmen of 1970 or 1977. Even today, the hard work required to design
a workable form of ends-oriented agency forcing is yet to be done. En-
couraging signs can be seen, however, in Congress, 408 the Executive, 409
and academia. 410 Given its experience with New Deal agencies, Congress
was sensible to try to force aggressive agency action with the crude tools
at its disposal. Like our predecessors, however, we too should try to
learn from our mistakes and hope that our future blunders will be as
fruitful as theirs were.
before the Act returns for revision. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, § 313, 42 U.S.C.
§ 7623 (Supp. II 1978). As a result of the leisurely appointment of commissioners, the
panel is off to a slow start, and it is too early to assess its work.
408. See, e.g., Regulatory Budgeting and the Need for Cost-Effectiveness in the Regula-
tory Process: Hearings Before the Joint Economic Comm., supra note 406; SEN. COMM. ON
GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS, supra note 28.
409. See, e.g., REGULATORY REFORM: MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT, H.R. Doc. No.
80, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
410. See, e.g., Breyer, Analyzing Regulatory Failure: Mismatches, Less Restrictive Al-
ternatives, and Reform, 92 HARV. L. REV. 549 (1979); C. DeMuth, Regulatory Costs and the
'*Regulatory Budget" (Dec. 1979) (unpublished Faculty Project on Regulation, John F.
Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University). For a small sampling of the many
projects now in progress, see E. BARDACH & R. KAGAN, THE INSPECTORATE (forthcoming,
provisional title); R. Litan & W. Nordhaus (forthcoming work on regulatory reform).
This concluding section is developed further in our book-length treatment, which
speculates more broadly on the links between institutional frameworks and the structure
of political coalitions. See our CLEAN MR/DRTY COAL, chap. 8 (forthcoming, Yale University
Press).
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